https://youtubetranscript.com/?v=qknAL5R_1Gc
Yeah, so what we were talking about just before we started recording was this notion that the C-19 is implicating perhaps all of the meta-crisis. Certainly from my point of view, since I spend most of my time looking at it from the point of view of the systemic side of it, I can say with confidence it’s implicating all the different aspects of the systemic side. I think it’s also enacting, I mean Chris and I were talking about this, Chris, Master, Pietro and I, it’s also sort of triggering aspects of the meaning crisis in powerful ways for people too. It makes sense. So I’m interested in learning in this conversation what’s happening, like how that shows up and even what the flow back through is, because I think it’s crucial to grasp that. It’s funny, I do actually keep seeing the right and left hemispheres. I don’t know if that’s useful. So what we had talked about was I’m right now doing work on trying to put together or formulate a form of decentralized collective intelligence, distributed cognition that is appropriate to the scope, and by the way, pace of this particular phenomenon. Yeah, I think keeping both of those in mind is important, scope and pace. So to kind of, not to recapitulate, but to capitulate, what I’m seeing on my end is, I mean first order is that there’s a bunch of different systems that are clearly implicated in each other. So for example, the primary system in C19 is obviously at the medical level. We have a specific organism that has specific characteristics in relationships with the human organism. And then of course it has its own characteristics interior to itself. So what its mutation rate might look like, what its molecular structure is that gives rise to the characteristics of how long it stays viable on surface, all that stuff. So you’ve got that at the concrete level, and then you have the relationship between the virus and the human being. And when you look at that, that particular dynamic, what you have is a cloud of possibilities that have different weightings. So we have increasing data coming in. So right now we’re in a high uncertainty phase, much less than we were a month ago, but still high uncertainty around terms that have now become commonplace, things like the infection rate or the doubling rate or the R0 and mortality or case implications and impacts on different characteristics, the relationship between the virus and different human characteristics. And then we have already begun the process of looking at it from the point of view of systemic impacts. And so it’s now pretty evident. Sorry, let me back up. So going forward, from this point forward, obviously we’re walking in a place of epistemological uncertainty. So what I will tend to do is I will take a particular set of hypotheses, which looks to visual to me looks like a tunnel, and it has a certain diameter based upon its probability. And I’ll walk down that hypothesis as if that is reality. But then I can back all the way back out and shift and walk down another one. Sure. And of course, you can always do a depth first versus breadth first. So one approach might be to start mapping out a whole bunch of different tunnels. So you’ve got a sense of what the landscape looks like. Another approach is to drill down a tunnel so you get a sense of how your thought process needs to inquire into how your inquiry has to evolve as you actually discover more detailed nuance around a particular tunnel. So one of the characteristics that I think started getting a lot of investigation, it started showing up more broadly in the collective sense making, in the last week, was the relationship between the robustness of a medical system and both the virality and impact of the virus. So for example, in Korea, where the medical system has a very high robustness around testing, they can and are choosing to test significantly. This is tending to show up as a reduction in the viral expansion because they’re doing a very good job of identifying who in fact is carrying what at what level and therefore able to do a better job of a more precise and more effective quarantine. It appears to be. Equally, if you take a look at what happened in the distinction between the impact of the mortality rates as a proxy for impact between Huawei and other Chinese regions, the overwhelm of the medical system, the overwhelm of doctors and nurses getting exhausted and or sick, the overwhelm of hospital beds being filled, the overwhelm of equipment being depleted and or fully used seems to be deeply related to the differential in impact. And so once you hit a, if you sort of say there’s a human being without any capacity for medical intervention, it looks like you’re looking at maybe a 5% mortality rate. And by the way, the variance on what I just said is quite wide. It may be much higher than that, by the way. Humans just natural in nature. And then as you apply medical intervention, you can drop that all the way down into what looks like about a 0.12, 0.17. What that means is that the variance between those two is going to be the degree to which the medical system is resilient or robust vis-a-vis the caseload that it has to carry. So if you’ve got 100 patients and you can handle 300, then you would expect and you’ve got a medical, you know, first world medical system, you would expect to see the total impact be closer to 0.17, maybe even lower. If you’ve got 10,000 patients can handle 200, you might see the total mortality rates being up in the 5% range. Right. And in demo. Right. So then you’re looking at, so you’ve got now a third variable. You’ve got the actual specific characteristics of the virus. That virus is relationship with the humanity. Then you’ve got those two now in the context of the robustness of the medical response. And here, medical response, including all the different characteristics like the Chinese capacity of the government to choose and then to actively implement quite draconian quarantine is part of the medical response. Right. So then I’m going to take another step further afield, which we’re seeing in Iran. And it seems plausible. We could see more broadly, which is potentially degradation of the choice making capacity of the governance mechanism. We have this interesting characteristic that this is a pretty highly viral. It spreads quickly or it can spread broadly and seems to be a pretty penetrative of the attack rate, meaning that if you’re exposed to it, the likelihood that you will catch it is reasonably high. And it disproportionately impacts people above certain ages and with certain immune responses and certain characteristics, which happens to identify leadership in almost every country. Yes. Yeah. And particularly during an election year, when our current leadership is spending a lot of time shaking hands and kissing babies and interacting with each other, it doesn’t take much to actually see this exploding into the leadership. Yeah. In fact, in some sense, we might already be seeing that we might already be in the leading edge of it, which would then lead to a potential degradation in choice making. And if you imagine in Iran, they’re already showing signs of government. The government is actually losing its ability to drive effectively because more and more of leadership is actually off the board, off their capacity to engage in distributed cognition, which creates another feedback loop. And so if you say, OK, the Chinese capacity to perceive and choose to make these draconian quarantines and then to effectively execute on it is premised not only on the typology of Chinese governance in general, which we don’t have, but also on the availability of that governance to propagate down through the system, given the health, the well-being and the structure itself. So that’s a fourth variable. And then another one that’s showing up, I think, increasingly, and it’s interesting because people’s different backgrounds, it gives them a perspective. And then if they follow their perspective and feed it back up into the larger complex system, you can get this great information, which is pivoting very strongly, initially away from the medical side into the socioeconomic side. Sure. We’re already now beginning to see real impacts, like measurable impacts across a wide variety of different industries of the freezing up of the Chinese supply. Yeah. So the supply chain in China has been impacted, that’s percolated through and even relatively prosaic institutions like, say, restaurants are showing real blockages in availability of materials. Also, Iran, my partner is Persian and in Toronto, a lot of the Iranian restaurants are shutting down because people are coming back from traveling in Iran and they’re bringing back the virus or the threat of the virus. That whole section of the economy is shutting down. I mean, I’m actually going to actually block that as more of the demand side. But yes, that’s happening, too. So we’ve got one is the supply side is percolating up. And the other is we’re now particularly in the first world getting the demand side, which, of course, the first world is where most of the demand comes from. And it’s happening across the board. So entertainment events are shutting down, canceling big ones, small ones. I mean, the Olympics is probably going to be next. South by Southwest is probably going to be turned off. Restaurants, particularly restaurants that within the epistemological sense making tend to be proximal to danger, like Italian restaurants, Persian, Chinese. But it’s spreading more rapidly. Even Corona beer, even Corona beer. Yeah, even a small semantic relationship. Yeah. Travel is getting completely shut down. And of course, that and that and that and that percolates out. So if we look at it from the macro level and now analysis are coming out on this front, I just there’s a white paper sitting on my desk. I thought I haven’t read through that came out of Australia that I think is got some good data on this. Now, if you have, you know, if I have a healthy person, their immune system is X, right? In response to the virus. But now if I’ve got somebody who is a stressed or has lost their job or can’t pay their rent or can’t afford to buy resources to take care of themselves, then I’m I’m I’m decreasing their resistance, the embedded resistance, the sociological level increases. Not even just the biological resistance, right? When you do that, you’re putting them into scarcity situations, the cognitive flexibility, their ability to properly rationally direct their own behavior degenerates as well. Right. Yes. Yeah. So actually, now that you say that this is a different factor that I haven’t been able to integrate into the larger sense, which is I’ve noticed that there seems to be like three epistemological positions right now. One is panic. Yeah. One is what I would call anti panic. And the third is what I would call carefulness. Yes. And it’s interesting. Like, I think anti panic is a really interesting piece. Like I hadn’t really thought about it, but it’s very commonplace, which is to not actually be careful, not to not to make a rational sort of portfolio allocation of your choices on the basis of rational risk analysis, but actually to choose an inverted ideological position to panic and therefore make equally irrational choices, but in the exact opposite direction. I’ve been personally wrestling with that. So, okay. So what’s, you know, so I live with my son and, you know, I think it’s highly probable that we will get in some sense locked down. I think that’s much more probable, for example, than we’re, we will likely catch a fatal form of the virus or anything like that. So, you know, we’re putting aside food and stuff like that because of that. But then part of me is thinking, well, it’s a bit of an inner conflict. It’s like, yes, but am I actually making these evaluations or am I just running, just being driven by, you know, accessibility and representativeness bias, you know, because I’m doing all of this, but, you know, getting in my car is still way more dangerous. And I’m still getting in my car every day and I’m still going in the shower, which is also right now more dangerous. Right. And so it’s like, I feel, you see what I’m saying? There’s one sense of which, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Something that comes up. So the way that came to me as you were saying that is something like the, what’s it look like? It’s like an equilibrium state in between risk aversion, risk seeking, and risk neutrality in the context of what you might call low hanging fruit of behavioral change. Yes. For example, both of us being relatively mature adults may recall that there has been a real shift in the relationship between behavior and getting in your car and driving over the past five decades. Yes. I recall as a child seeing a car driving down the road in Texas in the seventies and the person driving it had the windows rolled down because you couldn’t really run the AC because cars would overheat with a beer can in their hand and a cigarette in their other hand, which implies something about how they were driving. I guarantee you no seatbelt. And so over the past five decades, we’ve done things like embody as a basic habit, don’t drink and drive, embody as a basic habit. And whether it’s a habit in the person or the habit in the society enforced by law enforcement doesn’t matter. It’s a basic habit. Wear a seatbelt. So there’s been some kind of seeking of social equilibrium of a novel risk factor automobile that has reached a point of something near a saddle point of these are behaviors that we’re willing to ingest and burden ourselves with in order to seek something which is kind of the easiest low-hanging risk mitigation in relationship to an activity that not doing it kind of bears too much of a cost, something like that. So I get the feeling that basically what we’re all collectively going through is something along those lines in relationship with the pandemic that has some degree of uncertainty of the risk. So it’s like we may find that like this time next year or this time two years from now, everybody has a box of masks and three months of dried goods in their house because it’s just, why not? At the end of the day, the overall cost burden is not any different than wearing a seatbelt during the 99.9997% of the time that you don’t need a seatbelt. We know with the SARS thing, people wearing masks while traveling in Asia is quite common and because it’s not that they could do it. Once you get over the hump where it seems odd, like sort of like, oh, I’m not going to do things that look weird. Once it becomes socially acceptable, why not wear a mask? It reduces my risk by N. Who knows what N is, but the cost is less than N. And so that I do it. I would say with confidence that that’s going to happen. Like there’s going to be a kind of a buildup of autoimmune, like at a social level, sociological autoimmune to pandemics, which is actually a meta question, which is actually kind of neat. Mm-hmm. And useful. That’s useful because I think I remember being part of a working group on virology at SFI, like a decade ago. And it wasn’t just viruses, it was like memes and all kinds of things that spread using this kind of mathematics. But one of the groups that talked about it was actual viruses. And it was quite clear at that point that given the changes in population density and travel and even animal husbandry density, that novel viruses and bacteria were going to happen. And they were going to go pandemic. There was just no question that was going to happen. Questions really when and what were they going to look like? Yeah. So this is sort of an example, and hopefully it’s a relatively lightweight example, of something like that. And so to the degree to which we get a nice trial run as a global civilization of what that looks like, it can be building up some good habits on how to respond, which would be great. So that’s interesting. So that’s sort of a more like a long-term kind of response. It’s the medical response. There’s a cultural shift in terms of people’s background habits that give an overall increase in adaptivity to the risk or the threat. Yeah. It’s like, you know, folks who grew up on the Gulf Coast, Gulf of Mexico, tend to have bottled water and gas generators, because the likelihood of the power going out due to a big storm is high enough that everybody’s kind of culturally aware of it. And so the impact of the power going out in that region is actually not very high, because there’s resilience. So this is interesting, because it gives us kind of an indirect historical method of degree to which a culture is responsive and sensitive to its environment. So if we could measure the dissemination of this habit change, we could actually measure how in tune to its environment a particular culture is. So I imagine there’s going to be variations in this. Some cultures are going to be very good at sort of taking this up. Part of it’s going to be just how much exposure they had to the virus. Part of it’s also going to be a measure of the capacity for a particular culture to pay attention to significant environmental changes requiring fundamental restructuring in people’s habits. Yeah. Yeah. And we might even say also the local structure and the social structure, both. And so maybe that we will see that there’s a certain class of institutional formations that just aren’t responsive enough, that they just move too slowly or too porcelain. So that would actually lead to institutional change. And then there’s obviously things going on at the cultural habit level. Yeah. And what was coming to me then at the meta level there is it seems increasingly likely that the future, the human future, will be one where delta E is higher than we are used to. Yes. Yes, exactly. And so groups or cultures that are more responsive to a higher rate of and impact of change will tend to be more adaptive. I wonder also if people’s background ontology is going to change. I mean, if you start changing habits, you start changing habitats. What I mean by that, if we get a couple of these in relative proximity to each other, the world is suddenly going to seem a very, very dynamically scary place to people. Not that it already wasn’t for many people, but it’s going to be much more so the case for them. And that’s going to challenge a lot of our, I mean, so our capacity to deny certain aspects of the environment, to deny our own mortality are going to be significantly changed. So I’m thinking here of something analogous to what the Black Plague did, right? Really fundamentally altered social structures, altered people’s sense of their mortality, really made them see the world as much more chaotic. It even led to a sort of significant reorientation of our cultural self-image. The will became a much more important faculty than reason, because when the universe is more chaotic, you have to impose your will much more than reason, finding an order that’s already there. That’s why you see will-based philosophies and ideologies like the Nazis emerging in times of significant, where there’s a sense of significant chaos and threat. People say, oh no, no, what really matters is will, not reason. And you can even get, you can even get anti-rational things emerging. And so why I bring that up is that could also be a potential feedback mechanism, because if you get that sort of cultural shift, right, that might actually undermine to some degree the scientific practices we need to have, because we need our science to keep moving very rapidly, because these things are going to keep shifting. I mean, and yes, faster, actually, we need the science to actually move faster. Yes, and I’m going to take it as a fundamental presupposition that there is an important constitutive relationship between science, the growth of science, and the human capacity for being rational. And so if the world becomes scarier, and we see something analogous to what happened in the Black Plague, where we get a shift towards prioritizing, or even the end of the Weimar Republic, we get a shift towards the prioritization of the will, then, and don’t, let’s not forget that at least North American society seems particularly vulnerable to that already right now. We have sort of sensitized people in general to the idea that we can just assert things and make them so. I think that could feed back and seriously undermine the science we’re going to need in order to deal with these viruses. Did that make sense as an argument? Yeah, it does. It was interesting as I can’t empathize with it. I was trying to actually be that person, and I noticed I can’t get there. Right. It’s really interesting. So let me see if I can try that again. Well, I think it’s historically the case. So you’re not denying the history that I’m referring to. No, no, no. I completely, the history is right. I was actually trying to be that person so I could actually proceed from the inside. Right, right. I was trying to become Nazi, like become somebody for whom the response to increasing chaos is a, you know, triumph of the will. Well, so I mean this is chaos, right, in the sense like we were talking about earlier about being overwhelmed, right? So it’s going to bring with it a tinge of horror. It’s going to bring the sense that, you know, Erickson’s idea about sort of fundamental trust in reality, that that gets eroded in a fundamental way. And you can either, what it’s going to seem to you, you have only two options. You can cower or you can fight. Mm-hmm. Because there’s nothing in the world that is unfolding in a predictable manner. It’s so, think about the two things in animals learning. Experimental neurosis and learned helplessness. Okay, so experimental neurosis, the environment becomes unpredictable and the animal becomes very self-destructive, aggressive and bites itself, right? Or the environment becomes predictable. This is the opposite, but it can’t do anything, but it becomes like depressed, right? So I’m saying this is going to be much more like experimental neurosis, right? The environment’s going to be unpredictable and the people are going to react to that with a kind of aggression, a kind of… Yeah, so check this out. So what’s coming to me, the way that showing up is making it very difficult to process is that it’s like, because the rate of change is likely to be so high and so multimodal, the ability to generate an intense vector in any direction is overwhelmed. So it’s kind of like… In adequately choppy waters, a powerboat doesn’t do you any good. Yes. It’s something like that. And so what ends up happening is it’s like this characteristic of the psycho-cultural dynamic ends up… What does it do? Well, it creates… It feels like it just creates noise. It feels like what ends up happening is that if somebody goes in that direction, they actually don’t so much create entropy because there’s already so much entropy in the environment. They just disconnect themselves. Basically, this is a version of turning yourself off. Like you said, it becomes a neurosis where anybody who attaches to that particular modality becomes decreasingly fit so quickly. Well, I think I’m agreeing with that, but I want to put a bit of a twist on it. What you get is sort of the last ditch form of conformity. There’s chaos within, there’s chaos without, and what I’ll do is I’ll just run with that conformity. And I’ll just right and I’ll become a vehicle. I’ll become an instrument of… Oh, is this that we recorded when I talked about panic and anti-panic? I don’t remember. No, we weren’t. Is this anti-panic? Yeah. So what I noticed is that I’ve noticed in the environment, the milieu, there’s almost like three basic dispositions. One disposition is panic. Another disposition is anti-panic, is what I’m calling it. And then third disposition is something like care. In the context of care, there’s of course a whole continuum of ways that people express in care. And that’s based upon their own assessment of the risks and their own disposition about how they relate to risk, which is, that’s all kind of what it is. But panic and anti-panic are very different approaches. These are approaches that seem to be disconnected from endeavoring to make sense of and make good choices in the environment, but are rather commitments to an ideological or non-rational, irrational relationship with reality. So it sounds like what you’re describing is anti-panic is an example of this sort of thing. Yeah. That’s a good way of putting it. Yeah, I think so. I guess what I ended up doing, this was not my intent, but I think maybe we got here, is trying to talk about the way in which this milieu of complexity gets internalized into people and then how that actually shapes and alters the dynamics of their cognition. People do not just have a manipulative relationship to their environment. They identify with it and drive identity from it. And so there’s an additional threat that is being posed here. And this is where it sort of starts to lean into the meaning crisis. That’s what I meant when the people that survive the black plague, they didn’t die. But they come away from it, internalizing a different world, and they become different kinds of selves. It changes human spirituality in fundamental ways. And so I guess I’m trying to, here’s maybe a bit of pushback. I’m trying to say that the anti-panic, it sounds symptomatic to me in the language. Maybe it’s not, and you can correct me if I’m wrong, but I’m trying to point to something that could be a much more long-term kind of shift. Oh, absolutely. I was just trying to find out what are examples of that long-term shift that are maybe already showing up. I think it’s, when you said that, sorry, so when you first made that proposition and referring to the black plague, I agree with you completely. I think this is a way of putting it in my language is something like, the black plague was to the Catholic church what COVID-19 is to the blue church, or something like that, at least with some degree of probability. And with box around COVID-19 referring to actually Delta E, changing the environment. The virus is itself symptomatic of more things that are going to happen. Right, exactly. We’re going to see more and more things of this abstract kind, across more and more diverse versions. We’re going to see it coming in medical, we’ll see it coming in education, we’ll see it coming in certainly in politics, economics, like usually these subsystems have the same topology. So what’s interesting is the mind. What’s the mind that is associated with that shift? I’ve spent a lot of time thinking about the distributed cognition, like almost the objective direction. What does it look like and how do people go about doing it? But what’s the mind? What’s the interior experience of what is the nature of reality? I’ll give you an example. It’s been so long since I’ve been in this epistemological state. I don’t actually even remember what the prior state is like. So there’s state A and the state B. B is the way I talk about it. It’s like modern portfolio theory or sort of like Bayesian statistical probability as not just fundamental but inescapable. So there is no notion of there being a true with a capital T. There’s a notion there being a cloud of possible Ts and the implications thereof. And you’ve got this sort of large nest of things coming through. You’ve got the actual moment that you’re in right now and then you’ve got a large nest of things coming out and you just kind of keep rolling through that. So at any moment, this instantaneous moment is kind of a collapse of the possibility space into an actual from which I can change my sense of what the possibility of the next moment is going to look like. But I’m always dealing with a probability manifold. And therefore my choice making is very much like a modern portfolio manager in the financial system who’s basically just allocating risk correlates with each other. You know that I think that just massively overlaps with issues around relevance, realization, et cetera, et cetera. Yeah. And so I feel like my sense is that that’s not commonplace. My sense is that there’s a different epistemology, which is something along the lines of paradigmatic. That’s okay. That’s I think language in that way. In the Kuhnian sense? In the Kuhnian sense. Yeah. Okay. So I would say that a paradigmatic mind is a mind that has an obligate or near obligate, a high degree of necessity of connecting to one and only one dominant sense making framework, which collapses the possibility space enormously. Like it proves the possibility space enormously because you don’t have any epistemological uncertainty. You only have uncertainty around the state of facts that are fitting into your particular epistemological frame. And that I think is one of the things that goes away. And I’m going to say actually what’s interesting is I’m going to say that’s what emerged out of the Black Plague was that kind of mind. The paradigmatic mind? Yeah. You don’t think it exists before the Black Plague? I don’t think so. Or if it did, I think it existed very differently. Let me see if I can unfurl why I’m saying these things. Why would I say such a thing? First, I want to make sure I’m understanding what you mean by paradigmatic. So what you mean by paradigmatic is a commitment because there’s different readings of Kuhn. I want to make sure I’m not misunderstanding it. Yeah. So you can read the paradigm as a pragmatic thing, or you can read the paradigm as something that has some sort of realistic value to it. Like, you know, it’s an approximation to the real world or something like that. And then what I heard you saying was what you meant by paradigmatic is people have a sense that there is one true, final, complete picture of things. And the goal of epistemology, broadly construed, is to get to that one true picture. Is that what you’re saying? No, no. It’s more like the first, actually. But the key is that it’s a, almost everybody is sort of read-only on the paradigm. So while there may be a willingness and kind of at the highest level of philosophy, an acceptance of the premise that the paradigm is a map and not the territory, almost everybody is read-only on that map. And almost everybody is actually unaware of the fact that they’re using a map to intermediate the territory. So for practical purposes, it shows up as capital T true. I see. Which is one of the reasons why it has such a hardness, like a break, like paradigm shifts tend to have a collapse vector. They tend to be cracked and crumble as opposed to slide. So let me try again then. This is helpful. You’re saying the paradigm is almost completely transparent to most people and that they have sort of no metacognitive awareness of it in practice. They might have some sort of abstract statements about paradigms or something like that. But in practice, for most people, it’s completely transparent. Yeah. Okay, now I get you. Yeah. And so let’s see, what’s the shift that happens if you zoom in on the black plague and you have a bunch of different things are going on simultaneously, right? You’ve got the plague, you’ve got exploding literacy, you’ve got not too long after, you’ve got the discovery of the new world, which changes consciousness of space time. So it’s the breakup of the Catholic world, like the true Catholic world, sure. And the meaning of the word Catholic, universal. Even just the emergence of Protestantism, Protestantism maps to paradigmatic, maps to paradigmatic, right? That notion of there being an acknowledgement of the possibility of a multiplicity of fundamental models of what is true. Sure. And a distributed recognition, how would I put it, method that reorients the source of true knowledge. That movement of the source of true knowledge from the institution, the structure to the individual is a big thing, right? That’s part of that whole shift towards the individual will becoming crucial. You see it. And then of course, that reflects back, God changes, becomes more will-based, right? And eventually, even when that God disappears, that orientation survives and the will to power of Nietzsche and things like that. So you get this long-term fundamental change. So what’s changing sounds to me like you’re saying it’s a change from some kind of epistemological monism to a kind of pluralism. And then the response to that pluralism is sort of the individual will must impose because the pluralisms are competing with each other. Yeah, there’s a bunch of things. So think about it. It’s really interesting because so in the second mode, so that’s the post-black death mode we might call it just in the enlightenment era. One thing is this for sure is a real loss of faith in the possibility of a single fully integrated T mode, right? So we have a diversity of different paradigms that are domain specific. So Isaac Newton is going to be holding a paradigm in relationship to physics, and then another in relationship to religion, and probably another in relationship to politics. All right. You got Habermas’s thesis that you get these autonomous spheres of authority rather than a single authority. Yeah, exactly. And there’s a mapping issue. The mapping happens to this medium of textural communication. So what ends up happening is that these letters and books flying around create a new milieu of paradigm coherence and paradigm editing and modification. And this notion of dewy decimal disciplinary structures allow domain specificity. So I can kind of, there may be a complete incompatibility between the evolutionary paradigm and the physics paradigm, but because they’re so far apart that the members of those groups don’t communicate with each other, you don’t notice it. And then when they run into each other, there’s a process of, is there an integration between the two or just kind of ignore them or what’s the relationship? And that’s kind of the, I think the story of the last 500 years has been that kind of thing. Okay. Okay. So this also, by the way, I get now your thesis, it’s clear to me. This by the way is interesting because it relates to an ambient, like an ambient Delta E, you know, one of the characteristics of the shift from the pre-Enlightenment to the Enlightenment era was in fact a change in Delta E in along many different contexts. Yes. And so the emergence of that particular kind of mind, paradigmatic mind in fact probably is, as I’m speaking about it right now, just thinking about it, analogous to the adaptive response that we’re talking about is the transition that we’re undergoing right now, which is a need, a fundamental need to transition from a particular kind of mind that had huge advantages under certain values of Delta E, but just broke down under values exceeding Delta E. And so we shifted to this new one. And you map out, I think very well in lots of different dimensions, the ways that this new kind of mind tried to get its act together, tried to hang together as it kept running into a porias and bottlenecks and situations where the old material unraveled and you realized you were holding on to nothing. So now we’re in a context where not only are we faced with the meaning crisis in the context of the kind of the burning out of that model or that meta model, that approach, but we’re also running into the obsolescence of that model in the context of a rate of Delta E that is higher than what it could have handled. Yes, yes, yes. Yeah, yeah, that’s really nice. So check this out. So I’m going to say that again. It’s something like on the one hand, in the almost on the interior of the enlightenment mind, it has its own structural instabilities. It kind of as it expands and begins to do its own thing to be itself, it begins to break down in a variety of ways. And ultimately, we perceive this as the meaning crisis and all of its different characteristics from the inside out. And then you flip it and you say, okay, and also, if we kind of put ourselves in a place, I don’t know, like Victorian England, 1870, 1880, I don’t know, what would be like peak enlightenment mind, like really functional? Maybe it was actually like Germany around the time of the romantic romantic movement, I’m exactly sure when we could say peak, but that mind couldn’t possibly have dealt with the level of Delta either we’re doing with now. No, no. It’s very fundamental nature just couldn’t do this kind of thing. So on the left hand side of the meta crisis, the meaning crisis, I guess, real right hand side, you got the interior meaning that the meaning crisis is showing us that this approach is in breakdown across the board. And on the left hand side, you have the consequence, which is that the Delta E that we are in and are continuing to accelerate, um, it overwhelms that approach, even at its best. I agree with that. I think that’s really important. I think, I think that explicates and elucidates an intuition I’ve had for a very long time, which I’ve tried to articulate that there’s a deep interconnection between the meaning crisis and the meta crisis, but now there’s some specification to it. I maybe it would be helpful to think about some of the interior identity that people had in sort of that whole enlightenment phase and how even it sees one of the issues is that, you know, that interior identity is still being held on to even though the meaning crisis is showing that it’s collapsing because it’s progenitating history, it has undermined its own grammar, but that’s one thing. But then the other thing is, so that’s, that’s your pointing back. Yes. The pointing forward is ways in which that is not, if you’ll allow me these two terms, ways in which that is not only a degenerative interior identity, but ways in which it’s an exacerbating, thwarting interior identity. It’s not only that it’s degenerate, but it can no longer deal with its own history, right? It’s also, you know, preventing, it’s exacerbating the attempts to, you know, if you’ll allow me a temporal metaphor, it’s slowing down the rate of adaptivity that’s needed for the acceleration and delta E. Yes, this is why I was saying that this paradigm, for example, has these characteristics of collapse. It has this thing where it holds the resources that are necessary for adaptation in a particular arrangement and will continue to do so until enough energy is behind the change that needs to be made that that energy is enough to break this capacity to hold. Yeah, this is like a psychotic break. You have a complete catastrophic collapse of identity in the face of something. And instead of being able to make a smooth transition, the whole thing just falls apart. Okay, so that’s great because that now, now we’ve, I think we’ve again made more articulate this idea of how the external chaos actually gets internalized and how you start to get this resonance between them. Yeah, yeah, so yeah, in other words, say that I get the feeling that the psychosis is probably the right model, which is to say that we should expect to see the maladaptive response to the current environment to be an increase in the directionality towards psychosis. Yes, so the defining features of psychosis is to generally lose a grip on reality because you see far too many patterns where there aren’t patterns, right? So it’s a decline in the ability to discern real patterns from merely correlational patterns. So psychotic people, people are moving towards psychosis. If you give them a screen of static, they’re much more likely to see or even experience. So they actually feel like it’s called, it’s even called a psychotic insight. They often feel like they’ve had, because they do, it’s a perversion of the insight machinery because they suddenly realize patterns that other people aren’t seeing. And that of course gives you a tremendous sense that you are now getting in touch with this chaotic world. Well, I would say that’s actually the essence of this thing that you were calling earlier, the will. Right, right, right, okay. I can’t, when you’re in the psychotic break, your will, your ability to actually impose your will on the world is reduced to your ability to impose a preferred meaning making on the world, to feel the feeling of the hit of insight, to feel the feeling of I’m making sense of words. All you can do is you can’t actually affect the world in terms of really durably over time building a long-term construct. But what you can do is you can feel like everything makes sense. So would that mean then what we should see if this line of argument is going the right way is that we should see an increase in people creating over, they derive to create overarching fantastic in the pejorative sense of the word fantastic, like meta narratives, like grand conspiracy theories. Yes, absolutely. Absolutely. Yeah, because you’re going to have two things happening simultaneously. One is that they’re going to be taking the red pill. They’re going to exit the existing dominant sense making and meaning making architectures that are clearly black plague style failing all around them. Yeah, yeah. They’re going to dive into the deep end of a Delta E that is way beyond their capacity to make sense of it. And either, oh, it’s nice. So then either you’re going to either get a learned helplessness, you’re going to kind of get a shutdown overwhelm. Yep, yep. Or you’re going to get the equivalent of an erotic, you know, in this case, it’s a psychotic break. Right, right, right. Exactly. Yeah, exactly. Yeah, yeah. And so the question you’re going to feel empowered for both of those alternatives, because the tradition, right, is right has basically let you down. Yes, very very profound ways. Oh, absolutely. In fact, it’s the only thing you can really hold on to for sure that the tradition doesn’t work. Yes. It’s almost like you’re you’re you’re you know how to steer away from something. The question is, what are you steering towards? Right, right. So let’s do this. I want to pivot all the way back to the outside coming back in. But consciously now at a meta level using that to inform this conversation, because I think there’s something very powerful here. Cool. So one of the things that I was contemplating this morning as I was running a integration pass is that it actually feels like there’s a very strong bifurcation in terms of the the impact of COVID-19 on us. Right. So I’m going to push a button and I’m going to kind of do a flash collapse of my Bayesian net and just take a couple of assumptions. Please. So the highest probability models that I’ve seen have something like the ambient mortality rate is something on the order of an average of about 5%, meaning that if you were just sort of introduced this to wild type humans, you’d have a 15 to 20% mortality above 80 and kind of cast you know curves down and so cross total populations skewing higher for men you get kind of that rate. And then in a well managed high quality medical environment, it’s sort of below point two. So that’s kind of the spread that you’re dealing with. Huge variation. Huge variation. And what’s interesting is that variation feeds back on itself. So to the degree to which your choice making your social choice making makes sense of the risk and then makes choices to maintain the resilience and integrity of your choice making and action taking capacity, particularly in the sub domain of your medical system and your agenda capacity is equal to the vector of the harm that you’re dealing with. Then you actually able to hold the entire system dynamics in this left hand path and keep it at below point two and then it burns out. So more or less the story of China as far as we can tell. So you have this thing, the tidal wave was building, right? It’s got this exponential build curve. You see it coming. You respond quickly enough and you’ve got enough embedded resilience at the medical level that your medical system can take it, absorb the energy of what’s coming at you, not get overwhelmed. Hold, hold, hold. And then it ships that now. So that’s kind of path one. And what’s interesting about path one is that it has a bunch of self-reinforcing feedback groups is that once you begin to see that it’s working, what works gets more cycles pointed to it. You begin to realize what the thing you’re dealing with looks like. There’s a whole bunch of stuff on path one. Then path two, what happens is you wait too long or you act too slowly or you act with not enough resilience or impact and you start getting to a point of overwhelm. You get overwhelmed at, let’s say, the medical level, that you don’t have enough hospital beds, you don’t have enough ventilators, you don’t have enough antivirals, you don’t have enough hospital staff, you don’t move hospital staff correctly. It weakens the immune system of your social environment as you start seeing that mortality rate going up because you’re starting to get outside of the zone of a controlled situation. And by the way, also not just mortality rate, but even more importantly in the initial stages, the virality rate. Your quarantining structures aren’t strong enough and you’re actually starting to get more and more, you’re fighting a fire that’s growing faster than your responsive capacity. And so once the fire gets past a certain threshold in its relationship with your responsive capacity, you start getting a separation because it’s degrading your responsive capacity. Now you’re dealing with something where you’re depleting your medical resources, you’re beginning to lose, like we’ve actually seen now people inside the biopharma industry are starting to show up as being infected, which means smart people that would otherwise be working on diagnostics or antivirals are actually being taken off the board and their teams are degraded in functionality. So you’ve got a degradation in functionality. As I talked about earlier, you’ve got the degradation of functionality for the level of leadership. Iran is a situation where their ability to make choices is going down because more and more choice makers are starting to lose. They get sick, right? And so this becomes the right-hand path for us to have these feedback loops where there’s a bifurcation event pivoting around basically your overall autoimmune system as a society and the rising meta-systemic dynamics of the vector. And there’s a breaking point, a bifurcation event that either takes you here or it takes you here. And of course there’s things in between, which is to say, how far does the tide go in before you catch it and bring it down? China, in Wuhan, Wuhan looks a lot like the right hand path. Left to its own devices, if Wuhan was by itself, it would have been on the right hand path. They would have been meltdown. There would have been no escape because Wuhan was in the context of China as a larger context, the systemic resilience of all of China. It got hit by Wuhan, but was able to not break as a total system and therefore was able to push the whole of China back down to the left-hand path. Okay. So what’s interesting about this is that so much of this actually pivots on choice-making. So much of this pivots at a distributed cognitive level on our ability to make sense of what’s happening clearly and rapidly, and then make effective choices in a timely fashion with the right amount of impact to actually respond to what’s happening before we’re overwhelmed by an exponentially growing curve. I feel like that, that notion, that insight of choice-making responds all the way back to the conversation we’re just having. How so? I don’t know. I just, I actually, recalling all that made me lose. Can you remind what we were just talking about? We were talking about the fact that people, you know, internalize the environment and the care and we were sort of, there’s a possibility that what people will do, they have something sort of analogous to a psychotic reaction to all the noise and, you know, and this is an aspect you said this is a way of understanding this notion of will, right, they’re finding meaning and, you know, the possibility that what we’ll see is that, you know, the rapid possibly exponential growth of conspiracy theories and all kinds of things that divert resources and problem-solving abilities and distributed cognition and distributed labor on ways that could really exacerbate things. Yeah, okay. So then, so remaps some of these notions. So there’s a mapping here of something like being part of distributed cognition. This is, okay, that’s it. That’s the key. This is the important thing. The human beings are obligate tribal. Okay. So we are, we are part of something. Yes. And so for, if we’re, if we’re not part of something, we are adrift. Yes. And what’s happening is, is that as we, as you, as you exit, as you take the red pill, as you exit the tradition that is not working, you, you now are adrift and, and to the degree to which you’re able to find something that you can be part of that is itself has the, at least the ingredients to be adapted. It may actually not initially be adaptive, but it has the, it has the capacity, it has the, the scope and competence to actually be able to start making effective choices in the context of what’s happening. You will naturally begin to upgrade it in that direction. So, okay, how’s that show up? Hmm. I had like, uh, all right, right. Sure. Check it out. Um, where was this? Something happens somewhere where there was a crisis. There was a town and in the town you had a political structure and, oh, it was during Katrina. So Mississippi, Katrina, right? Uh, the, you know, hurricane hits the ledges are breaking and the existing political structure just drops the ball. Right. Right. Right. What happens is this one guy who’s like the guy who runs the general store has his shit together and he starts to coordinate, coordinate effective choices. We’re talking about local, small scale effective choices, but that creates an attractor and other people who witnessed that attractor, they’re like looking and they’re seeing chaos in all directions and they see one spot over there that is not chaos in all directions. And they begin to orient themselves towards that. And so he says, okay, well you do this and they start doing that. And as it turns out, that doesn’t fuck that. It doesn’t suck. It works a little bit. And, and by the way, them working with him, it works better. So then the zone of, of, of, of coordinated action, the zone of order, the zone of non-chaos, um, begins to grow organically because we were that obligate tribalism is, is that if we don’t, as individuals, lunar lose our capacity as individuals to see and orient towards what is truly effective choice in our context, as long as we have that capacity, which is our natural human ability, and then we have the capacity to orient ourselves to it in a flexible way so that we can upgrade in its capacity. Then you get a positive feedback loop in the environment that you’re in. So it’s that liminal shamanic, um, you know, we’re dealing with chaos all the time, really. And so let’s actually use that skill set to recore here. Something that is leaps all over, you know, crosses the chasm, does the Valley crossing into something that works. Right. Yeah. This feels like this is a little bit of a prophecy. I think what we’re about to witness is that I think we’re about to witness in the West is a generalized failure of traditions, institutional structures, leadership as it currently exists for reasons, both of corruption and ontological epistemological inadequacy. Right. And the movement towards the collective intelligence, the movement towards distributed intelligence, cognition, binding those individuals and groups that are actually able to make increasingly effective choices in the context of what’s really happening and then learning how to recore here and we coordinate with those groups so that they’re able to scale and increase their effectiveness. Um, I would say is if not this time, and I think this time is a good opportunity, like it’s a good trial run and it may be the one where that happens. If not this time, it will be sort of in the next few times of this, you know, this increase in Delta eight. But so as a human, sorry, go ahead. But there is a problem I see in that. I mean, not your prophecy. I think your prophecy is accurate. What I meant is, because now I’m thinking again of other example of Weimar Republic. You get a group of individuals who are locally very effective, but it turns out that the global solution that they’re proposing is actually, while it ends up destroying Germany, right? It actually turns out to be massively self-destructive. Yeah, the, the, so you do, you, I mean, you clearly have individuals that on the, on the street, right? And in, in, you know, in the marketplace of Germany, like they’re, they’re, they’re, they’re, they’re creating that attractor of order. That’s, that’s why they succeed. Right. They’re, but what they do is that, that particular configuration, the dynamical system they engendered, I mean, this is kind of, you know, a version of the tragedy of the commons, right? It’s locally order generating, but what it, it’s, it’s in the service of, again, of this, of a, of a psychotic conspiracy theory that ultimately puts the whole, you know, the whole country on a path of self-destruction. Yeah. I think, well, I think what we’re going to see is we’re going to see something like a million, uh, Nazi parties. Right. And I think we’re going to see is, is, is just lots and lots and lots of micro psychotic cabals. Yes. Um, and the question is going to be, how do they relate to each other? Because the level of systemic breakdown is, is the default state is failure. So it’s not like we need Nazis to fail. It’s more like we need something. We need sort of the opposite of Nazis to succeed and the default state is failure. Right. So what does that look like? Well, it looks a little bit like what Peter, culture war 2.0. Yeah. Yeah. But, but multiply by, yeah, multiply by a factor of probably five orders of magnitude. Oh yeah. So my concern there is then you get, you get general systems collapse because if you get this proliferation, your internal social environment becomes as complex and as unmanageable as the external environment you’re trying to respond to. Wow. You know, it’s interesting. Um, in this case, like something like a virus and here specifically nature, maybe our saving grace, because if the, if the complexity is happening higher in the human social stack, so, you know, politics, finance, um, it’s like sociology, things like identity and the medics, culture, those are so easily, how do I say this? They’re so amenable to psychosis. As long as I can tell a locally effective story that kind of makes me feel like I’m making sense of my environment. Um, I can, I can kind of go forward until I bump into something. Nature doesn’t give a fuck. If my story is that, um, it’s funny, I think it just happened actually in Iran, a, a cleric, um, you went to go and minister some people who’ve got the virus and he didn’t take any precautions because his, his, his, his model was that he would be protected and he got sick and he died. Um, nature doesn’t care what your psychotic story is. Like that’s, that’s rock bottom. So this, this psychotic break, it hits rock bottom. And so, you know, not being sick or not dying from sickness is like the kind that’s like, that’s it. Wow. I’ve forgotten about that. That’s the key. Like the checksum of this whole story is, is nature at the end of the day, we’re all running psychotic narratives. The question is, are they adaptive psychotic narratives or not? So the more the crisis is that we run into are non sociological crises, but in fact, natural actual natural crises that are, are visceral. Um, so, you know, climate change, unfortunately, until it is so intense that it’s irrelevant is not visceral. I mean, you kind of, everything you’re seeing is mediated by a very large interpretive distance. Um, and so you can always run a, a narrative in between those two points and avoid, uh, avoid, uh, what do you call it? Rock bottom. Yeah. Hit you in the face with something that you can’t avoid no matter what. There was something like, uh, getting sick and dying from a virus that’s growing very rapidly. You know, if you take a look at it, every one of these micro cabals of psych of psychotics, they’re going to get sick. If this is real, if this is a, if this is a real thing, um, well, more specifically, their local adaptiveness would be somewhat obviously, um, less than others. Now, what you’re about to say, I think it’s certainly a problem to my mind is that, you know, hardcore prepper communities are going to be indistinguishable from, um, groups are actually making effective choices, you know, in a larger context. Like there’s this whole bunch of nodes. There’s so much solutions to this particular event that are probably equivalent in terms of their adaptiveness, unless the event’s really big, right? And so it’s weird. Like it’s one of these things where I’m noticing as I’m talking like, wow, it would actually maybe be best for us. If this is a bigger thing than it seems like it might be because it would be a enough felt reality that it would push our consciousness past certain, uh, black holes that we’re in right now. So more like the bronze age collapse. Yeah. Which opens up radical, right? You do get this speciation of all these new, you know, cultural, economic, uh, political forms of organization and cognition changes fundamentally. Yeah. And in fact, if you can see, if you think about it, like if you think, okay, so we can go up, you can say the Chinese went through that kind of dynamic, what seven times, like every, every dynasty has gone through a collapse that was on the order of like two-thirds mortality and a couple of hundred years of chaos. And then that gave rise to the next dynasty. It’s funny because the continuity of China, which is different than the discontinuity of the bronze age, I think is precisely that order of magnitude. So, uh, we’ve got some 60% to 75% or something like that. You probably have no longer trying to China. You have something which is, you know, the Hittites to the Greeks. Yeah. Um, and then on the, so then you’ve got like the bronze age collapse, the Chinese collapse, the Roman collapse, and then like the black plague, something like that, where the black plague awful as it was, didn’t really interrupt the continuity of the West. Um, it created a real, the thing that came out the other end was very, very different, but I would say in, in, in deep blue fundamentally was still, still thought of itself as the West, at least. Yep. Yeah. Yeah. There’s a continuity of, there’s a certain continuity of identity back beyond it. Yes. I guess. Yeah. So this is, you can do the map all the way back down to the individual. So if you’ve got somebody who’s got, you know, delusion or addiction, um, and it’s, it’s how hard you have to hit rock bottom to have your moment of clarity. And that’s the question. And ideally you don’t have to hit too hard. The softer you can hit is the moment of clarity you’re looking for. It’s not the rock bottom you’re looking for. Yeah. Um, and I guess that’s the question is how hard do we have to hit rock bottom to have an, a moment of clarity adequate to the amount of change that we need to make in our interior and our exterior to be truly adapted to the context that we’re finding ourselves in? That’s a good question. That’s a good question. So, I mean, so something that comes up in my mind, it’s not a direct, uh, logical following from this, but what we just said, but it was like, I’m seeing this picture now of groups of people who like do the, basically do the learned helplessness and they just try to escape, right? And then we have the proliferation of the cabals, um, which is, is kind of like the experimental psychosis, right? And they’re, right? Um, but, but there seems to be, so I get that. I think that’s good. There seems to be another psychological dimension that’s at work here. And I don’t know how it fits in here, but I thought about it when you were mentioning something. And I want to be really careful because I don’t know if I’m mis- mis-attributing. So grain of salt on this, but remember you’re talking about how the, the, the, the thing about, uh, climate change is you’ve got this displacement, right? This displacement issue that allows people to defer, right? They, so basically they have deferral strategies, uh, denying or, right, or mitigating or reducing response because it’s displaced, right? And I, again, this is looks, right now it’s anecdotal. I don’t have any data. Nobody would have data on this yet. But it, it seems to me that there’s a, I don’t want to call it pleasure, but there’s something about this being concrete and present that is alleviating for people. That it takes the miasma of the meaning crisis and puts a concrete agent face on it that we do things about. And, right. And so part, I want to be really cautious here and I know you, you, you know, you, you, you respect that. But part of the, part of the reason why I think also you’re getting the panic. Um, well, this is, this is an ideal idea that goes back to like Tillic and Fromm. One of the things people do with anxiety is they try to transmute it into fear because if they can transmute anxiety into fear, then they can do something as opposed to just have that miasma of ambiguity and. Man, that is an intense notion. One of the things that people do with anxiety is they transmute it into fear. Wow. And you see, and that’s, and, and that, that kind of feeds into the conspiracy generation because what conspiracies do as psychological adaptive mechanisms is they translate existential anxiety into actionable fear because now there’s the threat, whatever is the kebab. Which, which, which, however overwhelming is at least concrete enough that in principle agency is possible. So, you know, I sometimes call this the demonization strategy. One of the ways, you know, I sometimes say to people, I mean this sort of half ironically, it would be kind of wonderful if there was a devil. It would be wonderful if all of the evil and suffering actually had, you know, an orchestrated genius behind it, because then at last we could know what it is we’re supposed to do. Yeah. Very clearly. We’ve turned it from an ill defined problem into a well defined problem. It’s a hard problem, but you know what? It’s not anymore. It’s not an ill defined problem. Right. So how do you know you’re not in a cabal? Yeah. How do we, how do we go about as individuals navigate these, navigating these choppy waters? Well, I’m wondering if that’s, I’m wondering if that’s one of the things. I mean, so a few minutes ago you were talking about a kind of wisdom we need in order to, right, make sure we’re going down the left hand as you, as you put it. I’m suggesting to you that part of that wisdom might be the kind of self-knowledge of this modal kind of self-deception. And one of the, so if I’m aware that I’m doing a lot of shifting of anxiety into fear, that for me is a red flag. That for me is a red flag. I love it. Right. A red flag that I’m probably getting into conspiratorial, cabalistic, gnostic in the pejorative sense of the word kind of thinking. Right. Yes, absolutely. It’s really interesting. I’m loving the inverse where the black plague broke the religion that was a religion. Yep. And this new thing is, is, is what gives rise to the religion that’s not a religion. You just, you just described one, you know, one piece, one, one, what do you, is it a call of homily? No. A reading, right? A reading, a reading from the book of the religion that’s not a religion, chapter seven, verse three. Yeah, yeah, yeah. If you notice that you’re shifting anxiety into fear, then it’s a red flag. Yeah, that’s right. That’s a red flag. And then the converse would be not just teaching people amelioration of anxiety. That’s not, you need something more like what we saw happen after the black plague. Where we, you, again, the, the, the, the identification of your interior life is, but the grammar of that is fundamentally changed. It would have to be something more like in that the more deep, so deeper into the guts of the psyche, the response to uncertainty and dynamic change is something other than anxiety. And we all, but it has to be, well, no, no, no, we’ve reconfigured the grammar of psyche before we have done this multiple times. So it would, so one is, you know, first of all, perhaps the first step is, well, am I translating anxiety into fear? Right? Well, that’s bad. But another one is, can I get deeper than the response of anxiety and come up with something other than anxiety as a response to uncertainty? Oh, it’s so good, isn’t it? I mean, it’s funny, like, it’s like, it’s like going through the looking glass, because what you’re talking about is faith. A kind of faith. Yes. It’s eight from the, that we had talked about, we’ve talked about this several times, we’ve come to the same place many times, right? Yeah. It’s not an ideological, it’s not an irrational commitment to an ideology. It’s not a willful assertion of a proposition. It’s a cultivated sense of being like, having a participatory conformity with an ongoing transformative process in reality. It’s continuity of contact rather than closure into conclusion. Right. Boy, that’s a bunch of good words, man. So timestamp, whatever this is right now, that was it. Somebody write that down in the comments. Yeah, the visual image I have is of like a buoy in the ocean that has, you know, it just, it’s weighted such that even as the water is chopping. Oh, I was having something similar. I was having a sailing imagery. The person who can sort of, can ride the edge of the storm effectively. Right? Yeah. You don’t want to get swamped, right? That’s the key. Yeah. And so, you know, having a series of capacities and abilities, including the ability to just sort of like surrender to what’s happening so that you’re not breaking as the system pushes on you, but you’re actually able to just keep that at all, always stay in continuity of contact. Yeah. Always stay there. Like, because you know that if you’re out of there, you’re in trouble. And if you’re in there, you can at least recover. Yeah. Right. Depending if the wave, if the winds die down a little bit, you’re back into sailing. Yep. Yeah. That’s the key. Yeah. That’s cool. That’s really cool. There’s a story by Joseph Conrad about a ship that gets swamped. And the sailors are all sort of folding onto the side of the ship. It’s actually been swamped. And Allerston, the captain, he’s just, they’re all watching him. They have a kind of, they have a faith in him, but he’s watching and he’s watching and he’s watching. And then all of a sudden he goes, okay, now raise that sail, that sail, that sail. And they can get the right timing of wind and wave and the ship rights. There you go. So he, like he’s, he represents exactly that buoy, right? He was, he was aware that even being swamped is not being swamped. Yes. Yes. Yeah. All it, all, it seemed like all was lost, but as long as the captain has got their eye on the winds, you know that you have a chance. And they knew long as he had his eye on the winds that they had a chance. And so they stayed together and popped. And that’s, that’s it, man. That’s a great story. Yeah. Yeah. So that’s, it’s funny. Cause so what he didn’t do is he didn’t lose faith, right? He didn’t, he didn’t, he didn’t fall into learned health business or neurosis. And he also wasn’t just doing willful assertion. He’s not a Rambo hero, right? That’s the point. He’s not a Rambo hero and he doesn’t just, I will, you know, he doesn’t just sort of muscle or force his way through it. It’s like the Wu Wei of Taoism, right? He, he find, he looks for the grain and he has the sensitivity to find the grain and align himself with it so that he gets that timing. And it’s just like that. Yeah. Good. I got to go soon. Anyways, my friend, I would like to pick this up again and maybe we could pick it up with a conversation in depth, maybe link the two things back together, the religion that’s not a religion. And there’s, we are getting pieces of what this reformulation of faith means. Yeah. Yeah. I think that’s really powerful. Yeah. And I think we should start there and then try and build on that. What do you think about that as a proposal? I love it. So is this call, so we were supposed to have called Wednesday and we’re doing now. So on our current schedule, we’re not going to have another conversation for another 10 days. Is that right? That’s right. Okay. I’m happy to change that. Okay. Flexible. Yeah. I’ll take a look at my calendar and maybe we could, we could get another time in because I feel the iron is hot right now and it would be good to strike it with good timing and pace with. Yeah, I like it. There you go. I’ll talk to you soon. Take care. Thank you very much. Excellent. Excellent conversation. Very timely.