The Epidemic That Dare Not Speak Its Name ｜ Stephen J Shaw ｜ EP 338 (Qrg8t34yXRs)

https://youtubetranscript.com/?v=Qrg8t34yXRs

You should accept yourself just the way you are. What does that say about who I should become? Is that just now off the table because I’m already good enough in every way? So am I done or something? Get the hell up. Get your act together. Adopt some responsibility. Put your life together. Develop a vision. Unfold all those manifold possibilities that lurk within. Be a force for good in the world and that’ll be the adventure of your life. The world’s falling birth rate isn’t on the list of major threats to life as we know it, but it soon will be. Taxes are destined to soar, pension systems will become unsustainable, while our healthcare systems won’t be able to cope with the ratio of old people to take care of compared to the shrinking number of taxpayers. Businesses will struggle to find workers to hire, school closures will accelerate, while social care will continually be slashed. And they say it’s an economic time bomb. I’m worried about the birth rate. Most people think we have, like, too many people on the planet, but actually this is an outdated view. I think that the biggest problem the world will face in 20 years is population collapse. Collapse. I want to emphasize this. The biggest issue in 20 years will be population collapse. Hello, everyone. I’m here today talking to Mr Stephen J. Shaw. Stephen is a British national who has studied and lived on three continents. He trained as a computer engineer and then as a data scientist. Before starting his first film project, Birth Gap, at age 49, he maintains the position of president of the data analytics and data science department. Stephen is a British national who has the position of president of the data analytics company he co-founded, Autometrics Analytics LLC. Stephen holds an MBA graduate business degree from ISG in Paris, France, and is continuing his studies at the Harvard Extension School. Looking very much forward today to delving into the issue of declining birth rates and population collapse, something that’s not particularly on everyone’s radar, and the issue of the invisible epidemic of unplanned childlessness. Why are people having so few children? The more I read about falling birth rates, everything was negative. You enter a downward spiral as you have fewer and fewer children, you have fewer and fewer future mothers, which in turn goes on and on and on. And no society in history has been known to come out of that spiral. So I’m talking today with Stephen J. Shaw, who’s produced a documentary, Birth Gap, that was originally released in its first version in 2021, and later version in 2022, and he’s been spending an awful lot of time delving into this particular problem. And so we’re going to walk through what he’s learned. Good to see you. Thank you for inviting me. Hey, thanks for agreeing to talk. So let’s start with your background. We could walk through what you’ve been up to biographically, first of all, to situate it, and then you can expand on that to the degree that you’re willing and able. So. Historically, for the last 20 years, I’ve been involved in data analytics, what we now call data science. I’m a part statistician, part coder, and I’ve worked with some great academics and PhDs that we have on staff and coming up with academic models, forecasting models for industries, mainly in the automotive sector. We try and do short-term forecasting. What might people purchase? What should car companies build? What should they market? What should they give for incentives? Done to a very minute level. This is a private venture? It is. And so it’s a corporation that offers these services? It’s a small niche corporation that’s been offering services to the world’s largest corporations for 20 years. And how did you get involved in that? It was a startup in London 20 years ago. I personally moved to the US. We got a contract with Nissan North America, took me to LA, and following that, I spent like 15 years following that company hands-on. Until around 2015, bizarrely, and I should explain, I’m a lifelong learner. I’d gone, I’d got accepted into Harvard Extension School to become a degree candidate to keep my data science skills up to date. And I was presented with some data that I just couldn’t believe on falling birth rates. So as someone who is involved in forecasting, albeit short-term forecasting, realizing that we’ve got this fundamental problem with birth rates that’s ultimately going to affect well, not just the number of potential car buyers. I mean, that’s the smallest problem in this overall, but that was something I felt almost ashamed of. Why do I know this? And then you expand that to what is this going to mean for the planet. And as a father of three, my three children were just about still teenagers then. I felt a sense of failure that I hadn’t been preparing my children for the world they were about to enter into. And we all, I think, are led into the belief that sure, that the world’s population is growing, perhaps exponentially still. That’s what I would have said at that time based on what I was learning. And I had no idea that the actual dynamics of everything from how work is going to be like to how society is going to be like to how pension systems are going to be like is fundamentally flawed. And at that moment, I realized something’s wrong because do you know what? The same trend was showing up for Germany and Italy and Japan. South Korea. Yeah, well, South Korea was just a little bit later, just a little bit later, which was interesting. But something triggered in the early 1970s in Japan, Germany, Italy, and you can add Spain, Portugal, Switzerland, Austria, to cause a series of parallel trends. And yet, what I was reading from experts was that these are localized problems. Japan, it’s work-life balance. That in Germany, it’s something called Ravenmother, which is the idea that parts of Germany, even today, for a woman to have a child and go straight back to work is really something that culturally shouldn’t be done. So that might cause some peoples to delay parenthood. In Spain and Italy, it was down to high unemployment among the youth. Other areas, it was gender balance, et cetera. So all these localized reasons were being proposed. For me, as a data scientist, you could see clearly, and if I can give you an analogy, it’s one of your own. You were talking to Lex Friedman. You talked about the dragon, I think, in terms of the environment context. So someone finds a dragon and they scream, “‘There’s a dragon.‘” And I loved the analogy, and I since saw that you use dragons quite a lot. So I thought I might, too. And it’s like you found this little dragon in Japan and the same kind of dragon in Germany and Italy at the same time, and they’re starting to get bigger. And I saw- So they’re lizards to begin with. Right, I mean, they’re tiny. The size of a kitten, I think, is an analogy. And they’re getting bigger, and then suddenly they’re appearing in other neighboring countries, and it’s growing, growing, growing from there. So the idea that these are localized issues, to me, just did not make sense. So why do you think you were struck to begin with by the fact that birth rates were plateauing or declining? I mean, because the typical response to that would be either, so what? There’s too many people on the planet anyways, or actually it’s a net good. So now you said you’re in a private company. Now, I should let everybody watching and listening know that one of the markers for the trustworthiness of a data analytic company is that people actually pay for their information. And so, it doesn’t necessarily mean that a private data analytic company is credible, but it does mean at least that they’ve been able to demonstrate their credibility enough so that they have paying customers, and that’s not an easy thing to manage. And so you were doing short-term forecasting that was integrated into the capitalist economy, let’s say, to help people plan their product development and so forth. But you came across this data at a much broader level, indicating a plateauing birth rate, or population growth. Why did that disturb you? Why did you think that was a problem? Because birth rates less than replacement level spiral downwards. They never stop. If you have fewer children that are required to replace a parent’s generation, once that generation grows up, they will, unless birth rates change, which they don’t historically, they stay low once they’re low, you’re going to have fewer people again. So you see it as a positive feedback loop. It is. And when you then look up, well, you want to find examples of societies coming from low birth rates going back to replacement level, and you realize there are no examples. In fact, there’s no known historical examples anywhere. And some people… Do we have enough of a historical track to consider that a concern? In modern times, if you look at the number of countries who fall into birth rates of 1.7, 1.6, 1.5, when you have no single example of a country going back to replacement level, we should be concerned. In fact, we should be very concerned. I know places like Quebec, for example, in Canada, with very, very low birth rate, have tried to institute government policies that, for example, make daycare, in principle, more accessible to young women and young families, although that’s had pretty much zero impact on outcome. I know that Hungary has put forward a series of policy transformations on the family support front. And my belief is, from what I’ve read, is that they’ve at least stopped the birth rate decrease and increased it slightly. So that’s the only… I mean, Quebec didn’t work at all. Hungary, it looks like there’s some minor… They’re still way below replacement, so it hasn’t rectified the problem in any sense. Here’s the deal. The government keeps raising rates because it’s the only tool they have to keep inflation under control, and it’s not working. You can’t spend your way out of inflation. You’ve seen the impact on the stock market, and you’ve seen the impact on your savings. Hedge inflation by owning gold, whether physical gold and silver in your safe or through an IRA in precious metals, where you can hold real gold and silver in a tax-sheltered retirement account. Buy gold and get a free safe to store it in. That’s right, on qualifying purchases from Birch Gold Group now through March 31st, they’ll ship a free safe directly to your door. Just text JORDAN to 989898 to get your free info kit on gold and to claim eligibility for your free safe. Then talk to one of their precious metals specialists. That’s JORDAN to 989898 today. What’s fascinating about Hungary, what I wanted to do was look at something much deeper than the typical birthrate numbers that we see today. I’m trying to change that. If you look deeper, you can find data that if you merge together, which I don’t believe anyone had ever done before, that gives you two measures. One is of societal childlessness, and the other is family structure. So the traditional way to measure childlessness is to wait until women are 45 usually and have some surveys, maybe a census. So you’re waiting until the end of the fertility window and counting them then. What I wanted to see was, what is societal childlessness today if there’s a reduction in the number of women starting to have families compared to what you would expect? We should be able to track that now. So looking at Hungary, which I’ve just been doing recently, was fascinating. They’re giving huge incentives for people to have three and four children. But the family structure in Hungary is not changing at all. At all. What is changing, which may or may not be linked, it’s associative in some way, but causal we don’t know, is the childlessness rate in Hungary does seem to be going down. More people look like they’re starting to have families. And what happens then is when people start to have families, they go on. Because family structure is locked in globally. That’s another finding. And so what do you mean? So we’ll go in two directions. What do you mean? What are you speaking about when you’re talking, when you’re expressing your concerns about family structure? Well, family structure basically is the percentage of women. We say women because we’ve got so much data on women, but really we should think of men and women. The proportion of women, couples, who have one child or two or three or four or five or more. And if you take data for Japan and you look at 1973, right before the fall in birth rates, the percentages of women having one, two, three, four are identical today as they were then. Six percent of women in 1973 were having four or more children. Today it’s the exact same number, six percent. So our focus has been completely… We’ve been in a fog looking at overall birth rates. What you find is in Japan in 1974, interesting year, an explosion in childlessness, which went from three percent to six percent to 15 to 21 to 30 plus percent in a space of about four years. The same in Italy, the same in Germany. In four years. In four years. It’s a shock. It was what I call a baby shock. And then if you look at Korea, South Korea, which you mentioned earlier, if we take South Korea, mid-90s, right in the midst of a currency shock, you see childless rates were already maybe 15 percent there. Suddenly it goes up to, I believe, 30 percent. And now it’s over 40 percent. And this is childless at what age? Well, when I estimate childlessness, I’m taking for the given population of women the number of births you’d expect to have at any age and say how many first-time mothers were there. And when you count up the number of first-time mothers of any age group and look at the overall population structure, you can see, well, wait a minute, there’s a gap opening up here compared to the number you would expect. So this is like age agnostic in a sense. And as a measure, people say, well, some of those women might, there might be a boom in future. People might be just delaying, but that doesn’t happen. There’s no example of those booms ever happening. So it seems to be we’ve got this cycle going on that people are pulled quite quickly into this, what I call, world of unplanned childlessness, if I can. I’ve had to coin quite a few freezes here. And I should explain what I mean by unplanned childlessness. If you look at surveys, look at research, the vast majority of people want children. It’s innate. And some don’t. That’s clear. What percentage do, approximately? I’m estimating around 5% don’t. There have been Gallup polls in the US done. Is that different between men and women? I don’t have that data. OK, so 5%, you figure, are out of the game by voluntary choice. Yes. And what percentage are childless? Well, right now we’re looking at 30 to 40% in most developed nations. So the vast majority, 80% is estimated in studies. And I think this… So that’s that involuntary childlessness. I’ve been thinking about that lately. We have this notion for men of involuntary celibacy in cells. We don’t have a term that’s at hand for involuntary childlessness among women. And it hasn’t been recognized as a, what would you call it, a universal social problem. But you just said 5% of women don’t want children, but 30% don’t have them. And so there’s a huge gap there between desire and reality. I think, frankly, I believe it’s the biggest societal problem that we have, and it’s hiding, because we haven’t recognized it. And if you find people, as I did make in the documentary, people who are struggling, 30s, late 30s, women particularly, but men too who have given up in their 40s, and they’re opening their heart to you with a level of what they call grief. And in English language, grief is used for one particular context. It’s not necessarily used normally for something you never had. I think in other languages there are terms that encompass that, but it’s the same emotion. And I have been pulled into conversations where I have, frankly, brought myself to the depths of understanding the suffering from these people who thought they were going through life, getting the education probably, starting the career path probably, thinking that, well, you know what, I’m not 30 yet. I’ve got time to meet a partner. And then getting to the point of often there is no partner, or that biology gets in the way. Yeah, well, it turns out that life is shorter than people think. You know, I’ve had clinical clients who followed that path, and some of them were women who had initially decided that they didn’t want to have children, and then changed their minds quite dramatically in their late 20s, which is a very common pattern, and then couldn’t have children. And it was just absolutely disastrous for them. They were often on the artificial fertility route for 10 years with multiple miscarriages and failures on that front, and it’s a bloody dismal outcome. Did you want to have children? I think if you caught me at the right day in my 20s when I was very in love or excited about a partner, I would say yes. But if you were to pry into that, I might say, oh, no, that seems crazy to have a kid in my 20s. I think that’s a good thing. I think that’s a good thing. I think that’s a good thing. I think that’s a good thing. I think that’s a good thing. I think that’s a good thing. I think that’s a good thing. I think that’s a good thing. I think that’s a good thing. I think that’s a good thing. But I know that seems crazy to have a kid in my 20s. Okay, so you’re making a case here. You’re making a psychological case in some sense at the moment in that this is a phenomenon worth attending to because the vast majority of people who end up childless, up childless, which is a more serious immediate problem for women because of the biological restrictions on their reproductive capacity. The reason that’s a problem is because so many women end up in that situation despite wanting children. So that’s a real psychological problem. But you could take a sociological stance and say, well, as has been insisted upon for 60 years, there’s too many people on the planet and it’s just not a bad thing at all if we stop reproducing in this manner. And if the price we have to pay for reduction in the number of excess months to feed is that there are some unhappy women, so be it. What do you think about this at a sociological or political or economic level? Well, first of all, I think that’s a terribly sad thing to contemplate that we have to somehow enforce perhaps lifelong grief and sadness on a subset of society who were mostly unlucky enough not to have the children they wanted to have for the sake of the planet when there are other… Hypothetical sake. Hypothetical planet at some future time. At some future time. And to me, the first thing, my reaction, strong reaction, isn’t there another way, if that’s right? And then you look at data as reported in Nature last year on the overall footprint by each group. Quite a number of scientists put their name to it and it states very clearly that 8% of our footprint occurs when we’re aged under 30. Then it rises quite significantly between 30 and around 65, I believe, and then it falls off sharply. Well, that means that if the world’s births were to magically, well, it wouldn’t be magic, drop by say half. I love taking extreme situations. So let’s imagine that from tomorrow only half of the births happen for some crazy reason. That 8% of total emissions or footprint would go down to 4% in 30 years’ time. This is going to have almost no impact for decades at a time when I think we have to find other solutions as much as they’re needed to solve problems that are out there. So the idea that we’re going to inflict this pain, deep personal suffering, pain on people and perhaps be pleased about it as I know some people are, I think is terribly, terribly sad. I think it might be that, to come back, I would like to clarify that for those people who don’t have the desire, I consider myself a pan-natalist. If you don’t want to have children, I would be your biggest supporter to say that’s fine. And I think there might be a misunderstanding in society for some people who perhaps don’t share that desire, who perhaps can’t quite understand how fundamental this desire is. Yeah, well most people who are in that boat are being willfully blind in my experience. And so the idea that there are reasons to not want to have children, one reason is an overwhelming self-centered narcissism. That’s not the only reason, but it’s definitely one reason. And people talk about the interference with their personal freedom and their desire to pursue their career. And in that I read something like the absolute inability to ever sacrifice your own narrow self-interest. And I do mean narrow to the, what would you say, concerns and needs of other people. So it’s interesting to me that it’s 5% that don’t want children and that the rate of that kind of self-centered narcissism is about 4 to 5% too. Now I am not saying that everyone who decides not to have children falls into that category, but I am saying that a fair number of people who don’t want children fall into that category. I mean if you think about it biologically, every single one of your maternal ancestors for three and a half billion years reproduced successfully. And it might be that you’re the exception to that rule, but if you are, you should think long and hard about why. You also might want to think long and hard about why, given that it’s likely to have a pretty damn detrimental effect on your life. It’s all fine to be fancy, free and footloose when you’re 30 and 35, but it’s a lot less amusing when you’re 50 and it might be downright dreadful by the time you’re, let’s say, 65. So alright, so on the population front now, we talked a little bit about the psychological catastrophe of involuntary childlessness. I’m curious too about the social and economic consequences. So as you get a demographic bulge, more and more older people and fewer and fewer younger people, obviously you have fewer people to take care of, the older people. But I also have never really read anything pertaining to models of like real estate value collapse, because it doesn’t take very long if there are more houses than there are people for the value of real estate to fall to, well, to what? To nothing? I mean, that’s what happened in Detroit. It basically fell to nothing. I mean, Detroit has recovered to some degree, but we don’t know at all what the world would look like if real estate values fell to virtually nothing, especially because that’s where most people put their retirement value. So what do you foresee happening on the political and economic front given the shift towards the elderly demographically? We’re going to see it in China first, right? Clearly. Clearly. Well, Japan too. Japan. One of the reasons I moved to live in Japan is to be close to, I wanted to feel this problem. Yeah, yeah. I wanted to be able to see it and almost touch it, and you can there. But you mentioned Detroit. I spent many, many years living in the suburbs of Detroit. And right around the time I was looking to start this project, I was able to drive around the streets of Detroit and see street after street after street of tens and tens of thousands of decaying houses. I remember one day driving along and there was a house, and these were nice houses back in the day, still spacious. And there was a young family having a picnic outside one of these houses. And it was the perfect setting, you might say, in every context except every other house in the street looked like they were completely vacant, dilapidated. And around that time, listening to local Detroit news every night, it was crime. It was street lights that weren’t functioning. It was lack of safety. It was lack of functioning of basic utilities. It was infrastructure and bridges that the city couldn’t afford. And of course in 2013 it went bankrupt. So I had this backdrop to knowing what was happening to Detroit as a city. And you’re right about property value. Around that time you could buy significant property in Detroit for $10,000.Youprobablycould{n}^{\prime }tgotheretoeverseeitbecauseitwas{n}^{\prime }tsafeatthattime.Andyo{u}^{\prime }reright,Detroithascomeback.Soinsomewaysitisatemplate.Well,theydemolishedhugetractsofhouses.Buthowdoyoudothatwhenhalfthehousesarestilloccupied?Yougothroughthisperiodoftime,unlessyo{u}^{\prime }regoingtosaytopeople,everybodymovethreestreetsovernow,andyoudothateveryfewyears,youca{n}^{\prime }teasilygointoneighborhoodsandstartmovingthingsbacktonature,whichiswhatDetroi{t}^{\prime }sdoing.Individualhouses,butyoustillhavethesescarsoftheemptyspacesthatwerethere.AndIshowsomeofthisinthedocumentary.Sotheidea,Imean,people,IwasonapodcastforChrisWilliamso{n}^{\prime }srecently.ItwasthefirsttimeIgotasenseofthecommentsthatpeoplemake.Andmanypeopleweresharingthesedeeppersonalstoriesabouttheirlifetodowithunplannedchildlessness.Yeah.Othersweresharingconcernsaboutwhethertheyeverbecomegrandparents.Right.So,butalotofpeopleweresaying,well,thisisjustabouteconomics.Whocares?Thisisjustaboutbigcorporationssuffering.Whocares?Ithinkpeopleneedtounderstandthisisgoingtoimpacteverybody.Everybod{y}^{\prime }slife.Ifyo{u}^{\prime }relivinginanareawherether{e}^{\prime }sliterallydecay,dilapidationallaroundyouandthetaxesthatyo{u}^{\prime }repayingtoyourcityoryourmunicipalityare{n}^{\prime }tcoveringthebasicinfrastructure,noon{e}^{\prime }sgoingtoescapefromthis.Ithinkpeopledo{n}^{\prime }tunderstandthat.Soinmycase,understandinglifeinDetroit,andagain,Ireallylovethecityandi{t}^{\prime }sgreat.Ilovethepeople.Ilovethewayitisstartingtocomeback.Butthatexperience,Ithink,reallyspoketomethatwereallyneedtothinkaboutwhatthismeans.Andyoutalkaboutthesocioeconomic.Theeconomicsgobeyondthecityandthepropertyvalues.I{t}^{\prime }sthepensionfunds.I{t}^{\prime }sthesocialwelfarefundsthatpeoplethink,IthinkIdidtooatthetime,thattheretirement,thecosttomaintaineachofusinaretirementisbasicallywhatthegovernmentorsomeon{e}^{\prime }sbeensavingforwhenwegettothatage.Yeah,right.I{t}^{\prime }snotwhatw{e}^{\prime }repayingrightnow.Tha{t}^{\prime }sabargainwiththefuture.Tha{t}^{\prime }sabargain.Yo{u}^{\prime }recoveringthepeoplewhoareretirednow.Whatthegovernmenthasputawayforusisdebt.Debt?Yeah,yeah.Ther{e}^{\prime }snosavings.Ther{e}^{\prime }sapromise.Right.Andthenthedeb{t}^{\prime }saproblembecause...Yes,tha{t}^{\prime }sforsure.Ifyouhaveashrinkingnumberoftaxpayers,thedeb{t}^{\prime }snotshrinking.Sotherepaymentonthedebtactuallybecomesworseandworseandworse.Yeah,well,hypothetically,youcanremediatethatwithimmigration,butthenthatopensofworms,whichisnoonereallyknowswhatthemaximalrateofincorporationasocietycanmanagewithoutimploding.Right?Imean,obviously,Canada,theUS,theUSinparticular,isanimmigrantsociety,andtha{t}^{\prime }sworkedoutextremelywellfortheimmigrantsandforthesociety.Buttheideathatther{e}^{\prime }snoupperlimittoourcapacitytodigestandintegrate,le{t}^{\prime }ssay,isabsolutelypreposterous.Sowedo{n}^{\prime }tknow,butthenotionthatwecanreplenishattheratethatw{e}^{\prime }relosingonthebirthratefrontstrikesmeas...i{t}^{\prime }satleastadebatableclaim.W{e}^{\prime }llberightback.First,wewantedtogiveyouasneakpeekatJorda{n}^{\prime }snewseries,Exodus.TheHebrewscreatedhistoryasweknowit.Youdo{n}^{\prime }tgetawaywithanything,andsoyoumightthinkyoucanbendthefabricofrealityandthatyoucantreatpeopleinstrumentallyandthatyoucanbowtothetyrantandviolateyourconsciencewithoutcost.Youwillpaythepiper.I{t}^{\prime }sgoingtocallyououtofthatslaveryintofreedom,evenifthatpullsyouintothedesert.Andw{e}^{\prime }regoingtoseethatther{e}^{\prime }ssomethingelsegoingonherethatisfarmorecosmicanddeeperthanwhatyoucanimagine.Thehighestethicalspirittowhichw{e}^{\prime }rebeholdenispresentedpreciselyasthatspiritthatalliesitselfwiththecauseoffreedomagainsttyranny.Yes,exactly.Iwantvillainstogetpunished.Butdoyouwantthevillainstolearnbeforetheyhavetopaytheultimateprice?Tha{t}^{\prime }ssuchaChristianquestion.Immigrationisasubjectthat,youknow,Ithinkweactuallyonlylookatonesideofit,andIcertainlydid,untilIwenttoNepalandIsatdownwithaprofessor,theheadoftheDepartmentofPopulation,ProfessorPatak,inoneofthelargestuniversitiesinAsia.AndIwantedtotalkaboutfallingbirthratesinNepal,whichwerejustaboutreplacementlevelatthattime.AndallheseemedtowanttotalkaboutwasthefactthattheUnitedStatesisacountrythatwewanttotalkabout,wasthepainsofmigrationonNepal,thepeople,thecommunitiesthatareleftbehind.Ineverforonesecondhadthoughtaboutthisdarksideofimmigration.Oh,thatyo{u}^{\prime }rebraindrain,forexample.Communitydrain.Yeah.Yo{u}^{\prime }reactuallytakingaway,yo{u}^{\prime }releavingtheoldparentsthere.Andyo{u}^{\prime }resendingremittancesback.Andtha{t}^{\prime }s,youknow,i{t}^{\prime }spositive.Butthoseparentsare{n}^{\prime }treallylookingforremittances.The{y}^{\prime }relookingforpeople,community,theirchildrentobethere,intotheirolderage.Andwewenttofilmsomeoftheseolderpeopleandthelooksontheir,forlornlooksontheirface.Noonethinksaboutthat.Andthenyouhaveanothersituation,whichisofteni{t}^{\prime }smenwhoaretheimmigrants,atleastfirst.Yeah.And,well,okay,somaybethatseemstosomeagoodwayforittostart.Butther{e}^{\prime }sanotherdarksidetothatisthewomenbehindareeithernotmarriedyet,ortheyaremarriedandtheirmenhavegoneoffelsewhere,andthe{y}^{\prime }renothavingchildren.Right.Ortheirhusban{d}^{\prime }scomingbackforthreeweeksayear.Andyo{u}^{\prime }vegotthreeweeksayeartotryandgetpregnant.Andofcourse,mostarenot.Soyouactuallyarepropellingcountriesintolowbirthrates,thesamefactorthattherestofusaregoingthroughrightnow.Sotheimmigrationdebate,and{I}^{\prime }manimmigrantmyself.I^{\prime }vebeenanimmigranttotheU.S.,toJapannow.So{I}^{\prime }mabsolutelynotagainstimmigrationatall.Asyousay,i{t}^{\prime }sdonegreatservicetoU.S.,Canada,andmanyothercountriestoo.Buttheideathat...Butyeah,butthatdoes{n}^{\prime }tmeani{t}^{\prime }sasolutiontopopulationreplacement.Right.Right.Now,youtalkedaboutJapan.Le{t}^{\prime }stalkaboutJapanalittlebit.HowlongdidyouliveinJapan?Istilldo.So{I}^{\prime }vebeenthereforfiveyears.Uh-huh.Andyousaidyoucan...Well,sowhatdoyouexperiencethereinrelationshiptoyourconcernsaboutpopulationdecline?LetmetellyouaboutacommunityinruralTokyo.Sothisistheworl{d}^{\prime }sbiggestcitybasedonsomemeasures.YougotothenorthwesternpartofTokyo,andther{e}^{\prime }sanareacalledTakeshimaDairo.I{t}^{\prime }sfeaturedinthedocumentary.In1973,the10,000homesinthisapartmentwerefilledwithyoungfamilies.Andther{e}^{\prime }sallfootagewhereyouseejustchildreneverywhere.Iwentbackwithsomeonewhowasachildinthosedays.Andyoucanhearthevoicesofthepast.Andtoday,i{t}^{\prime }saghosttown,buti{t}^{\prime }snotunoccupied.Ninety-eightpercentoftheapartmentsarestilloccupied.Butthe{y}^{\prime }reoldpeople.Andthe{y}^{\prime }remostlyoldwomenlivingalone.Yes,andthe{y}^{\prime }reoldwomenbecausemendieearly.Mendieearly.Right.Sothisisanother...Tha{t}^{\prime }sexactlyright.Sooneofthethingsthatyouseeasyoungpeopledisappearandasthepopulationagesisthatthelandscapeismadeupofisolatedoldwomenwhonoonecaresabout.Right.Adismaldestinyforallconcerned.I^{\prime }dlovepeople,frankly,towatchthedocumentarytoreallysensethisbecausether{e}^{\prime }sonescenethereanditisharrowing,buttoputitinsimpleterms,ther{e}^{\prime }san80-year-oldwomanwhohasnofamily,wh{o}^{\prime }scontemplatingsuicidebecausesh{e}^{\prime }snothingtolivefor,noonetolivefor,andnoonetocommunicate.No,sheshouldmovetoCanada.Wehaveanicemedicallyassisteddeathprogramheretha{t}^{\prime }s,Ithink,accountingforsomethinglikethreetofivepercentofalldeathsnow.So,youknow,ther{e}^{\prime }sasolutionforeveryonetocontemplate.Yeah,well,Ijustworry...Infact,therewasaJapaneseprofessorwhocameouttheotherdayaweekagosuggestingthatitwouldbemorallyappropriatefortheolderpeopleinJapantoconsidersuicideasarouteoutbecausethe{y}^{\prime }reaburdentosociety.Andnowh{e}^{\prime }sbacktrackingsayinghedid{n}^{\prime }treallymeanthat.Buti{t}^{\prime }sdangerousonceyoustarttoputthatouttherebecausetherearepeople.Youknow,IrememberaconversationwithayoungwomaninJapanandtalkingaboutherfuture,andIdidthatwithalotofpeople,over230peopleIinterviewedin24countries.Andshementionedthathergrandmotherwaslivingwithherfamily.Butshementionedtheburdenofhergrandmothertothefamily.AndshecameoutwiththepointthatIguessmanymightbethinkingwhenyo{u}^{\prime }rethatage,whyisshestillhere?Andwhenyouhearthat,youknow,andthenyoumeetpeoplewhoarethatagewhoIthinkhavestillsomuchtogivetosociety,the{y}^{\prime }rejustexcludedfromit.The{y}^{\prime }renot.Well,i{t}^{\prime }shardifthe{y}^{\prime }renotintegratedin...Well,sometimesi{t}^{\prime }shardiftheyareintegratedintoafamily,buti{t}^{\prime }sdefinitelyharderifthe{y}^{\prime }renot.I{t}^{\prime }salsothecasethatalotofpeoplewhocontemplatesuicidedothatnotsomuchbecausethe{y}^{\prime }respecificallysuffering,althoughthatcancertainlybeacontributingfactor,butbecausetheydobelievethattheyarefundamentallybestconstruedasaburdenandthattheworld,includingthepeoplearoundthem,wouldbebetteroffiftheydisappeared.Sotha{t}^{\prime }saverysad,whatwouldyousay,realmtoinhabitinyourmiseryandisolation.Socanwewalkthroughthestructureofthedocumentary?Yes,ofcourse.Yeah.Soi{t}^{\prime }sjustsoeveryonelisteningisreminded,i{t}^{\prime }scalledthenameofthedocumentaryisBirthGap.Andsole{t}^{\prime }swalkthroughthestructureofit.Firstofall,thetitleBirthGap,I^{\prime }vegottojustexplainwhyisitcalledBirthGap.Whatisabirthgap?Tome,i{t}^{\prime }swhatIdefineasthegapbetweenthenumberofoldpeopletosupportinsocietyandbirths.Soi{t}^{\prime }sanindicationof,frankly,ameasurethatw{e}^{\prime }renottakingaccountoftoday.Whatisthatratio?Sotome,tobeveryhonestwithyou,whetherwehit9billionormaybe10,i{t}^{\prime }strivial.I{t}^{\prime }sgoingtohappen.I{t}^{\prime }sgoingtobeinthatballpark.Whetherwelikeitornot,tha{t}^{\prime }sgoingtohappen.Yeah.Andwhatactuallymattersistheagestructure.SoBirthGapisthetitleofthemovie.Tha{t}^{\prime }swhereitcomesfrom.BeforeIwentonthisjourney,ChapterOneismeliterallygoingwithaniPad,showingpeopledata.WestartedinItaly,wewenttoSwitzerland,wewenttoJapan,andjuststartedtotalktopeopleaboutwha{t}^{\prime }shappeningintheirownsocieties.Sohowdidyoumoveintotherealmofdocumentaryfilmmaking?Well,Ihavetothankmysecondson,Adam,forthat,becausemyideaatthispoint,Imean,I^{\prime }mnotafilmmaker.Icertainlywas{n}^{\prime }tthen.Mythoughtwas,thisisabigproblem.Icanwriteabookaboutthis.IthoughtjustaboutIhavetheabilitytowrite,toexplainthis.AndwhatIwantedtodo,becausether{e}^{\prime }sotherbooksoutthere,wascomeupwithanewwaytohelpvisualizethisproblemandtousethebooktokindofcommunicate.AndIfelt,well,maps,noon{e}^{\prime }sreallycomeupwiththestructureofamap.Andindoingthis,IwasexplainedtomysonAdam,andhesaid,Dad,nooneourage,hisage,readsbooksanymore.Weallwatchdocumentaries.Right,right.Orlistentothem.Orlistentothem.Yeah.Andforme,well,tha{t}^{\prime }snotme.Ther{e}^{\prime }snowayIcouldpossiblydothat.Andthenbychance,afriendofafriend,wh{o}^{\prime }saformervideographer,newsanchorforaWashington,D.C.newsnetwork,butwasgoingoutonherown,andlongstoryshort,wethought,well,okay,le{t}^{\prime }sseeifwecanmakethiswork.AndIbroughtheralongfortwoweekstofilmthefirstinterviews,thinkingifnothingelse,thisisgoingtobeanarchiveformyownresearch.Right,right,right.Savedmenote-takingwhile{I}^{\prime }mlisteningtoallofthesepeople.Andaswegotintoit,thepersonalstoriesopenedupofpeoplewhoyoucouldseethemcontemplatingthefutureoftheirlives.LikeonespringstomindayoungelementaryschoolteacherinSwitzerland,30yearsold,ayoungman.AndwhenwewalkedthroughwithhimthefutureofelementaryschoolsinSwitzerland,youcouldseetheprocessinhismind,realizingw{e}^{\prime }renotgoingtoneedanywherenearthenumberofelementaryschoolteachersthatwehavenowandwhatthatmightmeanforhim.Sothedocumentarystartsliterallywithmeaskingpeopleincountries,whyisthishappening?Andfrankly,Iwashoping,inthisentireproject,Iwasexpectingatsomepointtositdownanddosomeformofregressivemodel,tofindacorrelationbetweensomethingthatwouldlinkthesesmalldragons,thesefallingbirthratesinJapan,GermanyandItaly,becausetheywerehappeningatthesametimeandneverspreading.Inevergottothatpoint,and{I}^{\prime }mverygratefulIdid{n}^{\prime }t,becauseIprobablywouldhavefoundsomethinglikeicecreamsaleshappenedatthesametime.Somecuriousthingwouldhavecomeup.I{t}^{\prime }sveryhardtoidentify.Well,itseemsobviousthatoneofthecauses,thedistalcauses,Iwouldsayclearly,isthepromotionofthebirthcontrolpill.Buteventhatisasomewhatshallowanswer,becausether{e}^{\prime }saveryspecificsetofsocialandeconomicrealities,zeitgeist,thatevenmadetheinventionanddistributionandacceptanceofthebirthcontrolpossible.Youhadtohavethepsychologicalstagesetfortheacceptanceofthattechnology,thedemandforthattechnology,beforeitcouldbedevelopedorimplemented.Andso,well,okay,soyoustartedthedocumentary,yo{u}^{\prime }reinchapterone,yo{u}^{\prime }restartingtoaskpeoplewha{t}^{\prime }sgoingon.Whataretheytellingyou?Yeah,well,noonehadaclearanswer,andmaybethatwasoverlysimplistic,butwhatIwastryingtodowasfindsomecommonthread.Butletmejust,ifIcan,talkaboutcontraceptives,becausether{e}^{\prime }sawonderfulcounterexample.ThecontraceptivepillwasnotlegalizedinJapanuntil1990.AnditwasonlylegalizedbecauseViagrawaslegalized.Andatthatpoint,womensaid,wait,yo{u}^{\prime }vebeenblockingthecontraceptivepill,andnowyo{u}^{\prime }reallowingViagra,andatthatpointitwasmadeaccessible.Soyouhadtheprecipitousdeclineinbirthrate.From73,youhadanincreaseinmassabortions.Sothiswasasocietalissue.Right,right,sothatshowsthati{t}^{\prime }ssomethingdeeperthantheurinepill.I{t}^{\prime }ssomethingdeeper.Andalso,ifyoulookatothercountries,particularlyUKatthetime,FrancetotheUS,whereyoualsohadaccesstothecontraceptivepill,youwerenotseeingfallingbirthrates.Andalotofpeoplewouldsay,well,i{t}^{\prime }sobviousitwasindustrialization.Itwassomethingtodowithurbanization.Butthecorrelationsare{n}^{\prime }tthere.Ifyoulookat,well,whydidthisonlyhappeninthosethreecountries?Andtheanswercomesbackto,I^{\prime }dlovepeopletoseeitunfoldinadocumentary,buti{t}^{\prime }sasuddenincreaseinthisunplannedinvoluntarychildlessnesshappenedinGermany,Italy,thosecountriesatthesametime.Well,i{t}^{\prime }sdefinitelythecasethataswomenbecomemoreeducated,theyhavefewerchildren.Andtha{t}^{\prime }snowtheprecisecausalpathwaythereis{n}^{\prime }tobvious.Onesimplesuggestionwouldbethatitisamatterofaccidentaldelay.Imean,I^{\prime }veseenthisinmydaughter.Youknow,mydaughter,althoughshehadterriblehealthproblemsandthatcomplicatedherlifealot,shehadinitiallythoughtthatshemightwanttogobeaphysician.Buttha{t}^{\prime }slike12years.Andshewasalsoveryorientedtowardshavingchildren.Andsh{e}^{\prime }smanagedtohaveonechilddespiteherhealthproblems.Butthatdesiretopursueanintenseeducationalpathwaydoesexistinconflict,certainlywithanearlystarttofamilydevelopment.Ifyoupresumethatthatdoes{n}^{\prime }tmatterbecauseyo{u}^{\prime }vegottime,yo{u}^{\prime }renotgoingtofindoutthatis{n}^{\prime }ttruefor10yearsinyourownlife,andmaybetheculturewo{n}^{\prime }tfindouttha{t}^{\prime }strueforlike30years.Youknow,Imean,westilltellyoungwomenwhoare19,ImadeacommentthatwasclippedonanInstagramreelbysomeoneaboutthefactthatwealwayslietoyoungwomenaboutwha{t}^{\prime }sgoingtobeimportantintheirlives.Wetellthemi{t}^{\prime }sgoingtobeallcareer.I^{\prime }veworkedinfemaledominatedindustriesmywholelife.Andwhat{I}^{\prime }veobservedisamongmenandwomenalikethati{t}^{\prime }saveryrarepersonforwhomcareeristhemostimportantthingintheirlife.Evenifthe{y}^{\prime }remen,althoughi{t}^{\prime }strueformoremen,i{t}^{\prime }strueforvirtuallynowomenbythetimetheyhit30.Andtheamountofvitriolthatcommentgeneratedwasunparalleled.Andtha{t}^{\prime }ssomethingbecause{I}^{\prime }vehadplentyofvitriolgeneratedfromthingsIsaid,butthatwas,anditwasallyoungwomen,youknow,talkingabouthowsomeoldwhiteguylikemehadnorighttotellyoungwomenwhattodowiththeirbodies,whichImostcertainlywasnot.Butitis,youcanseeasimplepathwaythere,right?I{t}^{\prime }slike,well,wehavethisavenuewherewecanpursueourcareerandoureducationandeverythingelsewewant,andthenw{e}^{\prime }llbeabletosolvetheproblemofhavingafamily.Theproblemwiththatis,well,i{t}^{\prime }shardenoughtofindamatewhenyo{u}^{\prime }re23,24.Bythetimeyo{u}^{\prime }re30,i{t}^{\prime }sevenmoredifficult.Andbythetimeyo{u}^{\prime }re35,i{t}^{\prime }sstartingtobecomewellnighimpossibletofindamateandgetpregnantandhaveafamily,especiallyifyo{u}^{\prime }regoingtohavemorethanonekid.Andso,well,sother{e}^{\prime }sadirectconflicttherebetweentheavenuesthatareopentowomenandtheneedtostrikewhiletheiro{n}^{\prime }shotonthereproductivefront.Nobodyreallyknowshowtoreconcilethat.Imean,i{t}^{\prime }sodd,becausewomenwillliveaboutsevenyearslongerthanmen.Soitcouldbethecasethatthesocietalnormcouldbethatwomenhavetheirchildrenwhenthe{y}^{\prime }requiteyoungandthengobacktoschoolintheir30s.Thatwouldactuallyworkout.Inprinciple,thatcouldworkoutquitenicely,butwedo{n}^{\prime }thavethenormsinplacetomakethatapossibility.Butwehavetostartaddressingexactlythis,becauseifwedo{n}^{\prime }t,youknow,tome,Imean,ther{e}^{\prime }ssomanyideastodayaboutreproductivetechnologythatareoverstated.Oh,yes,terribly.Freezeyoureggs.Andeggs40.Ifyouhaveapartnerandifyoustillhaveenergy,youmightthen...Yes,andeverythinggoeswell.Andyouhavethemoney.Andtheemotionalstamina.Allofthat.Sopartofwhat{I}^{\prime }mhopingtodothroughthedocumentaryandmyworkafterthisistojustincreaseawareness,particularlytowomen,butyouneedamanaswell.Soi{t}^{\prime }sboththatthefertilitywindowismuchshorterandtheabilityofchildrengetsharderandharder.I{t}^{\prime }snotjustaboutgettingpregnant.I{t}^{\prime }saboutbeingabletodeliver,youknow,beingabletoseethepregnancythrough,whichgetsexponentiallyhardervery,veryquickly.IshouldmentionIinterviewedfivefertilitydoctorsforthedocumentaryitself.And,youknow,eachoneofthemwantedtoopenupaboutthechallenges,becausenormallytheyhavetoselltheirservices.NormallyIhavetotellpeople,thinkpositively.Her{e}^{\prime }swhatw{e}^{\prime }vedoneforotherpeople.Her{e}^{\prime }swhatwecandoforyou.Whattheyweretellingtomeopenly,andfranklygettingquiteemotionalaboutitonacoupleofoccasions,wasi{t}^{\prime }sterriblebecausesooftenitdoes{n}^{\prime }tworkout.Well,oneinthreecouplesbytheageof30havepronouncedfertilityproblemsdefinedasinabilitytoconceivewithinayearofembarkingontheendeavorconsciously.Right.Sotha{t}^{\prime }soneinthree.Andofcourseitjustgetsworseandworseasagecreepsup.And30isnotthatold.Anditdoesmeanthatwomenhaveadamntightwindow.I{t}^{\prime }s13years,le{t}^{\prime }ssay,bythetimeyo{u}^{\prime }re17.Bysomestandardsyo{u}^{\prime }rematureenoughtoconsiderreproduction,17or18,ontheextremeend.Andthen,well,35istheotherendofthatdistribution.Andyo{u}^{\prime }replayingwithfirebythetimeyo{u}^{\prime }redelaying,especiallyifyoudo{n}^{\prime }thaveapartner,bythetimeyo{u}^{\prime }redelayinguntil35.Andifyouwantthreechildren,youknow.Yeah,well,right.I^{\prime }mthinkingjustone.Youknow,andi{t}^{\prime }salsothecase,Ithinkifyo{u}^{\prime }reareasonableobserverofhumannature,youseethatpeoplehavethreesourcesoffundamentalgratificationintheirlives.Oneistheirpursuitoftheirowninterests,includingcareerandjob.Oneistheirintimaterelationship,andtheotheristheirfamily.Andobviouslytheintimaterelationshipandthefamilyareveryintegrallyassociated.Andifyoumissoutononeofthose,youmaybeabletofillitbyexceptionalabilityintheremainingdomains.Butformostpeople,notonlyisthathighlyunlikely,i{t}^{\prime }salsohighlyundesirable.Sototakethepointaswell,hereIam,anoldermaletalkingaboutthingsthatareverysensitivetowomen.Buttherearealotofwomenouttheresayingtheexactsamething.Andtherewasonethismorning,IgotanemailfromMelanieNotkin,wh{o}^{\prime }swrittenabookcalledOtherhood,whoherselfhasnochildren.Andsheputitsuccinctlythatinherwords,womenaregoingthroughtheeducationpath,thecareerpath,totrytoultimatelyfallinloveandhaveafamily.Yeah,right.I{t}^{\prime }salllinked.Yeah,well,Ithinki{t}^{\prime }sthesameformen.Ithinksotoo.Halfthereason,half,i{t}^{\prime }smorethanthat,halfthereasonthatmenstriveforcareersuccessistoimpresswomenandattractthem.Infact,i{t}^{\prime }shigherthanthat.Butmaybethatpointistheheartoftheproblemwehavetoday,becausetoday,ifyoulookatwh{o}^{\prime }satcollegeandwh{o}^{\prime }sactuallyearningmorerightnow,IreadthismorningwomenincitiesintheUSareearningmorethanmen.Ido{n}^{\prime }tknowiftha{t}^{\prime }srightorwrong,butyouhavethissituation.Yeah,i{t}^{\prime }srightunder30.SoinUScollegesrightnow,Ibelievei{t}^{\prime }s9.5millionwomenandaround6.5,7millionmen.Oh,andthewomenstartdroppingoutofcollege,bytheway,whentheystarttooutnumberthemen2to1.Becausealotofthereasonpeoplegotocollege,yo{u}^{\prime }vegottoaskyourself,wha{t}^{\prime }scollegefor?I{t}^{\prime }slike,well,togeteducated,togotolectures,tobeaccredited.I{t}^{\prime }slike,no,probablynot.Probablythereasonpeoplegotocollegeistofindamate.Andther{e}^{\prime }saselectedpoolthere,andyouhaveadecentchanceoffindingsomeoneofapproximatelyyourabilityandforward-lookingvision,le{t}^{\prime }ssay.Andthereasonpeoplearewillingtoshelloutbetween$150,000 and $250,000 for four years is in no small part so that they can find a mate. Well, if you demolish that by, well, radically decreasing the number of available men, for example, you’re just going to blow the whole enterprise out of the water, which is already what’s happening. Absolutely. And this is perhaps my greatest concern, because I think if we make young people more aware of the fertility window, they might want to have children earlier. If we link that to, in some way, enabling careers later in life, which has to fundamentally happen for this to work, we might still be left with a situation where women who, the term is hypergeny, where women typically want to marry someone at least as educated, at least as successful, taller than they are. But if we’re in a situation where there’s so few men getting the same level of education, we might be left with this imbalance. Oh, yeah, that’s already happening, clearly. It’s very difficult for women to overcome the hypergamous instinct because they’re trying to redress the imbalance in terms of reproductive responsibility. There’s no evidence at all. You get a little bit of flattening of hypergamy in extremely egalitarian societies like Scandinavia, but it certainly doesn’t disappear. And so that’s built in at a very fundamental biological level. And I don’t think any casual tinkering on the anthropological or sociological front is going to shift that a bit. So that’s a big problem. It’s also the case, too, that if marriages where the wife outearns or outstatuses the husband, tend to be comparatively unstable and violent. So, you know, now you can lay that at the feet of the men if you’re inclined to, but in some sense it doesn’t really matter because that’s the way it is. And so the women are unhappy and the men are threatened, and that’s just not a good recipe for marital stability. So everyone loses in this situation. So let’s talk about another country, Thailand. So you would think if you asked me how many women are in college in Thailand, I might have said 15 percent. I have no idea, but it’s 55 percent. 40 percent of men are in college in Thailand. So you have a similar shift even there. And what’s happening to the men? In the documentary, we went to a temple where monks are trying to rehabilitate young men who fell out of college or didn’t go to college, moreover. What they did at age 16, 18, was turn to alcohol. It was turn to substances to drive taxis because they could get some cash because there was no point trying to compete with a woman. So you have these deep societal problems, but yet they want to be really clear that the answer to this is not in some way preventing women from getting an education. That’s just not going to function. How are you going to do that? Wow, you also lose access to half the world’s brain power. Of course, of course. There are people who think that and there are people who I think want to use this conversation to promote that because I’ve seen comments along those lines too often. This has to be therefore partly about men in some way asking why are men excluded from society? Why are they becoming incels? In Japan they call them otaku, the young man who stays home playing his gaming systems. See, I don’t think that’s the right question. I think we almost always ask questions backwards. Why people become useless, that’s not a mystery. It’s easy to be useless. The mystery is why that doesn’t happen to everyone all the time. And the answer is because we build up extremely careful structures of societal discipline to encourage people to adopt mature long-term responsibility and to reward them judiciously for doing so. And when you allow those structures to collapse or work consciously to undermine them, then you get default to the default. And the default is useless. It’s short-term gratification. And so you never need an explanation for that. It’s like, well, why do people turn to short-term gratification? Because it’s gratifying in the short term. It’s easy. Now, you know, getting men, encouraging men to shed their Peter Pan persona, juvenile Peter Pan persona, and to adopt mature responsibility, that’s a real challenge for every society. And we are increasingly not only failing at doing that, but punishing young men for developing, say, the virtues of ambition and, well, and even sexual desire for that matter. So, all right, so Chapter One, you went and interviewed a variety of people and just started to flesh out the territory. How does that unfold after that? Well, it comes to the point where I realize there’s a moment I realize there is a connection across all these countries, and it’s to do with this structure of the family. You know, you would expect if you’re having fewer children, you know, and some of these organizations encourage people to have fewer children, have fewer smaller families, you would expect if they had had any success or if people were doing it, you would have a lot of families with only one child. But actually, singletons are actually really quite rare in life, and they’re no more common today than they were 30, 40 years ago. So, I started to discover… So, you see people with zero children. Right. That’s the only… How do you get a fertility rate of less than replacement levels? You know, the number of people having one child are none. So, connecting that allowed me to start to ask more questions about childlessness and about aspirations in life and that really… I see. So, it’s not a matter of small families. No. It’s a matter of no family. That’s right. And then it’s a matter of involuntary no family. That’s right. Okay, got it. I didn’t end up doing any regressive analysis because it’s a counting problem. You know, we were counting this the wrong way. You just simply need to look at the number of people having one child, two, three, four, and you find this gap, and you find that gap getting wider and wider. And it effectively explains the entire fall below replacement level. I see. I see. I see. But there’s really good news here, too. The best news in all of this is that if the majority or significant number of those people who are involuntarily on planned childlessness, as I call it, if they were having a family, they’re not going to have one. They’re going to have in the same proportions, one, two, three, four, five, plus. It’s all about having that first child. So, the documentary… Right. Well, the pre-… Look, the second child is pretty straightforward after the first. And once you’ve got two, you’re already completely screwed. You might as well have three. Then the kids start to take care of each other, by the way, too, which is something that parents don’t understand. If you have eight kids, it’s not like you’re taking care of eight kids. The kids start to form their own society and take care of each other. Yeah, and there’s great examples of that in the documentary. Or at least in my journey, you saw in Italy this mother of four children saying she educated her eldest daughter, taught her how to read, and she taught the next daughter how to read, and she taught the next one how to read. So, that’s certainly true. But the good news is here, because family structure is really locked in, once, of course, if you go to some countries, as I did in Africa, you’ve got high birth rates because of poverty. Somewhat access to reproductive services, but mostly that’s covered now. Mostly it is. So, we’ve got poverty. The people in Africa need children to go and get the water. But a lot of good things are being done. That poverty level is coming way down. And we’re seeing in Africa, on average, in sub-Saharan Africa, just to cover that briefly, the average woman is having one less child every 15 years. It’s around four now. So, around 30 years’ time, we’re looking at Africa starting to get down towards replacement level. It’s on the same path. Yeah, yeah, yeah. That’s the reasonable assumption based on the data right now. So, once you get to that point, and this is what I think the world of demography really skipped over, is that it’s not the same form. It’s not like you look at families going from four to two and then down to 1.5 and say, this is the same trend. It’s not. When you get to replacement level, when women are having pretty much the family size that they actually want, childlessness kicks in. And it’s that that pulls it down a different level. So, the next part of the documentary, then, going to people, finding out what their young people, what their aspirations for the future was, then also talking to men and women who hadn’t had children, why they didn’t, what it meant to their lives. And that gets quite rough. So, what do you find on the aspirational front, Ben? Oh, the majority, the significant majority of people, young people, expect or want to have children someday. Right, right. Now, I do have some concerns, but no evidence for it, but it’s just a natural concern. And what we’re seeing in the world today, perhaps this over-focus on the environment, is through fear. Yeah. Persuading people more than you would normally expect to not think of children. But I have hope around that because this internal desire really does seem to kick in. I think it’s not so much fear that’s interfering on that front. I think it’s actually demoralization. Right? Because this is especially true for, let’s say, decent young men who would like to be moral actors. If they’re told continually, which they are, that all of their male pattern behaviors, for example, in school, are disruptive, and that their male ambition is nothing but a reflection of the tyrannical patriarchy, and that any interest they might evoke, they might evince towards women, is part of the predatory pattern of male behavior, then it demoralizes them, literally. It makes them feel like their natural proclivity for ambitious striving, let’s say, and sexual desire is immoral. And the people you hurt the most by doing that are the people who have a moral heart, because the ones who don’t don’t care, and the ones who do. I had a friend, his name was Rob Dernan, and he fell prey to this anti-male narrative very early in his life. This is like 40 years ago, 50 years ago, and he was definitely guilty about his role as a patriarchal male, let’s say. And he did everything he could to adopt a kind of nihilistic Buddhism and just take himself out of life. He thought everything he did was, and everything that men did in general, was just part of the destructive force that was ravaging the world, and he eventually committed suicide. It was awful. I watched that unfold for 50 years. And I would say he had his flaws like everyone does, and in that self-destructive pathway, there can be a fair bit of, let’s say, unconscious self-serving, but fundamentally, he was overwhelmed by existential guilt in relationship to being male, and that eventually convinced him to do himself in. It was quite the catastrophic voyage, all things considered, and I know perfectly well that that’s not rare, because I’ve talked to thousands of young men who have been demoralized to the point of suicide, and that story is, I’d say that’s the archetypal story. So it’s not fear exactly. It’s an assault. It’s a moral assault. And it’s unconscionable. It’s an unconscionable moral assault. If your solution to saving the planet is that you have to demoralize young people so badly that they even abstain from sex, then there’s seriously something wrong with your worldview, and maybe we can call out Paul Ehrlich on that front, for example. Alright, so now you’re starting to talk to people about their aspirations. You’re finding out that young people do want to have a family, and that doesn’t mean one child. It means a family. But they’re not prioritizing that properly? What happens to the people who end up without children? Well, there’s no path to it. The path is education, education, education, usually. Not for everyone, but… And then debt? Sure, debt. But debt’s not the driver because education in some countries is much lower than the US. So some people will say, oh, debt’s the problem. It’s not a good thing. It can’t help. And that’s career, career, career. And no one is guiding people to say, actually, there is a moment in time when you really need to prioritize this. So we’ve left young people to find a path on their own, having sent them off as parents, as societies, to find a path in life that will get them to where they want to be, which everyone, I think, implicitly assumes, for most people, not all, will involve love and will involve children. Yeah. But actually what’s happening is when young people are getting to that point, they’re often in their 30s because no one really is thinking that 30 is too late at all. But, I mean, just another statistic. If you look across every country we had data on, the probability of becoming a parent, a mother rather, the probability of someone without children age 30 ever becoming a parent at most, at most, is 50%. Really? That’s just the outcome. By 30? By 30. If you haven’t had your first child by 30, in most countries, it’s lower than that. And why is that? Do you know? I mean, there must be multiple causes. Part of that would be partnerlessness. Part of that would be fertility difficulties. What are the major contributors to that? The major contributor is not finding a partner at the right time. Yeah, right. Or when you do find a partner, you have challenges. Yeah, well, the other thing that is painful to point out to women is that 30-year-old women aren’t competing with other 30-year-old women for partners. They’re competing with 18 to 35-year-old women for partners. And so all things considered, if you’re 30 and you’re looking for a mate and you want children, you’re putting an awful lot of pressure one way or another on your 30-year-old male target. Because his option is to find a 25-year-old woman who all things being equal is of the same value as you are, except that you’re 30. And that means his time frame is now shortened in a manner that wouldn’t be the case if he married someone younger. Plus, women tend to prefer men who are slightly older than them. Well, not exactly slightly. It’s actually four years is the average internationally. And so the optimal target for a 25-year-old woman is a 29-year-old man. And so it’s rude to point such things out, but mate selection is a very difficult problem. And it’s also exacerbated by the fact that this is also a terrible thing, is that because of this hypergamous tendency of women, as women are, I knew a lot of very successful young women who worked in the legal field, and they were often stars in their firms, extremely able people. And generally they were very vivacious, attractive, intelligent, educated, and intimidating as hell, two men. And not that interested in someone who didn’t have the same ability and status they did, which was almost no one. So then they’re 30, they’re extremely choosy, and you could say they have a right to be. But the problem is, well, yeah, you’re 30 and you’re extremely choosy, and your pool of available candidates has basically shrunk to none. Because first of all, a lot of men are already snapped up by the time they’re 30, so there’s that reduction right off the bat. And then if you’re going to reject, women rate 80% of men on dating sites as below average in attractiveness, and that’s just the baseline, right? For the women who are high status and high attractive, let’s say, very able on the career front, and the men they’re going to regard as acceptable, that’s a vanishingly small proportion of men. So that’s part of the reason why they, what would you say, select themselves out of the mating market. That’s brutal, man, it’s brutal. And I watched women struggle with that, like Mad, and certainly had no shortage of sympathy for them. But the mere fact that you’re sympathetic to someone doesn’t mean that the brute reality that confronts them has been altered in any manner whatsoever. A couple of points on that. So I agree with all of that. What I see, and I get to, often once or twice a week have a coffee with a young person who has reached out, and you know when you talk about the documentary or friends or friends or friends, someone wants to talk to you about something personal. A common conversation would be women more than men, they’ve been dating someone for five years. They think they might want to, well different scenarios, they think they might want to settle out and have a child with them, but they’ve never talked about it. Well it’s only been five years. Right. Or they’ve already figured out they probably don’t want a child with this person. What should they do? Or, worst of all, they’ve just broken up because they’ve been dating this guy for seven years, and he’s not got another girlfriend who’s 25, and she’s pregnant. Oh my god, yeah, that’s a brutal situation. Brutal? But those are real life stories. Oh yeah, all that’s very common. So the idea of dating someone for an extended period, my children are now 27 to 20, they’re getting to that point where to me I’m thinking of my own children, when I think of these young people and the advice I would give them, and frankly the advice I usually give, and I’m not a clinical psychologist, but people are asking for advice and I’ve talked to a lot of people is, if you’re unsure, break up. Because you know what, if it feels wrong after you’ve broken up, you’ll get back together quickly. And I’d say more often… The other advice too is get the hell at it. You think you have a long time to decide. Well here’s a way of thinking about it. If you’re reasonably attractive, you’ll be able to try out five people. That’s it. That’s what you’ve got. You know, because it takes a while to find someone, and then it takes a while to get to know them. And finding them and getting to know them, that’s probably something approximating one to two years. And if you do that five times, that’s ten years, and that’s your fertility window. And so you think you have time, but that’s a delusion. And you think the right person will come around. Well first of all, that’s a delusion to begin with, because you build a relationship, you don’t find one. Now you should have some sense when you pick your partner, to the degree that you have the luxury to have some sense. But the notion that the person right for you will come along at the right time, that’s just not the case. That isn’t how things work at all. And if you know that even if you’re very attractive, that the list of true candidates is probably five. And for some people, it’s one or zero. And so that’s… It’s hard, eh, because when you’re 17 or 16, especially if you’re attractive, and I would say this is especially true if you’re an attractive young woman, you have no shortage, generally speaking, of people who are interested in you. And it looks like that’s sort of a landscape of plenty. But that doesn’t mitigate against the fact that it still takes a long time to get to know people and to find the right person. Now men have it a bit easier on that front, I would say, because I had one friend who didn’t have a child until he was 55. You know, that can always be the case for men, and so the pressure isn’t on in the same way. But even with men, had I married my wife earlier, we would have had more kids, you know, and that didn’t happen. And we got married comparatively early for our social class, say, and educational background. Okay, so now you’re talking to people and you’re finding out they want to have kids, and then they find out that they don’t get to, right, a little bit too late. And so where does the documentary go from there? So from there we take it into the consequences. The consequences, well, they’re partly personal, but partly economic. But everything ultimately is personal, because everything ultimately comes back to, you know, whether it’s you and your life and how you live it, and whether you’re lonely or not, or how much the state can help you, particularly in your later years, through health care, through pensions, through your city providing basic services like water. It all comes back together. So we explore a lot of those. And by the way, I sat down with, I believe, about a dozen experts, many professors, many, you know, a priest, a monk, people involved working with government health care programs around the world. So we hear these voices. And other than one organization, which happens to be the successor to what Paul Ehrlich set up, they were the only organization who took an optimistic view. Of course, they would do that. Everybody else is negative. Everybody else is worried about the future consequences of this. And just by the way, I should call this out. So they set up an organization, author of the Population Bomb, of course, called ZPG, which evolved into another organization. Zero population growth. Yeah. It evolved into another organization that still has something like 30,000 teachers who train other teachers, who educate 4 million U.S. high school kids every year. And they explain the population problems, usually in Africa, and their message is, please think about this. Yeah. Well, there’s nothing racist about the too many African narrative. Yeah. And when you teach someone like two and two is four, you don’t say, think about that. But when you say, here’s the problem in Africa, and you say to a, think about that, you’re not really saying, think about Africa. You’re thinking about, you know, do you want the kids or not? So that’s covered in the documentary as well as part of the narrative as to why we still have this viewpoint, when frankly, we should have known about this, you know, decades ago. Well, we can also look at the self-evident economic statistics demonstrating that since Paul Ehrlich and his Population Bomb and the Club of Rome, etc., these anti-population zealots started beating the drum back in 1965, saying that we were all going to starve to death by the year 2000 when we’ll have 4 billion people, God help us, and now we have 8, and the relationship between wealth growth and population has been extremely positive, not negative or flat, and everyone on the planet virtually is richer than, well, than anyone had ever conceived of. And it’s clearly the case that we could manage this if we had half the will to do it. And so the data are in. One of the things I’ve really learned is that I believe the whole idea of natural resource, almost the whole idea of natural resource is specious in that human beings, the wealth of the planet is dependent on the psychological health and the structures of governance that are put in place by people of goodwill, and that if we organize ourselves properly and aim up, there is no real limit to abundance, and it’s certainly not population dependent. We’re not in a zero-sum game. We are not yeast in a Petri dish. We’re not doomed to a Malthusian outcome. And the biologists who make that claim and say it’s scientific are assuming that the yeast in the Petri dish model of human function is the appropriate biological model, and it’s not. And the reason for that is because we can let our ideas die instead of us, and we can learn, and we can transform, and we’re very good at that. And there’s no justification whatsoever for stating that it’s a scientific fact that population increase is going to produce a Malthusian catastrophe. Now it can in limited circumstances, but we are not yeast in a Petri dish. That’s the wrong model. So I can’t disagree. I’m a data analyst. I’m only prepared to comment when I have done my own work or have seen detailed work of others. I can’t imagine how complicated it must be to model the planet. I mean, that’s on a level beyond anything any rational statistician could do alone. It’s models on top of models on top of models. Yeah. So where I come from is, to be honest with you, I don’t know. But I do know that we are adaptive. I do know that we should prepare because, to be honest with you, green technology sounds like pretty cool things when you look at Teslas out there. They’re not perfect, but they’re… Remember, I work with a lot of automotive clients, but what Elon has done for the industry is phenomenal. And if we come at this from a point of view of positivity, what can we do? And I look at my own kids and their generation and the Malays, the belief that the world is coming to an end. The world is not coming to an end anytime soon because of this. Well, unless we precipitate it in that direction, which we seem to be striving to do with all diligence at the moment. Well, and to bring it back to the documentary, at this point we come back to this point of loneliness and meet people. I mean, there’s a scene where I go to a crematorium in Germany. And I’m hoping to find out something about what it’s like to bury people who have no family. I nearly got an interview directly with the director, but he refused to meet me. And an intermediary kind of sat down to explain why. And it’s horrendous. And so this is off camera, but I got a long note recently with more information as to what’s happening. People with no family in care homes are being effectively mistreated, malnourished, tied to their beds for long periods of time. And we know this, or it’s known in this crematorium, because the bodies that come are, I guess, white and marked. And they weren’t prepared to say it because they’re fearful of the system. So someone should make a documentary about that alone. But it tells you that the life of these people without family, and we can’t see it because these people, whether it be in a suburb in Japan or in Germany or anywhere else, these people are spending their lives in their homes alone, hidden from the world. Well, the thing is, in our culture, we only seem to be able to apprehend life until about 30. Like, that’s our vision. You know, the vision is you’re young, you’re full of promise, you get educated, you have your career. And you’re 30. And what’s happening? Well, now you’re successful. It’s like, OK, but you got 60 years left there. What are you going to do with that? Well, how long is your career going to run you? Well, you know, lots of people think about early retirement, and that’s particularly perhaps the case if you’re successful economically. So let’s say you retired 50. OK, fair enough. You had 45 years left. What’s your vision for that? Well, now you’re alone. You don’t have a family. You don’t have a partner. You don’t have a career either. So what are you planning to do exactly? What’s your vision? And the answer is we don’t have a vision for that. We don’t have a vision for the expense of our life. And so and that’s an interesting thing in and of itself. I mean, you know, for a long time, back in the 1860s, people even in the West were struggling along on less than a dollar fifty a day in today’s money. And it’s not like people had the luxury of developing a lifetime vision. They were sort of fending off one disaster after another, like people do now who live in absolute privation. There’s about 800 million people like that still on the planet. And then once you get a little wealthier, a little more secure, you can start thinking about the future. And that’s very, very complicated. And this luxurious wealth we have is new enough so that our capacity to develop a lifetime vision hasn’t developed to a degree that’s sophisticated enough to take that whole time span into account. But this vision of isolated death with no one around you that cares, that’s I wouldn’t recommend that as your life from 70 to 95. It’s pretty damn dismal. So, Jordan, it’s going to be worse in less industrialized nations because you go to Brazil and as professors there, I met three of them. The phrase they used was, we’re getting old before we got rich in Brazil. So they can’t provide the infrastructure resources to the elderly on a level comparable to what we can. So the life of elderly people. So I look at, when I look at India with the birthrate now below replacement level, growing population because it’s so young, people are living longer, which is a good thing. But I’m looking at a future for India 30 years from now where you’re going to have so many old people and so few people to take care of them. So this is a problem that we focus too much on in our own societies. This is a global humanitarian crisis of old people who are going to be left by and large to some extent to fend for themselves. And when they’re not fending for themselves, they’re going to be mostly in their homes or alone. I find the psychological argument, I would say, probably more compelling. I think not because I take any issue to your forward looking projections, but because things are so unstable on the technological and economic and political front that projecting even a decade into the future seems in some ways like a fool’s errand, right? Because God only knows what’s coming down the pipelines with regards to new technology. But I think you can make an extraordinarily strong case that one of the things you don’t want to end up happening to you in your own life is to be involuntarily childless and isolated starting at the age of 30 going forward. Yes. Right. And so I do, you know, I’ve looked at the situation in China and in Japan with this, what do they call that, the inverted pyramidal distribution where there’s way more old people than young people. Obviously, that seems untenable on the technological or on the economic front. But I do think the psychological issue is much more present, should be much more present for young people. And the warning is don’t be thinking you’ve got a lot of time to get your act together because you don’t have as much time as you think and you want to get things going sooner than you might find it convenient. There’s never a convenient time to have a child. There’s stupid times to have a child, for sure. But there’s never a convenient time. And that’s the other thing people do, too. You know, when my wife and I finally got together, she was about 28 or so. She wanted to have a kid pretty, you know, pretty much right away. And I was finishing off my postdoc and I hadn’t got a permanent job yet. And my sense was, well, you know, everything’s not in place. And we talked that out for quite a while and decided to proceed regardless because there was no real reason for me to be concerned. The probability that I was going to be jobless was, barring catastrophe, zero. And you jump into the abyss holding hands with your wife, you know, there’s no right time. And the reason that’s so important to know is because the clock ticks while you’re waiting. And that’s also a catastrophe. And then it sneaks up on people unawares, as you just described, and takes them out. Not good. OK, so now you’re talking, now you’re investigating in the documentary the consequences of this involuntary childlessness. And do you progress past that? Yeah, well, so the consequences go into both the economic. We go to Detroit. We look at what might happen to the future of the world based on what’s happened to Detroit. Yeah. We look at, briefly, future pension systems. We look at AI technology, but only very briefly. And it’s a very important area that I’m sure many people, like you mentioned technology just now, but a comment from me is that robots don’t pay taxes. So simply saying, there’s going to be AI. They also don’t necessarily want to take care of you. So we’ll just see how that works out. And I think they’re going to be expensive. So the idea that AI is a solution just like this is probably oversimplified, possibly very oversimplified. But of course it has a role. Technology definitely has a role in this. So I might just turn away from this subject and say, let’s not worry about it for that reason. The final part of the documentary, and I have to credit a friend, I thought it was done after filming in probably 18 countries. I thought, well, this is enough now. I can see the global pattern. And this friend in LA said, no, you haven’t finished. You have to go to Africa. And you have to go to other countries like Bangladesh. And India had already been to, but I wanted to do more filming. I wanted to go into… We went to slums in Mumbai. We went to slums in Rio. I think five in Johannesburg. And I wanted to see what’s happening in the parts of the world that I think to some extent we might fear are exploding. And you have the same fundamental story happening everywhere, even Nigeria. So Nigeria is a good example of a country that’s moving towards lower birth rates at a much slower pace. There’ll be more people, by the way, in Nigeria by the year 2100 than there are in China for everyone watching and listening. That’s quite the shocking bit of information. Yeah. And you look at Nigeria and you still have a culture there where the more male children you have, it’s part of the bravado that you have. That’s that status reward. That’s the status. But you go to Ethiopia and you meet people there and you talk to professors there. And Ethiopia used to be like that, but the birth rate right now in Ethiopia is four. It used to be seven or eight, not that long ago. And there’s a transformation happening. So you can see and feel the transformation happening in Africa, just like everywhere else. So I like to think of the analogy that the world is on a roller coaster. And countries like Japan and Germany and Italy and now South Korea are in the front car. They’re over in terms of the peak population and sure, they’re aging and people are going to live longer and longer. So we’re not going to really see the drop for a little while, but we know what’s coming. Africa is in the rear car. They’re still on the way up, but the path is the same here. But perhaps the thing that struck me about Africa, where I’m planning to go back and spend a significant amount of time for my own purposes as much as anything, when you go through Africa and you go to Malawi, which is, I believe, World Bank data, the 12th poorest country in the world by GDP per person, and you go to a community and people are laughing, smiling, and you go to kind of an area that’s not even a soccer pitch. It’s nothing like a soccer pitch, but there’s a soccer ball there. There’s no rules, but you’ve got 30 kids running and screaming and laughing. And we’re there, and they come and say hi for a moment, but they want to get back and play soccer with each other. And to see that sense of community and that intergenerational community, maybe in some ways part of a solution here that we’ve, I think in Oregon for me, is that we’ve lost a sense of community for one reason or another. And so that’s something that surprised me, actually, how similar really we all are, and we’re just at different parts of that cycle. So you’ve laid out this documentary, and you’ve documented a problem that is not being attended to much, that’s a very pervasive problem, and that’s going to affect virtually everyone personally and sociologically. We talked a little bit about pathways. You know, I mean, it’s one thing, obviously, to diagnose a problem, and that’s not a straightforward thing to do, to see the problem and then to diagnose it. It’s a completely different order of things to start thinking about what might constitute an acceptable alternative. So in Hungary, what they’ve done, you probably know this, is that if you’re a mother in Hungary and you have one child, you’re now exempt from income tax at the federal level for the rest of your life, 25 percent, and then that scales up to 100 percent for four children. And the idea there was both practical and cultural. So the cultural idea was we need to signal that we value motherhood in children. And one of the more powerful signals that society has access to is economic signals. And the Hungarians have stopped the decline in their birth rate and tapped it up slightly. They’ve increased female participation in the workforce, by the way, 13 percent. So the feminists had objected, or some of them, that the Hungarian government was just turning women into baby-making factories, which is a hell of a nasty epithet, I might add. But what’s happened is the reverse, is more women are working now than before, and I suppose that’s because they get to keep more of their money, you know, and they can make childcare arrangements more straightforwardly and all of that. They’ve knocked the divorce rate down substantively. They’ve increased the marriage rate. They’ve knocked the abortion rate down 40 percent, 38 percent, with no compulsion, right? It’s not as easy to get an abortion in Hungary as it is in the US or Canada. And the legal limits there is 12 weeks instead of the 16 weeks, which is about what Americans think it should be. But the point is these alterations in policy have produced increases in fertility, increases in the marital rate, decreases in the divorce rate, decreases in the abortion rate, and those look arguably like desirable things. Do you see, and we talked a little bit about the fact that women live seven years longer, and so in principle have a time, let’s say eight years, where they could have children without really being at a competitive disadvantage on the economic front with men, assuming that it is a competitive landscape, and that’s also not particularly obvious to me. I mean, have your thoughts turned to what might constitute an appropriate pathway forward for young people? Well, I certainly would quite boldly say what will not work, because there’s so many examples of things that have been tried and tried and tried and tried. Now we’ll come back to Hungary in a moment, because it is very interesting. But if you look at baby bonus programs globally, at best what they do is temporarily increase the birth rate, and then you see a dip, and the dip usually goes below where it was before. All you’ve done is bring forward the people who would have had kids anyway. Yeah, right, right, right. And you look at the amount of money, certainly in Japan, certainly in South Korea, are spending on kindergarten. Yeah, that doesn’t seem to help. In Quebec it did make a bit of difference. No, it isn’t lack of childcare that’s causing this problem. Yeah, and it’s not income either. So a lot of people think it is income, and it’s a natural thing, I think, for people thinking, well, if I had a little bit more money at the right time, or my apartment’s too small. But actually what you find is that when people have more money in their pocket, birth rates go down, they do other things. It’s like, we can take this vacation now. Well, I also think that their expectations for what constitutes sufficiently prepared for children also change. Like I said, when I was in Montreal, I was already educated, I had a job, it was clear I was going to get a job, but my standard for what was sufficient security and opportunity for my children rose along with my horizon of vision on the economic front. And it’s also not the case that more security makes you liable to take more risks. That isn’t how life works. You have to jump into children just like you jump into a marriage, or into your life for that matter. I think that’s the key point. So ultimately, Hungry Aside for a Moment and also Russia in the past have had similar programs where they have put significant benefits in place that seem to work for a time. But vast majority of financial incentives or even societal changes such as kindergartens have very limited effects. Very limited indeed. If we come back to understand the fundamentals of the problem, this unplanned childlessness issue, perhaps what Hungry might have got right, and I will never frankly tell someone you should or should not have an abortion, that’s your choice. That’s not something I want to have any say. I don’t believe it’s my right to say that. That’s just my personal position on it. But what Hungry might have done, and you stated a moment ago, is just make it more positive, the idea of parenting. That’s what they’re aiming at. The Hungarians do understand. So their president, Katalin Novak, a young dynamic woman who is their symbolic head of state, was very much involved in the formulation of these family policies. She knew perfectly well that part of what the goal was was to culturally elevate the, let’s call it the sacred significance of motherhood, something like that, to put the mother again on something approximating the necessary pedestal. You know, you see this in Catholic imagery all the time, is that, of course, in the Christian tradition, Christ is obviously the central figure of redemption and divinity, but there’s strong competition symbolically on the part of Mary, because it’s Mary and the infant. And I would say any society that doesn’t hold the mother and infant as sacred is doomed. For obvious reasons, since we all had mothers and we’re all infants, if you don’t value that, whatever that value means. And when my wife had little kids, she was treated pretty damn dismally, I would say. You know, I used to go out to restaurants with her and just watch when she entered in with the kids. And there was a lot of sneers and a lot of, you know, casual mistreatment. There was no, they were a nuisance, you know, and that was extremely annoying to me to watch, because I don’t think of kids as, kids can be nuisances if they’re not well behaved, but there’s something wrong with you if you think children are fundamentally a nuisance. And it’s definitely the case that we don’t value the contribution of young mothers in our culture the way that we would if we were wise. And that’s a very difficult problem to solve, right? All this emphasis on, you know, the kind of hedonic freedom that’s associated with being a youthful teenager, and then that equally sex in the city nonsense about, you know, your freedom on the sexual front while you’re pursuing your career. It’s so bloody juvenile that it’s almost incomprehensible, but it’s not an easy thing to reverse. And it isn’t even obvious that it’s the government’s role to reverse that. And the outcomes are unplanned childlessness. Right. I mean, it’s time and time again. I think, you know, it’s just clear that people who could have done that path are thinking of what society tells them they can do in the short term only. That would be a good title for this interview, really. We should probably call it unplanned childlessness. I love that. Well, because that is so interesting that that exists as such a plague, and yet it isn’t identified and it doesn’t have a name. And that’s a real catastrophe. You know, one of the early screenings I did, there was a young man who was in Japan, but he’s from the US. And he just stood there afterwards, gazing at the ceiling, and he’s probably 30, early 30, 35. And he said, unplanned childlessness. And he looked at me and said, that’s me. That’s me. And you could see it wasn’t just the term. It was talking. Yeah, right. The realization. The realization that you actually have to, in some way, have a plan, even if the plan is to do something not irrational, but to take a leap of faith. And to come back to men as well, men can have children aged 55. You know, I divorced, sadly, around 40, I guess, and I thought there’d be a time where I would meet someone again and have more children. That’s something I would have desired, frankly. Not to get too personal, but it wasn’t my plan for life to be a divorced dad. Right, right. And what you find is that you’re competing with younger men. Yeah, right. For the same younger women. Easier said than done. Easier said than done. The fact that you can technically have a child at almost any age as a man doesn’t mean that you’re going to. So the outcome is… No, no. What makes you think you’re going to be more successful old and ugly than you had been young and ugly? Right. So, yeah, yeah. And every year you’re on the path to get older and uglier. So, you know, it’s men and women in this situation, I think, that society needs to make parenting something more valuable. But to come back to your point, that cannot be the sacrifice of career education options. We have to make it more almost the default option that you can continue your education. I love the idea of lifelong learning, which is what I’m doing. Yeah, yeah. Why? Well, it’s very odd that we orient our educational establishments to people between 18 and 22. I just can’t figure that at all. I taught at the Harvard Extension School, by the way. I had a lot of adult students and I enjoyed teaching them a lot. There’s absolutely no reason whatsoever that the university should specialize in 18 to 22 year olds. That’s a hangover from… I don’t know, God, I don’t even know when that was useful and relevant. It’s just not a smart idea. And it’s in the college’s interest because as the shrinking number of children come through these systems, universities are going to need to diversify. Lifelong learning is the answer to that. So why… Well, it’s also the case that in an era of rapid technological transformation, that lifelong learning is necessary practically. But it’s also, why the hell wouldn’t you want that? Because it’s part of what keeps you updated. I remember the first class I took at the Extension School. I was in statistics and I went to my first class probably dressed like I am now with a leather briefcase. And everyone else, I was not the oldest at all. But everyone else is in jeans and t-shirts and backpacks. And I haven’t dressed like that for decades. But I went out and I got a couple of t-shirts and a backpack. And the most transformational thing happened to me. First recognition, I’m learning something I want to learn. I’m fully engaged. And that makes you the best kind of student. I think so. But everyone else, there were Harvard College kids there taking summer classes. And there were people older than me. It didn’t matter. I love teaching at the Extension School. I mean, at Harvard, the undergraduates in the formal school were smarter than the people on average in the Extension School. But the Extension School people were a lot more motivated to learn. Right? There was no one not attending because they were there because they wanted to be there. I’m probably asking questions that were… I actually took a psychology class probably in the building. William James? Yeah, William James. Yeah. And again, I was there with a lot of even high school learners at a summer school program. But I realized the professor was enjoying the questions I was asking. Yeah. They were just different to the question. Yeah. They were serious questions. Yeah. When were you there? I started in 2015. 2016 I would have taken the psychology. Probably 101, of course. But the point is that the recruitment cycle for many career options is linked to the education cycle. So you can’t change one without the other. Yeah. And people say, well, it’s fine. Certain companies allow recruitment later in life. But it’s not the normal thing to do. It’s a risk. So if you’re a woman or a parent taking time out to raise a family because you think you want to do that exclusively earlier on, that’s a risk that you might not get on that path and you might not get the recruitment. Yeah. You know, I don’t really buy that. I don’t really buy that because I had one student, for example, Shelly Taylor, who… No, sorry. Shelly Carson. She came back to Harvard as a graduate student in her 40s. I was younger than her as her supervisor. She’d been an airline stewardess, pretty middle class life, had been out of the academic stream for quite a while and was quite a lot older than most of the graduate students. And she hit it hard and developed a bang up career. And she’s managed that quite successfully. And I think that that’s not normal. You know, it’s not the standard practice, but it’s by no means impossible. And given that women do have that seven year advantage in terms of lifespan, there’s… Man, you think you’re out of the running on the education and career front when you’re 35. You’re out of the running on the reproductive front. Yes. You’re not really out of the running on the education and career front. And I’ve seen lots of people hit the education ground running in their 30s, mid 30s, sometimes later, and have a whole new career. I mean, Jesus, at 40, you can still have 30 years at your new career. So that’s a very optimistic way of looking at it. And so, all right. So, well, for everybody watching and listening on YouTube and its associated platforms, thank you very much for your time and attention. And to Stephen Shaw for agreeing to talk to me today about birth gap and about the issue of declining birth rates and population shrinkage, bringing that to everyone’s attention, bringing the issue of unplanned childlessness to everyone’s attention, because that’s a crucial issue here to note the existence of a problem and to give it a name is to bring it out of the darkness and to unshroud it, let’s say. And that’s an extremely useful thing to do. And I’m going to talk to Stephen for another half an hour on the Daily Wire Plus platform. I’d like to spend half an hour with my guests investigating how their pathway through life made it manifest, made itself manifest to them, both in terms of the problems that gripped them, the concerns they had, both voluntary and involuntary, and the opportunities that presented themselves as a consequence. And so if you’re interested in that, then please head over to the Daily Wire Plus platform. You could consider supporting them in any case. They have also worked diligently to make the kind of conversations I had today possible. And that’s much appreciated to the film crew here in Vancouver, because that’s where I am today. Thank you very much. And thank you all for your time and attention. Good to talk with you. You bet. Hello, everyone. I would encourage you to continue listening to my conversation with my guests on DailyWirePlus.com.