https://youtubetranscript.com/?v=b4Ez8cu5wQE
So first an acknowledgement, this talk is based on current and extensive work with Ben Chiappi, Professor at the University of California, about the phenomenology of rover field work on Mars, and my whole life there. So this is what I want to do today, I want to talk to you about what do the rovers have to do with vision. These are the rovers that are on Mars, spirit, and opportunity, this is how we’re getting a lot of our information about what Mars is doing on the field, work on geology on Mars, water on Mars, etc. I think what I think is interesting for us is an example of what’s called 4E cognitive science. The 4E themes of the idea that cognition is extended, not just in the head, it’s embodied, the body plays a crucial role, it’s embedded, it’s deeply coupled to its environment, and it’s enacted, it’s through the sensory motor loop that cognition actually exists. What I want to show you is I think the rover is a really interesting test case for applying 4E to vision, especially vision into cognition. The main problem I want to address is how the scientists with only limited visual information, we’ll talk about what that is shortly, develop a sense of being on Mars, and what does that exactly mean? How can remote time delaying vision create a sense of presence? We’ll then talk about the two senses of presence and the transformation from very similitude presence to epistemic working presence to dynamic identification. I’ll go through what all of that means, of course. If you told the understood about it the same way, you’d know from the talk. This case study shows how the propositional theoretical knowing of Mars depends on procedural fieldwork skills, which depend on respectability to restructure salient landscape in sizing up. Now I want to finally argue, this is the part that I find so provocatively intriguing, this perspective of what it’s like to be and work on Mars depends on participatory knowing of and through the rover. Seeing as, the famous victims’ name phrase, on Mars depends on seeing as the rover. Okay, so what does the rover mean? Okay, so the NASA scientists worked a lot on the robotic rovers on Mars in order to do most of the scientific investigation on Mars. Of course, there is so much supplement from orbital satellites. Most of it is fieldwork on Mars. That’s interesting because they’re not actually there, but that’s what they refer to it as, doing fieldwork on Mars. In geology, Mars plays a crucial role. The strategy has been to follow the water, look for evidence of water on Mars as a precursor to looking for evidence of life on Mars. So, this is important to talk about how this interaction happens. The rover’s send back batch still photos. They send back a whole bunch of still photos all at once. And there’s significant time delay, of course, because of the distance from Mars from Earth. So it’s important to understand that there’s no joystick control of the rovers. You can’t joystick control the rovers. The temporal-spatial relays can break them. They originally thought they would find the element of that image. It’s just not real. Yet it is the scientists on Earth, of course, who are using the visual information and the ability to move the rovers to do all the science on Mars. So the rover AI is acting adequately to do the science. So although there is no joystick control, the scientists are still doing the science through the rovers. The AI basically helps the rover navigate and avoid obstacles, but it doesn’t in any way do the science. So this seems like a clear case for examining extended cognition. It seems like there’s some combination of humans on Mars and it’s extended in time and space. It’s actually doing, right? There’s humans on Mars. Sorry, there’s humans on Earth. There’s rovers on Mars. It’s extended in time and space. And somehow together they’re doing the science. That looks pretty much like extended cognition, which is an important for you to see. Yet it seems to challenge another theme, enactment. Since the sensorimotor loop is so delayed and its connection to action is so displaced, there is no joystick control. So there is any kind of tight sensorimotor loop. It also throws a wrench into the embodiment, since the robot body is not even embodied, nor is it in the same environment as the human being. So both embodiment and embeddedness are problematized in significant ways. However, and this is where it gets really, really tricky. For all of this problematization, the scientists regularly and reliably report two important phenomenological features. They report a sense of being on Mars. I’m on Mars. I’m applied to wait. The sense that I have right now that I’m in this room. They reliably report a sense of presence. And they report that this sense of presence is bound up with seeing as the rover. We’ll talk about what that means. So this ability to be on Mars and see as the rover is actually highly advised by the scientific community. Because they specifically select for individuals who show the ability to pick this up. And they don’t quite know how to teach it either. They just sort of, they sort of tutor and apprentice people. And some people get it and some people don’t. And the people that get it, that sort of hire and take it into the community, the people that don’t are given the part of the difference. Now, fieldwork is used, that term is used as I said, to designate the combination of exploration and explanation generated through the rovers. And it’s deeply analogous, the scientists consider it deeply analogous to human geologists and fieldwork on Earth. So here’s the problem. So here’s the problem. Given how disruptive the standard coordinate features are, how is it that the scientists nevertheless seem to acquire the phenomenological markers of embeddedness in action and that we shall see? How do they get that sense of being on Mars and seeing as the rover? That’s the central question I want to try to address in this talk. Now there’s one extended word at the end, that’s Jackie, and we’ll pick up on the implications of this argument for our extended vision, especially for the phenomenon of vision into presence, how does vision generate a sense of presence? We’ll also explore why this might imply an extended vision. But right now I just want to center in on this one question that I posed for you. Okay, so there’s a lot of work on sense of presence since the rise of virtual games and environments. So VR has really led a lot of people to ask, well, how do you get this sense of presence? Because how do you get a sense of presence is how they saw after each other. People want it, they look for it, they try to figure out what are the features of the game, for example, that will make people rely on it when they report that they have a sense of presence. Now I’m not attempting here to summarize that work, because it’s actually quite large to work on presence. And so I will not be offering an exhaustive definition of presence. That’s not my goal here. Instead I will try to point to some key features that will be necessary for this talk. So the sense of presence is the sense of being there. It’s an active, indexical sense of here-nowness in some environment. I’m here now in this room. And this is what I talked about expressed as being in, like I’m in this room right here right now, or being on Mars, for example. Now one important consequence of a sense of presence is an attentive sense of realness. So in the VR research, when people get a sense of presence, they will often say, it felt so real. It felt so real. So presence makes the experience real, where I’m using this term to report a sense, rather than making an ontological reference to reality. I will use realness, that word, to refer to this phenomenological feature in contrast to reality for an ontological claim. Is that understood? Thank you. This sense of realness is normative for us, in the sense that we see it as good, we experience it as good, we intuitively understand why someone can see it. If someone says, I want to experience realness, and again you don’t go, why? Why would you want that? We go, oh yeah, right, I want that too. And we experience that as rewarding. Oh, that’s great, it felt so real, yum yum yum yum yum. Such that it is plausible that it’s an evolutionary marker that guides behavior. It seems that it’s doing some important, talkative work for us. So two questions immediately arise. What is it about presence that generates realness, and why does it have this normative value for us? And you can see that normative value in the field work on Mars, because the scientists love for people who can generate the sense of presence, the sense of realness. So what’s going on? And how is it working when it’s so far away in this place in time? So one information that a lot of people have is that the sense of presence is generated by versatility. The more the game looks like the real world, the more the sense of presence I’ll get. And I mean, this is a plausible intuition, because that versatility will help to explain, presumably, both presence, a sense of presence, and a sense of realness together. So it is an intuitively plausible claim. And one of the things that scientists do that is undermine intuitively plausible claims. That’s a good way to get a job as a scientist. And that’s what quite a bit of the research into VR has shown. It’s shown that you can have versatility without a sense of presence, and that one can have a sense of presence in games of disctress that have varying low degrees of versatility. So although it seems, yeah, that must be the answer, it’s no. It seems neither necessary nor sufficient. This last feature that I’m pointing to also strongly suggests that the sense of presence precedes in causation, but not in our own biology. It precedes the sense of realness. Okay, so could I take questions at the end, please? Thank you. So the role of Tetris points to the role of intense involvement in generating a sense of presence. So when you look at that case, what many people say, well, although there is a verisimilitude, there’s this tremendous sense of involvement, and that’s somehow related to the sense of presence. So performers like Gary Avanasian and others in 2019 just last year drew upon this lack of verisimilitude and this sense of involvement in previous work that I have done with the Arara, which are in the area of the rest, to argue that the ability to generate the flow experience that chips that behind me, is actually what creates the sense of presence. It’s that people get into the flow state, and then the flow state is what’s generating the sense of presence. And that, of course, accounts for a lot of the data very well, because we know that one of the things that video games reliably do do is induce the flow state. That’s again very plausible, and some features of the flow state may explain the sense of realness. So these are the features that Chicks and Mike talked about. You have an intense and focused concentration on the present moment. That might sort of enhance a sense of presence. That makes sense. Emerging of action, of awareness, a sense of that oneness. You’re deeply at one with the environment. Although you’re real, and you’re at one with the environment, no environment is going to be real, right? There’s a loss of self-consciousness. That doesn’t mean a loss of consciousness. It means that sort of narrating, narrating sort of nanny ego in your head. How am I doing? Do they like me right now? How’s my hair? Is anybody noticing that I skipped a term there, etc.? Although you know you’re exerting a lot of effort, there’s a sense of effortlessness or grace. Your extensive time is altered, and that may help to compensate, for example, with its harmability. You experience the activity as intrinsically rewarding, a sense of realness. Realness and presence are intrinsically rewarding. It’s super salient. There’s a sense of significant discovery. It’s like the world is shining to you. That could also induce a sense of presence and realness. When we have an experience of insight, we tend to regard what we have of insight about as more real. And it’s also an optimal experience in two ways. It’s very rewarding and it’s very effective. We feel like we’re in a very strong, very strong environment. The problem for me and for Dan, oh sorry, this is the Flo Chama. So you always, what you need is the demands of the situation are just met by your skills. And you know, again, doing this work on Mars is very demanding, and you have to use all your skills. So all of this, as I said, is very plausible. But as I said, there’s some challenges about this. So first of all, this is a prototypical thing from generating the flow state. It’s a rock climbing. Generating the flow state is the only explanation I can come up with. Why people do this absurd thing. This is a torture from Greek mythology. You, you’ll up this. You’ll hurt yourself. You’ll hurt yourself. You’ll be tremendously apropos. You might fall and hurt yourself. And once you get to the top, come back down. So, and then worse research on it. So people do rock climb precisely because it engenders the flow state. So you can see why, just, I’m putting that up so you get an intuitive sense of why flow would get you so engaged, and involved, and connected, and the environment becomes so present. So this all seems very different. I say, I knew this already, but you know, when I was talking through the area, I had a lot of different sort of issues with this. Because for all this promise, flow brings back the problems we’re addressing. Sheikh Samahai argues that in order to trigger the flow state, the interaction with the environment has to have three essential features. There has to be clear feedback of information. There has to be a tight coupling between actions and the results of actions. There can’t be a delay. It’s a significant delay. An error is diagnostic. Failure disrupts performance in an obvious and powerful way. That’s why rock climbing is important. So notice how rock climbing has all those features. You’ve got to clearly know what’s going on, right? Or like, whoa? Like, your actions and how the environment responds are tightly coupled together. You have to make fine-tuned, rapid decisions, and errors completely diagnostic. You make a mistake. It’s very costly. But think about that. While error with the robots is no doubt critical, because it could lead to the demise of the robot, we should know that the visual pictures that come back from Mars are not clear. They are inherently ambiguous. They are literally subject to hours of debating. Literally. But when you finally see something, that’s gone from tremendous processing, tremendous debate and discussion. So the feedback is not clear. And as I’ve already mentioned, there is no way this could be done. There’s no way this could be done. Now, I think that maybe within the flow phenomena, there’s a more basic phenomena that might be relevant to the sense of presence and the sense of realness by the rovers. I want to pun a little on the previous picture about something presupposed by flow. Okay, so here’s our rock climber again. And I want to pun on this idea developed by Merle Quanti about optimal grip. Because one of the things this guy needs is optimal grip. Okay, now he needs it literally. Merle Quanti is talking about it in a metaphorical sense. And what Quanti needs by that is, and this idea has been more recently developed by Gleason Taylor, philosophy, by Brunnenberg, and that developed within psychology. And I’m also going to make use of some related development ideas from what’s called prospect and breaching spirit. So what’s the basic idea of optimal grip? Right? So what Quanti argued, and these other people have developed, is the idea that we’re all, that we envision, we’re trying to get a tradeoff between variables. And we’re trying to get sort of the best tradeoff between variables that will optimize our interaction with the object in the situation. So what is between the Stalt and features? Okay, so I try to get to a place where I can get the best relation from the, right, between the overall Stalt and the individual details of the chair. So this is generally not very good, right, too far back. So it’s also when I try to look at somebody, I try to zoom to the place where I get sort of the most, so this is good for Jim, but you know, not so good, right, things like that, and not so good because of inclusion. So you’re actually moving around to try and get this best tradeoff between the Stalt and the individual. Is that okay? That’s one tradeoff. That was one of the ones that Marv Quanti emphasized. Minton also talked in 1976, and he spoke on sentence between other tradeoffs, there’s a tradeoff of course between foregrounding and backgrounding. What are you foregrounding and backgrounding? And you’re constantly sort of move, shifting that around to try and get an optimal relation for your interaction. You’re also moving around, right, to try and get the best tradeoff between what’s familiar and what’s novel to you. Too much novelty, you can’t categorize it. Too much familiarity, you might miss some opportunities of what’s needed in this situation. That’s not an exhaustive list, you understand that? I’m just trying to give you a flavor for what Optimal Grid is doing. Now, I ultimately think this is found out in relevant serializations, but I’m not going to talk about relevant serializations because I promised myself I wouldn’t. Another tradeoff emphasized by Prospect and Revenge Theory is that between seeing and being seen. So one of the things that Prospect and Revenge Theory is also good. It has a version of the nickname, it’s called a womb with a view. A womb with a view. Because we are all involved in the context in which we are seeking food and seeking to not be food, what we want is we want to get us to a place where we can see as much as possible while being as hidden as possible. And those are in a tradeoff relationship. Because if you get too hidden, it includes your vision, and if you open up too much to see too much, then you’re easily visible. So we’re constantly trying to get the tradeoff. So we’re doing all of this in vision. We’re trying to get an optimal grid. So, let’s try to put it together. Optimal Grid, we’re trying to get a good view, to stall feature foreground background for later in the novelty, while engaging in a good viewing, Prospect, Revenge, and also we’re trying to play between exploiting our situation and exploring other situations. And both of these dimensions are dynamically complex and are constraining each other all the time. This is Marvro Conti’s idea, it has developed by Driver, Sintero, Rumber, Grunberg, and Redbelt, etc. I would also argue that the Polynian distinction between focal and speciduary forecasted awareness is often here. In Optimal Grid, one has a focusively good view. This is sort of more ab-ent-tile. While one has a passive awareness of and through a good viewing, which is more ab-ver-tive. So I’m sort of tacitly aware that I’m moving in the right way, I’m getting good viewing, I’m doing prospect and refuge, exploring and exploring, and then I’m vocally aware that I’m getting a balance between gestalt and feature, etc. So all this gives us seeing as. When I do all of that, I start to see this as something. Now that’s not full-blown categorization, but it’s different from just it being an indistinct blob in my heart. I see it as something with which I can effectively interact. I call that an aspectuality, to pick on Wittgenstein’s idea of seeing as. But of course, this generation of aspectuality, this seeing as, is unfolding through time. There’s a temporality to it. She’s not going to talk about that later. In a way which is really centered upon us as actors. So there’s an aspectuality to it, all that stuff I just talked about with Optimal Grid. It’s an aspectuality that’s unfolding through time and it’s centered on us as actors because it’s ultimately grounded in affording our interaction. By the way, that gives you the acronym ACT, aspectuality, centrality, temporality, that’s my way of putting it on the map. What we get out of this multidimensional complex, Optimal Grid, sizes up through time, centered on us, is a constantly shifting salience landscape. I think they’re standing out to us. So I think they’re foregrounding, backgrounding. When I get that sort of Optimal Grid, they start to pile up to me in a certain way. So I’m getting this dynamic and shifting salience landscape that has aspectuality, temporality, and centrality. I call that salience landscape. I want to call this Optimal Grid sizing up salience landscape in perspective. I will know. This is what it’s like to be here now. Through both senses of the word, through and by means of, this is what it’s like to be here now through one’s current state of mind. Of course, the state of mind is inactive in the way I’m trying to explain. My claim is that sense of presence is the phenomenological feel of perspectival knowing. That when perspectival knowing is going, the way it’s likeness helped perspectival knowing is the sense of presence. So how do the scientists generate perspectival knowing through the rovers while dealing with displacement and fillet? Okay. So Bertessi, in her book in 2015, she did the ethnography of the scientists working with rovers. One of the people that did the ethnography. Talks about a complex process she calls drawing hats. She explicitly links it to the Kitzlein’s notion of seeing hats. The idea is that scientists are altering the image in that, that’s one sense of drawing. They’re doing stuff to it, manipulating the image, drawing it. But she wants to play on that word, they’re also drawing out what needs to be seen. So drawing the eyes means drawing the drawing out what needs to be seen as a way of affording seeing eyes. So they’re specifically doing all this manipulation so you can see this blob on the photo as a deposit of cellular. So as I said, they do lots of things. They take the rock photos and they process them in order to be able to generate seeing as, spectrality. They need continuously creating a shared narrative of the movement of the rover. So they’ve got this sort of narrative constantly running and they mark it on the photos. This is where they were, this is how we come. And they’re always keeping in mind and talking about the mechanics of the rovers. Everything is centered on the energetic economic limits of the rover. That has ultimate authority over all decisions that are made. For example, you have to often forego doing scientific exploration because you have to use the resources of the rover to get it to a place where it can sleep and get enough sunlight and wake science, so they can be able to use the rover in the next day. So there’s two kinds of processes that are designed to create two kinds of presence for the scientists. The first alters the photos. All the photos are always being altered. This first way alters color, lighting, stability, background features, points of view, and you can create several pictures together to create something that is seen as very similar to your presence. What Mars would look like to me if I were on Mars. Here the scientists seek out and seek to convey a sense of awe and beauty for themselves as motivational, but also as positive. They explicitly look for vast vistas that nevertheless convey a sense of journey and tranquility or serenity. So they’re doing prospect wrecking all the time. Where can we place it so people, they use this term, so people will feel awe, they’ll feel like they’re in a place where they can be a part of the world. They even look for vistas that convey an American sense of a frontier being explored and explained. This is how they try to get familiarity and novel and explore and exploit, balanced nicely. They key cultural and aesthetic aspects of the universe that they’re trying to convey. So they’re trying to find a way to make the universe a place where they can be a part of the world. This is how they try to get familiarity and novel and explore and exploit, balanced nicely. The key cultural icons of the frontier for Americans. They do this deliberately. So this is an example I created. I want to show you two stages. I can’t show you all the process. See how they’ve knitted a bunch of things together, and then they’ve done all of this stuff, and then they’ve done the algorithm that resituates the point of view from the rover to where a human being would do. They balance the background of the sky. The pictures were taken at different times, and the sky changes. All this is happening. And then they release it to the public like that. This creates a tremendous sense of presence. In one sense, oh, that’s what we like to be on Mars. But it’s actually a weak sense of presence in another way. Because the scientists don’t really value those pictures because they don’t afford working on Mars at all. That various military sense of presence, like in the video games, doesn’t improve working on Mars. Because those pictures, that first kind of presence, is what it would be like to be a human at Merriam-Eaclton on Mars. But what is needed is what it would be like to be a rover on Mars. Because you have to use the rover. The needed seeing is not seeing as a human, but seeing as a rover. So I’m playing on seeing as not only seeing something as something, but seeing it as beings, like you are a kind of agent. It’s not just the seeing as of the viewer, but also the seeing as of the viewing. And the viewer, that’s why, that’s the title of her book, Seeing Like a Roper. Seeing Like a Roper. Seeing As a Roper. The second sense of presence is the one that Tali saw afterward. And as the title of her book indicates, she was really interested in how this second sense of presence was created. And what she notes is there’s a reciprocal process of identification that helps to develop that sense that was generated through the center of practices. She noticed that the robots are in four parts, but in a very particular way. The scientists regularly say things, I need to go there, meaning the rover needs to move to a location. They talk about moving the cameras as moving the eyes. They manipulate the arms, so the tools on the arms are referred to as fingers. The rover sleeps, it wakes up, it looks at its targets, and it talks to the earth. But there’s more than anthropomorphism at work. Tessie talks about how the scientists do the reverse. She joins this term, they epistemomorphize themselves. The scientists will try and actually enact this epistemomorphic identity. So here’s a drawing of one of the scientists doing this. Here’s a rock, she puts her phone down, and she sits on a moving chair. Here’s my camera, and I need to do this. She enacts it. She turns herself into something like a robot. So there’s this loop. The human beings are anthropomorphizing the rover, but they’re also technomorphizing… Actually, I started five minutes later, so I should get another five minutes. I need to keep talking to my watch. So they anthropomorphize the rover, but they technomorphize themselves. It’s very powerful. So there’s an active integration of knowing oneself to move through the rover, knowing the rover through oneself, so that one is simultaneously knowing oneself, knowing the rover, and knowing through the rover. It’s a really complex process, and they’re doing it all intuitively. They don’t sort of let’s do this exclusively. There’s a dynamic mutual shaping that is analogous to how organisms and environments dynamicly shape each other. So we’re not mutually shaping each other in niche construction or culture. Also mutually shapes people and environment. Niche construction makes us sort of biologically at home in the environment. The culture layers on there, and the technology from the symbolic play. So we’re more even more at home with how we’re at home with it right now. And that’s contributing very significantly to your sense of progress. I’d like to name this cognitive visual enacting mutual shaping into being at home, but it’s kind of a category phrase. So I want to replace it with this idea of participatory knowing. I want to emphasize that reading this participatory knowing goes with a series of quotes from the Richard Cron paper 2012, but there’s similar quotes in Brutessie 2015. The first quote comes from the person in Macking the Rover, a couple of slides I showed you. The person is being drawn. So that points to yourself on the back of the close-up rock. And then I know that there’s a disconnect, raises hands to either side of her face, between left and right eyes of the rover. So I can move my head like this, tilting head down, rotating at the base, tilting right hand higher than left. And I have my left eye here pauses, and this, and then this swivels to the other side, keeping head down with left hand higher than right. This might be from my right eye. You see that? She then goes on to say, my body by the way is always the rover. So right here is the front of the rover, my magnets are right here, touches the base of her neck, my shoulders, the front solar panels, right? So I have all kinds of things, antennas sticking up over here. She laughs when I’m taking a picture of something in the atmosphere, but it helps me to kind of look up, being the rover, and this is the front of me. We’ve got to put my head up wherever to, which vector I’m looking at. Another researcher talks about the shift from two-dimensional to three-dimensional picture changes. It changes salience, it alters the salience landscape in a way that triggers a kinesthetic sense in the scientist, which then is fed back into the picture. There’s something to be said for engaging your own kinesthetic sense. If you take a look at this 3-E, you can see how it kind of pops out at salience, and how this terrain is kind of undulated, where I can see kind of that there was a ridge here in 2-E, this is now giving me a much better sense of the size of that ridge and the slope of that ridge. So going 3-E pops something out, it triggers his kinesthetic sense, and then he gets that sense of the depth and the slope in the picture. One of the mission, I’m trying to give you a variety of points from a variety of people, one of the mission managers at ISTA said, You just have an intuition as to, I think, I don’t know, this is a good example or not, but you know as you get older you understand how your body works more, and so you know the effects of it, and you haven’t eaten breakfast or something, and you know what lunchtime you can feel, you know what it’s like to feel, you know how you feel differently right before lunch as opposed to yesterday and at breakfast. And so operating the vehicles after a while, you get an idea of well, okay, I went over to this yesterday, so I have a feeling, I know this could be light tomorrow, I know it’d be a really long drive yesterday, so I have a feeling. Another scientist at ISTA said, I was working in the garden one day and all of a sudden I don’t know what’s going on with my right wrist, I can’t move it out of nowhere. I get here to the planning meeting and Spirit and the rovers have his white rock-realist style, things like that, you know, I am totally connected to Spirit. Another scientist, that’s kind of creepy, right? Another scientist said something similar, interestingly I screwed up my shoulder and needed surgery on it right about that time, opportunities in my knee-arms started having problems, like with my stiff shoulder, and I broke my right toe before Spirit’s wheel broke, so I’m just saying, maybe it’s kind of sympathetic, I don’t know, haha, haha, I mean I don’t think there’s any magic involved or anything, but maybe it’s some kind of subconscious thing, I don’t know. Protesting that reports that this bodywork is certainly intimately associated with visualization practices and interpretive skills. This, people who do this, are the people they want, because they succeed at getting the science out of the box. So it’s important to note that this bodywork is not a science, so it’s important to note that this second-line processing takes the pictures way away from verisimility, they’re doing all kinds of manipulations of the picture, they put colors on it, they draw, they put words all over it, because they’re trying not to trigger verisimility of presence, they’re trying to trigger this epistemic working presence, sense of presence. I’m proposing to you an order of dependence. The position of theoretical knowledge of pain through vision is dependent on procedural knowing, how to use the rover, which is dependent on perceptual knowing, this second sense, the epistemic working sense of presence, and that is dependent on a participatory knowing, being on Mars. The theory depends on skills, which depend on seeing as, which depends on seeing as the rover. So, we know that when we talk about that flow article, Hobart talks about that in flow, what you need to do is you need to implicitly set up all the conditions that will distinguish causation from correlation, that’s why it’s called value. It’s very similar to the scientific experiment, you need to clear information, it’s become value, you need to take up link dependency between X and Y, and falsification matters. So he says the way you improve implicit learning, the way you improve your intuitions, and all this is intuitive for the scientists, right, is that you set up in the flow state an inactive implicit structure that’s very similar to scientific experimentation, and that’s what actually gives the sense of realness in flow. You’re doing a kind of implicit experimentation that helps you distinguish the causal products from the correlation products. Well, the scientists can’t get into flow, but you know what they can do? They don’t do implicit science like the Watt-Kleiner is doing, they do explicit science. They’re explicitly working with the rover to distinguish causation from correlation. So in addition to the optimal grip in flow, they’re doing what Hobart said, flow is avanteages for, but they’re not doing it implicitly, they’re doing it explicitly, they’re exclusively doing science. And that act of distinguishing causation from correlation is also helping to generate the sense of realness. So think about this, if they can do all that hacking, the propositional into the procedural, into the prospecto, into the participatory, and then they’re doing good science and distinguishing the causal patterns from the correlation ones. That’s why the sense of presence is also going to be important, I could argue, in the sense of realness. Seeing as, depends on seeing as the rover to a prospecto or participatory delight that you’re going to be able to distinguish the causation from the correlation. Seeing as the rover to a prospecto or participatory delight that generates presence and realness in how one does. And that’s how you do seeing into being on Mars. Thank you very much. Applause So we have some time for Q&A, but thank you so much for your incredible talk. So first, we have some questions. Yes. So in an earlier slide, you would present, you would explain that there is a double dissociation between sense of, between sense of, let’s see, what was it, versimilitude? Versimilitude and sense of presence. Anyway, you make this inference that the sense of presence, I am here now, is causally prior to the sense of realness, and I don’t really follow that inference. Can you go back to this slide? Because, for example, in Tetris, people don’t initially find it to have any sort of sense of realness, because it doesn’t look like anything. It’s not realness. But when they get into something like a close-leap, they get a sense of presence, and then they say, so I’m really there, I’m certainly both realness. That’s what I meant. You were talking about the perceptual knowing. Perspectival, yeah. Knowing through our environment, through our senses. Could this phenomenon also be explained by an almost billion of lengths of those senses? You’re not necessarily experiencing them in an environment you’re currently in, but through your imagination, you can trigger those same senses or same things? I think that’s a really important question, and I think it’s actually important to this case study. I did have time to talk about it the day I was working on it. There’s obviously an important way in which imagination is being used by the scientists, but it’s a weird kind of imagination. It’s not meant to be in your head. It’s more of a premeditated sense of the imaginable. It’s always interacting. The images are always interacting and they’re enacted in the environment. And it’s really important because people who just try to imagine, they don’t get the skills that are needed. So I think imagination plays an important role, but I don’t think it’s so much a capacity to interest the experimental images as to do this enacted kind of thing. Would you almost say it’s almost like a hopeful form of schizophrenia? In the sense that you’re experiencing something that’s out there, but you’re not into any kind of trigger that’s happening? No, I’m not sure about that. There’s so much salience to this regulation going on in schizophrenia. It compounds so many things. I don’t know. I wouldn’t want to draw that again. I need a lot more argument and evidence to draw that argument for me. Do you get this sense of realism when you’re dreaming and sleep without any outside interaction with outside world? How do you think that comes about? Well, there’s interesting stuff to monitor about what that might mean. And there’s a lot of limits. I mean, you are sort of, you have a certain bit of body and a certain bit of environment and you’re interacting with it in that way. What’s really interesting is actually qualities of interaction seem to really well up that sense of realism. So this is one of the things that distinguishes illusory, for example, and what’s interesting there, for example, is the fact that things are sort of surprising to you and beyond. So as you ramp up the challenge and the awareness that you’re challenged, you get to something that you can always have a close date. I think that helps with the expungements going on in your head. Which is really creepy with illusory dreams because when the dream fingers come up, you can talk to them and they seem to have perspectives other than the ego dream. And that really ratchets up the sense of realness of the dream. As soon as you’ve got a sense of other perspectives, then it’s cool. People talk about the sort of jargon of the dream. This is a great talk, first of all. Thank you. We talked about people having this sense of presence in video games and that being a form of implicit science and, moreover, being a form of explicit science. Do you think there’s a quality to the difference between those two? I mean, I do. I think because of the hypostemic potential, I think one of the reasons why we black-pack is explicit science, rather than just trying to get into the flow of everything, is the scope of things about which we can do that kind of distinction between causal and correlation patterns is greatly expanded by explicit science in a way that it’s much more localized in flow, precisely because of how tightly bound it is to the medium-scoping environment. So, well, I wonder, with respect to the sounds of presence, the hypostemic problem… Well, I argue there was. I think it’s pretty clear, and Dan agrees with me on this, that the scientists are not getting into it closely. So there’s a lot of non-phological difference there. But they are getting this other sense of realness and this sense of presence. And that’s why I think the participatory knowing is so important. It’s doing a lot of the heavy lifting. It’s doing a lot of the heavy lifting. Okay. Thank you so much for all your questions. Thank you again, Dr. Berdicki. And we’ll just take a quick break, and then we’ll move on to our next speaker, Dr. John Fonsi. Thank you.