https://youtubetranscript.com/?v=niBaMwlwVc4
Welcome to Untangling the World Nod of Consciousness, wrestling with the hard problems of mind and meaning in the modern scientific age. My name is John Vervecky. I’m a cognitive psychologist and cognitive scientist at the University of Toronto in Canada. Throughout the entire series, I will be joined in dialogue by my good friend and colleague, Greg Enriquez, from James Madison University in the United States. Throughout, we are going to wrestle with the hard problems of how we can give an account of a phenomenal-like consciousness within the scientific worldview, how we can wrestle with that problem in conjunction with the problem that Greg calls the problem of psychology that is pervasive throughout psychology, which is that psychology has no unified descriptive metaphysics by which it talks about mind and or behavior. Throughout this, we will be talking about some of the most important philosophical, cognitive scientific, and neuroscientific accounts of consciousness. So I hope you’ll join us throughout. We’ve done three sessions so far. I took the lead on those in which I was trying to set up the problem of what’s typically called the problem of consciousness, the hard problem of consciousness, sometimes more traditionally called the mind-body problem, and trying to show how, using the pivotal figure Descartes to try and show how enmeshed this problem is in our worldview, our scientific worldview, how they’re deeply interwoven and bound together, and how much they’re enmeshed with our sense, our normative sense of realness, and how that normative sense is actually unstable for us in a way that intersects with the difficulty of the hard problem of consciousness. And we want to continue that history, but we’re going to shift, and Greg is going to take the lead, and I’ll be more of the interlocutor commentator, and he’s going to discuss how this world knot sort of unfolded and ramified through the history of psychology. So welcome, Greg, and thank you for taking us through this, please. Amen, amen, thank you, great to be here. Look forward to this installment. I think we have set up what I want to share here very well today through the three previous installments. In particular, analyzing Descartes’ struggles with mind and matter really sets up essentially the stage, which I’m going to then try to take forward, following it in relationship to the discipline of psychology. And my fundamental point here is that there is, that I really want, I think anybody that cares about philosophy, science, knowledge, the social sciences, should really understand is that there is this thing called the problem of psychology, okay? And that it’s actually well-documented, it’s well-understood, and in a nutshell, here’s the basic problem, and that is to this day, we don’t have a good language system, a consensually agreed-upon way of talking, as professionals, as experts, as scientists, as philosophers of the intersection of science, mind, and behavior, okay? We just, we don’t know, we don’t have the shared understanding of what those terms mean as reference in the world. That’s my basic point. So, Greg, would it be fair to use Kuhn’s notion here of psychology being pre-paradigmatic, that it doesn’t have a unifying paradigm in which to do the science? Exactly, so that’s exactly, so I like to say that modern psychology is both pre- and multi-paradigmatic. Wow. Okay. And it’s pre-paradigmatic in the sense that it does not have the classic, consensual, so we can use Newton’s classic mechanics as the ultimate paradigm that lasts 200 years in physics, where the idea of what matter was, what the foundational laws were, the calculus that we’re gonna use to study it, and the power of that paradigm to dominantly allow consensual knowledge to be built with a center that has virtual complete agreement until the anomalies of quantum mechanics, general relativity, then sort of overthrow that. But that’s a classic example of paradigm. And what I’m gonna walk through is really psychology has never had a paradigm, okay? It very quickly started to fragment and then never achieved any kind of dominance in relationship to what actually it was, okay? So that’s interesting. I agree with that. I think that’s a, I remember talking to my friends about this when I was in grad school about this. We read, you know, some philosophy of science and Kuhn at the time, but I’m interested, you’ve got a more subtle distinction that maybe you could unpack it just a little bit. You said psychology is pre-paradigmatic, and you’ve just explained that. I don’t wanna steal your thunder for what you’re gonna say, but in what sense do you see psychology as multi-paradigmatic? Right, and that’s, so now what we will do in the sense that of course there are clusters of ideas. We have Freud and psychoanalysis and psychodynamic thinking. We have behaviorism starting with Watson. And so actually I’ll use that opportunity to help understand the different paradigms that at least people tried to establish to then compete for dominance over what this territory is. Okay? Great, that’s really good Greg. One more question, and now I’m gonna put it on my cogs I have here. And so there’s also, I mean, the difficulties of course without a paradigm or especially when you’re multi-paradigmatic is a massive ontological equivocation and confusion, which of course you’ve highlighted in some of your work. And then I’m also thinking as a cognitive scientist that there’s even, is this the right adjective? There’s even a broader possibility of equivocation because there’s also competing sciences of mind with psychology. There’s neuroscience, there’s artificial intelligence. I really believe, okay, so if we ask, why is the meaning crisis right now in the 21st century particularly acute, okay? And what is the way, what are one of the key patterns that we’re gonna need to wake up from it? It is solving the language game problem on this issue. Okay? And Wittgenstein, I use that from him and I, he hated psychology in many ways because he saw it as a convoluted mess, rightfully so. So we’re gonna have multiple paradigms inside the field. We’re gonna have competing interacting elements associated with it down into neuroscience, okay? And then actually up into philosophy of language issues. We’re gonna have cultural and indigenous psychological problems, okay? Meaning problems in terms of, well, what is the frame that you’re actually trying to place on? So all what you get, what I realized, so I wanna be clear, I love psychology. I took 65 credits as an undergrad, it was half of what I did. And I was like, oh my gosh, you can do a science of mind. You can measure stuff, you can do experimentation. And my journey on this is then I actually got into the therapy world in my graduate studies, okay? And I wasn’t aware that there was a problem after 60 credits and relatively, you know, reasonably thoughtful about these issues. It didn’t really dawn on me because what I thought psychology was, cause this is what I was told, is that it’s really, it’s about the science that we’re trying to do, okay? So it’s really about the epistemology and methodology that we’re trying to take. That’s actually what modern psychology becomes, okay? Is that it’s a frame, an epistemological, methodological frame called science that we’re going to apply, okay? And then, but when you actually become a therapist, all right, and you start to say, okay, I’m gonna be a clinical psychologist, now I’m gonna have to work. And then I learned stuff from the modern, cool psychodynamic from Freud to Young, Karen Horni is one of my favorites. You know, there are a lot of really interesting stuff there. And then I learned the Beckyan model and Ellis, which is the cognitive psychotherapy paradigm. And then I was always actually most arm wrestling with Skinner, although I turn out that my model is about, if there’s one person it turns out to be parallel with, it’s actually ironically, about BF Skinner of all people’s interesting, okay? So all of these individuals say really interesting things. And then I wanted to be coherent as a therapist. I wanna be grounded in the science and say, but when you back up, you realize that they actually use these very different languages, have very different starting points, make very different claims. And then you get massive equivocation when you try to achieve coherence. Right, okay. This is a very helpful and clear setup, Greg. So start taking us through the history then, please. Okay, so the history is right where we left off with Descartes and the emergence of modern science, okay? So what you have is from, we’ll do the Galileo into Newton and the development of matter in motion, okay? So just for clarity, we are adopting now a naturalistic frame for cause and effect, okay? We’re gonna start measuring stuff because we’re now suspicious of the representational mind. We’re gonna try to cancel that out so that we get independent measurement of primary qualities and we will be suspicious of the secondary first-person empirical perspective qualities and we’re gonna try to gain systematic methods of experimentation, measurement, and the mathematical mapping of matter in motion, okay? So let’s just, Rob, just so we can keep refreshing people’s awareness of this term so we can use it. Greg invoked the distinction that’s common between both Galileo and Descartes between primary and secondary qualities. The primary ones are the mathematically measurable ones, as Greg just said, and those secondary qualities, right, that exist only in some sense in the representational mind, the term that is used for that in sort of common parlance are qualia. So when Greg and I start talking about qualia, we’re talking about all of those properties, all of those qualities that are not held by the scientific worldview to be properties of objective things, but exist in some sense vague, look at my hands waving, just only in the mind, just to remind people of that. Exactly, okay. And then we get the empiricist philosophers, most famously Locke and Hume, okay, really saying, well, what is this? What are we seeing? What’s out here? Making this distinction, reifying it, and now, and Brene Descartes coming on with dualism, okay, offering that split that there’s the world of mind, there’s the world of matter. We get then, we get Kant with his rational and empirical synthesis and really is the founder, modern philosophy really begins with Kant, okay? And he then offers his categories of mind, he brings the idea that mind is not just a blank slate, but it actually has what we would call perhaps cognitive schema, that afford it’s the categories of space and time and causality that are built in. And he then has, I don’t wanna get into the technical aspects of the a priori synthetic, whatever, but there’s basically, okay, the mind, the human mind is there to organize the nomina, the things in themselves, but it has a phenomenological experience of the things in themselves, okay? And that then hands the modern enlightenment, a basic model of a subjective phenomena that is in some categorical relationship with the nomina things in themselves. Right, right, okay. Okay, and that basically, how dualistic that is, it’s not really philosophical dualism, but the relationship between phenomena and nomina is a very, very complicated issue. Right, right. Okay, so now what we wanna do, okay, so now we’ll sort of fast forward, that takes us into the 19th century, all right? Where science by this time, Newton’s work is really, now it’s expanding into chemistry, the drive for scientific mathematical analysis of matter and motion, various kinds of energy matter changes is really, I mean, this is the hay day, right? I mean, people are making discoveries that great things are happening, okay? And then what you get then is the idea that, well, maybe we can scientifically correspond changes in the physical environment to changes in our phenomenological experience. And to do that, to yoke that together, that would set the stage for a systematic then science of the secondary qualia. Right, right, right, right. So like people like Fechner and people like that, is that who are- Bingo, that’s exactly where we’re going, okay? So now Helmholtz and Fechner set the stage and generate some of the actually the most powerful and sustaining findings, okay? The psychophysical laws of just noticeable difference, okay, absolute threshold. And what they’re doing is they’re changing the relationship of a physical stimulus in a quantifiable, primary quality way, okay? And then they’re having people report on the changes and what it is that they experience, what just noticeable differences they have, and what is the threshold of detection? And then how do you make the change physically and what pops up in a person’s field of first person experience? So let’s just give a quick example of that, I think that’s very good. So one might be just noticeable difference. So I have a sound which is a wave frequency, and I can vary that and I’m burrowing it physically, the frequency, and then I ask people when they notice a change in pitch. Exactly. And then what I do is I sort of measure out these changes in pitch against the continuous variation frequency of the wave, and then I calculate some correspondence ratio between them. And then I get a psychophysical law. I get the psychological event of noticing the difference matched into where on the physical continuum of change in frequency that gets marked, and I get these psychophysical laws. Exactly. That’s exactly right. And what I wanna then hone in is sort of like, when we use the term physical, we’re gonna have a very clear reference point for what the physical means. The problem of psychology is the competing paradigms are not going to agree on what we just used as the term psychological right there. Right, right, right. Because what we mean by there is exactly this distinction between the primary and secondary, and that is the grammar that emerges at this juncture. I’m sorry, I was just gonna say, so one of the fundamental problems then is that the way, given what we’ve talked about in the previous classes, sessions, is that the very definition of these two types. So the primary are by definition mathematically measurable, and secondary ones are by definition not mathematically measurable. So how can you possibly measure them together? Exactly, exactly. And then we can start to think, okay, so now what we see is then this does establish the fundamental trajectory for what becomes psychology. So Wilhelm Wundt is the father of psychology in general, and he picks up on the psychophysics. And we have the psychophysics of sensation, and what he’s going to do is he’s going to transform this into the introspection on perception. So I’ll say that, so you have the psychophysical around sensation, so I’m gonna, and then all you need to do is say, oh, I feel that, I notice the difference. Now we’re gonna take it up a layer, and I’m gonna have a narrator, an introspectionist, report on what I see. So if I hold up this and you say, well, what do you see? Oh, I see a phone, okay? And then there’s gonna be, well, actually, is that what you see, is you see a phone, or do you see a shape that you then infer to be a phone? Okay, so now we’re gonna have, now what happens is, well, psychology requires us to introspect and to share about this representational system that we only have access to our own internal world. Right, right, and then also it’s bringing out the beginning of the problem of meaning and intelligibility, because seeing a phone is not an entity which within the ontology of physics. Physics talks about mass, and it talks about, but this being a phone is not part of that ontology problem. Okay, so that’s, thank God you bring that up. Okay, so now one of the things that we’re doing here is where the modern empirical natural science system brings an epistemology, we’re gonna shift from your subjective perspective to as external focus on the primary quantities really as possible, okay? And we’re gonna have a classical mechanical cause-effect deterministic sequence. That is the fundamental real ontology, okay, of cause and effect, and everything else is sort of epiphenomenal potentially, if you’re a hardcore reductive determinist mechanical materialist. Right, right, right. Okay, so there’s an ontological and epistemological language game that classical matter and motion mechanics offers, and we’re trying to then take that and we’re gonna try to understand the mind jammed into that, okay? But there’s gonna be a lot of debate as to whether, well, are we taking the epistemology of that system or the ontology of that system? Yeah, right, right. Okay? So the idea is, are we using the methods of Newtonian science to understand the mind? And Hume exemplifies this, how he understands what he’s doing, or are we actually land at three? Are we actually claiming that ultimately the mind is just another material thing, that it is ultimately made out of material stuff? And of course, there’s lots of equivocation between those two also, going all over the place. Okay, so massive, so here we have, and so what Vant is, Vant’s ontology is actually psychophysical parallelism, okay? Which would be an actual early version of what I would offer in some ways, in the sense that it’s, he doesn’t know how to connect the two, but he argues that they are connected, they’re all one substance at one level, but there is some fundamental cause effect relation at some level that he hasn’t unable to specify, so he wants to pull that out, okay? But he’s more interested in the laboratory descriptive analysis of professional introspectionists on their inner experience, depending on the different environments and external independent variables that they try to share. Okay? So that’s Vant. Vant also makes a very important point that he differentiates the lab-based analysis of inner experience versus what he calls Volcker psychology, which really sort of a social cultural folk psychology. Yeah, that’s the term he’s used in cognitive science still. Okay, yeah. So basically for him, he’s like, well, people are reporting on their introspective experience all the time, they’re generating narrative, this is gonna drive art, it’s gonna drive convention, you can’t experimentally analyze it, but if we understand the phenomenological experiences through introspection systematically, then we can understand the parts, and that’s gonna be part of psychology, and that’s gonna bridge us into the other social sciences, so that’s Vant, okay? And he, to really label him in a particular way, especially in American psychology, will follow his student, Edward Titchener, okay? And he brings, to Cornell University, he brings structuralism, all right? And he’s an authoritarian guy, and he brings this very strict and narrow view that psychology is only about human first-person experience, and you can only study it through his structure, and it is all about the qualia. He develops a list of like 44,000 different possible qualia that he then creates a hierarchy of how they’re organized, okay? So now psychology is the science for this branch of the structure of qualia. Right, right, right. Okay? So did he, this is something I know nothing of, so this is a question out of ignorance, I mean, around the same time, or you’re getting the beginnings of pragmatism, you’re also gonna get, you know, what’s gonna become phenomenology in which people are trying to study a phenomenological experience, but I take it that I didn’t, I’ve never heard of any connection between people like Husserl and Titchener or anything like that, or? I wouldn’t, I don’t know whether Titchener was influenced or what he said about phenomenology exactly. There’s a- I think he predates it, I think. Yeah, yeah. Well, but there are, your point about pragmatism in James actually is nice, I’ll follow that line, okay? Because that’s actually, that’s what then, this is the first real divide in understanding what we mean by the mental, the psyche. Okay? So as you know, we get William James, who is one of the fathers of pragmatism, okay? And a philosopher, and the father of American psychology, who writes in 1890, Principles of Psychology, okay? Which is arguably, in this time period, as far as I’m concerned, is best book written in psychology, okay? It’s like heads and shoulders really above the rest in terms of what I think we’ll come back to, okay? But here’s James’s, he’s a pragmatist, and a functionalist, which is the functionalist wants to look around and ask how the heck do animals and humans do what they do in the world, okay? And what is it about them that enables them to behave so radically differently than the inanimate world? The function of their action, okay? Which for James is, this will create a, is mediated by conscious mental life. Right, right. So James is influenced, I know James is somebody I’ve studied very deeply, James is deeply influenced by Darwin, right? Exactly. That’s where the, so the notion of, I just wanna be clear here for people, the notion, James’s functionalism is not the same thing as computational functionalism. No. For James, functionalism basically means something that explains Darwinian adaptation. Exactly. Just to be clear about that. And then that also introduces an important point here that the Darwinian model looks very much like it fits in the Newtonian worldview very well. It looks like it’s just talking about purely mechanical processes, et cetera, et cetera. But it does introduce, and this is part of the argument I make, it does introduce dynamical systems and complex system theory. It insinuates it into the Newtonian worldview. And people, sensitive people, thoughtful people like James, were picking up on this. That’s right. In a way in which, I think it’s fair to say the physicists of the time were not picking up on that. That’s a great point. Okay, so now let’s back up just a second because this is exactly what is happening in terms of the meta, what I call the descriptive metaphysical problem that we get ourselves into. So if we go back to Galileo, we mentioned this earlier, I offered you were commenting that and I reiterated. So Galileo hates metaphysics. Okay. And much of his identity is breaking from Aristotle across the entire Aristotle for causes of substance material, kinetic efficient, okay. And then you have formal and final causation, all right. And matter in motion, as the words imply, require some sort of substance and some sort of kinetic. But the rest of it is a shoe. Okay. And I believe that the material dimension of complexity, if you, in my language system, the Trinology is the matter dimension. Yeah, actually, Aristotle’s application of final and formal causation to the behavior of atoms and rocks is not as superfluous and confusing and not very effective. But when you get into what plants, cells even, animals and people are doing, we’re talking about a radically different set of behaviors that are both a function of something very different and they function really, it’s hard to not see them as functioning to do different things, right. You get this function of and then function to dynamic. Exactly. And what I wanna do just to connect that back is the notion of adaptivity exactly smuggles those to it. Because you have to talk about the structural functional organization and what it functions to do, it functions to afford the organism surviving long enough to successfully reproduce. So these Aristotelian and Alicia Urraro has noted this. Darwin is basically smuggling in, I don’t think in any explicit fashion, but he’s bringing in dynamical systems, he’s bringing in deep continuity, but he’s bringing in as Gregg just said, he’s smuggling in these two missing Aristotelian causes. Absolutely. And I believe that actually when we get sophisticated about the concept of information, computational process, all of that, we are then going to see exactly what is the functional information processing, storage, accumulation over the generations, how it gets played out in an individual’s life, but of course they don’t have access to these concepts at this juncture, right? But genetics, the computational science revolution, et cetera, all of that will then awaken us to these other ways of thinking that are not available. So James is a functionalist, he’s also gives rise to radical empiricism by which he wants to embrace, hey, what do we see? What do we actually see in the world? And what is our functional useful explanations for how it actually works? And so what James is trying to do for him is really what I would call sort of a mental life behavioral view. And what he means by that is he’s watching the actions and adaptations of animals across their life and understanding the Darwinian history of it, and says that’s the dynamic functional mental life. Psychology should be explaining how the hell that happens. That’s what our task is. And to sit in a lab and nitpick structural differences where the problem’s at. Right, right, right, right, right, right, right. Well said, very well said. So there’s a sense in which the two problems that are the subtitle of our work together are really coming together in James, right? And the tension between the functionalist and the structuralist. And we get then this break. And this is a very strong break, the structuralist, especially by the time Tichtner comes along, he’s like, this is what you do. And you either submit to me or you’re doing something different. And I wanna own psychology, okay? And James, of course, has already been influenced. And so they are not agreeing, okay, on what it is that they’re talking about. And then right at the now, the 20th century, it’s about the time, so James has published 1890. I don’t remember exactly when Tichtner gets installed in Cornell, but it’s, you know, 1905, 1910s, that’s the done. Well, then another thing happens. Actually two things that will happen simultaneously to give us the split across all these domains. By 1920s, we will have the ossified problem of psychology, which the great theorist, Russian theorist, Lev Vygotsky calls the crisis, okay? So we’re heading towards the crisis, all right? It is there, right? Let’s keep going. So, and then we have two major figures that in American psychology then set the stage for the dominant paradigms that are operative in America. We get Watson. Watson comes along and is, wants to be, is working with animals and is experimentalist, okay? So he’s in the lab. He wants a framework for understanding that methodology of experimentism. He wants the epistemology of natural science and he is a hardcore mechanical reductionist, okay? So he has the, he wants to then bring the physical science, methods of experimentation, epistemology of external observation and the idea that basically everything is matter in motion and for him, a complex of neuro-mechanical reflexes. Yeah, he’s deeply influenced by both Pavlov and Thorndike, right? The order. Exactly. He is, right. Particularly Pavlov, why? Because at the time in particular, now Skitter will advance on this, at the time, the Pavlovian reflexology that Pavlov was developing, okay? For those who don’t, Pavlov is actually a digestive and physiological person, but in Russia, the categories are a little different. He’s testing how meat powder attacks, results in salivation in dogs most commonly. He’s developed this unbelievably powerful paradigm, which is with us today, classical conditioning, although it’s been updated so we know kind of more functionally what it’s going on in relationship to learning, but it’s a pairing of a bell, classically, with meat powder, boom, and then the bell gives rise to salivation, okay? And now you can test this and this is conforms to the language game of natural experimental science. We have independent variables, there’s a mechanistic process, we have dependent variables, we can now begin the serious process of real psychology, because we know that everything is just physical anyway, and so we’re just, it’s just a complicated matrix of physical switches, and now we have a methodology according to the classic behavioral system of a stimulus response, and he’s very explicit, get rid of consciousness, okay? It doesn’t work in the language game, but what we can study is now, he’s gonna introduce us officially, behavior, mind as behavior, you don’t need the concept of mind, what you do need is the concept of behavior. So everything now in psychology is in terms of observable measurables, can measure the physical properties of the stimulus, and then I can measure the physical response of the organism, and that’s all I’ll need in order to explain behavior, versus he’s the father of behaviorism. Exactly, exactly. And then that becomes a very, very powerful mind, notice it, because it lines up with epistemology, ontology, and methods of physics, okay? And then what’s happening in a very parallel time in Vienna, a guy by the name of Sigmund Freud, okay? He’s actually at the time working as a neurologist, okay, early on, and studying crabs and other crustaceans, and finds, hey, this nervous system thing, it’s all about activation and inhibition, okay? Everything is activation and inhibition, and of course, the steam engine has been enormously influential in terms of, so is this nervous system thing a energy release kind of mechanism, okay? And then he shows how, hey, experiences can be shown, he’s actually has early models of long-term potentiation that are found in his work, and he starts initially a project for scientific psychology, which he never publishes, okay? But for him then, now we have the idea that out of the nervous system is gonna be energies, all right? But then he hooks up with a number of people, but basically to focus, what he start, he needs to make a living, and he hooks up into a physician practice, and starts to look at how people are getting hypnotized, okay? And what he, what notices at the time is an appreciation that some people will have a complete change in their physical symptoms when they’re hypnotized, and most commonly, or classically, what’s called glove amnesia, and there’s a syndrome of the time, so somebody would not have any feeling in their hand, okay? They could prick it, they could look away, blah, blah, blah, and Freud knew enough, and they knew enough about neuroanatomy at the time to know that actually that doesn’t make any sense from a neuroanatomy perspective, because actually you’ll feel this if your hand goes to sleep sometimes, these two fingers are tied to one nerve, and the rest of your hand’s tied to another, the idea that you would have a line right there that would lead to numbness is really odd, okay? And then somebody would be hypnotized, and then all of a sudden they’d have some cathartic moment, and this is right about the time and Freud’s getting these kinds of terms, and then they release it, and all of a sudden, oh, the hand feels again. So Freud sees a couple of these instances and then transforms his idea of energy impulse that the nervous system in general is that’s underneath, okay, the conscious rationales that we are giving, okay? And what’s actually happening, what’s a lot of chaos, confusion, is that there’s this massive misdirection of consciousness for reason given relative to these animalistic urges and impulses, all right? And they start leaking out through the filter of consciousness, and he does interpretation of dreams, and then in 1899, right before the turn of the century, he then does psychopathology and everyday life in 1904, okay? He then gets invited in the Clark Lectures in 1909, I think it is, I think he comes with Young at that stage, and introduces, by this time, he has this analysis that, hey folks, conscious reasoning and self-conscious awareness, that’s the tip of the iceberg, okay? Huge amounts of suffering, confusion, and the ultimate drivers of human behavior are these animalistic, biological drives that we are unaware of, okay? And they drive a lot. And so now what is he concerned with? The dynamic unconscious, that which is behind consciousness, okay, which then puts him at odds a bit with James, and doesn’t have a real good model for the distinction between sub or non-conscious process versus consciousness, okay? He’s aligned with Watson in some ways, and that’s a hydraulic model, but it’s unbelievably mentalistic, okay? And Freud does drop his strong mechanistic reductionism, it gives rise to psychic determinism, in the sense that there is a psychic energy, his ontology of it isn’t very clear, but fundamentally what we then have is, so now we have, let’s just review, we have the attempt to scientifically analyze the mind, okay? Which is then sort of defined originally in sort of the dominant idea of the day that is these secondary experiences relative to primary events, psychophysics starts down that road, you get then the emergence of Wundt, and then the structuralist line off of Tichner, okay? So that’s one meaning of psyche, all right? Then we have the adaptive mental life functional meaning from James, all right? Then we have no, really psyche to the extent that means anything, it’s just what animals do that we can experimentally analyze, all right? Then finally it’s no, there’s an underlying mental psychic entity that we’re not fully conscious of, we have a conscious filter system, it leaks out, there’s a dynamic unconscious, and this we need to study it. And what Freud also offers that the other three don’t is he offers a comparatively effective form of therapy, right, exactly, so you get this, he wants psychoanalysis to be a science of the unconscious, a treatment for neurosis, and ultimately a world view that understands civilization and human’s discontent. And of course, of all the people in terms of the impact, Freud is a head and shoulders above in terms of, because he spills over to the humanities, and he just, such an unbelievable, gigantic, whatever you think of him, his influences, surpassed only by Einstein and a few other people, and well, one of those nations at least. But that success is actually the opposite of what becomes an increasing form of criticism of Freud, which is Freud’s model doesn’t fit in to the scientific world view, and it doesn’t, you can’t study it with scientific methodology. That’s right, that’s the popular in critique of it. Now I find that his ideas are so complex, and actually we know that a lot of them are wrong precisely because we can systematically analyze them. So I find Popper’s critique a little simplistic in some ways, but you’re, I mean, yeah. But you’re absolutely right, the question of what Freud’s ideas are, and whether they are scientific or not, is one of the great, and I certainly, he way overshoots and comes up with a number of crazy things that can’t be falsified. So there’s definitely aspects of his ideas that are very difficult to falsify, and they basically become sort of objects of faith that the psychoanalytic faithful pledge allegiance to. That’s well said, that’s well said. And then that’s gonna be a problem that’s gonna ramble through all the, I mean, maybe we could pause here and say, what are the problems that each one have? So the problem with Freud is, and the whole psychodynamic that also applies to Jung is, well, what’s the epistemology here, and how does this fit into the scientific worldview? Is this even a science at all? Is this a science of the mind? Even though it’s very clinically effective, right? And then the problem facing Watson, of course, which is gonna be the endemic problem of behaviorism, right? And this is gonna drive what’s called the cognitive revolutionist. And you can hear James over here, it’s because organisms, and this is what actually comes out of the more sophisticated study of Pavlovian and Oppert condition, these organisms ultimately don’t respond to the physical property of the stimulus. They respond to the meaning of the stimulus. So just to give a very common example, an organism can see the light colored light of a fire, it can smell the smoke, right? And those are two very different physical things, but it responds in exactly the same way because they mean the same adaptive thing to the organism. And so it’s gonna be one of the, so the meaning is missing from behaviorism. The problem with structuralism and Tichenor and introspectionism is, right? For all of his, and you’re completely right, for all of his authoritarian taxonomy, you just don’t get the invariant agreement you want. Introspection is too, well, it’s too beset by all of the vagaries of human consciousness and working memory and self-perception and bias. And then the problem with, for James, right? And I think of all of them, James started on problems maybe better than others. Absolutely. I think James realized that trying to incorporate these Darwinian ideas into the study of mind was problematic given the standard Cartesian epistemology. That’s why he becomes so enamored with Pierce, right? Pragmatism, because pragmatism is an attempt to create an alternative epistemology, an alternative to Cartesian mathematical epistemology. Exactly. But the way to which that project has succeeded, of course, is problematic. So that’s why it’s still an issue. Dan Chappie and I are reading Bacon’s book on pragmatism, which just traces this history out. The ongoing, especially when you get to figures like Klein and Davidson and Sellers and Rorty, the ongoing dialogue and debate between pragmatism and scientism, which is a Cartesian interpretation of how you do science. And so that problem is ongoing. So just a quick review. So not only are we getting fragmentation, it looks like each one of these four is in some important sense lacking. Definitely lacking. Inadequate, inadequate. Definitely lacking. And so from just a basic, we should be able, in my opinion, we should be able to step back. Things will get a little complicated with the cognitive revolution, but we can basically step back and say, okay, so you have some people saying mind is just behavior. All right. And then you have some in saying, hey, mind is phenomenology. Right, right, right. You have that. And then you have some sort of functional cognitive mental life with James. Right, right. And then you have this distinction between a self-conscious portion of mind and a sub or unconscious portion and the dynamic relation between them. In Freud, yeah. In Freud, okay. These are the referent points. And I think we should be able, a unified frame of psychology, we’ll be able to put the ontological reference in each of those that there is a way to think about mind and behavior is connected. There is a way to think about phenomenology. There is a way to think about the hierarchy of consciousness and a self-conscious into subconscious kind of dimension. And we’re gonna want an adequate, unified frame of psychology. We’ll conceptually juxtapose these ontological reference into a conciliant picture. Right. So of course, that’s gonna be something we’re gonna work towards. That’s what we’re working towards. We’re just right now what we should all, in terms of problem formulation, we’re still in the problem formulation stage. There’s a history of ideas that are competing. And once again, what somebody is observing this conversation, observing this history is like, there’s no adequate language game. There’s just no adequate language game. There’s no adequate one, but there’s also four that are competing with each other. Absolutely, right. There’s no adequate superordinate one. The reasonable, if you enter into it and you say, hey, I’m gonna start playing this game, they obviously live because they have slices of information that have reasonable things to say that you can start gaining cumulative knowledge around. Absolutely. But at the same time, they are totally, the rules and grammar by which they play force definitions and are limited when you flip outside of them and they compete. And they say, oh, so Watson’s most obvious about this. He just has to say, you can’t talk about consciousness. It’s pointless. It’s outside the modern empirical natural science language game, period. So there it is. So you violate the rules as soon as you bring the term in. Right. So let’s gather this all together because it’s really important. So we get a host of, let’s call them epistemological and metaphysical problems from Descartes and the scientific revolution, which we’ve already explored. And then what happens is you get the birth of a science or at least the proto-science that’s posted in some sense, solve this, address this, right? Somehow situate mind back in the scientific worldview as a project. But when it tries to do this, right, not only does it not adequately address the Cartesian problems given to us, like epistemological and metaphysical problems given to us by Descartes and the scientific revolution, it now introduces this additional problem, which we may call, I don’t know what to call it. We could call it like a disciplinary problem in the sense of what we have or a paradigmatic problem or something like that. I want to distinguish it from the pure sort of epistemological and metaphysical. Yeah, no, it’s a multi-poly, it’s kind of like, I’ll use Peter Lindbergh’s notion of the culture war 2.0. It’s a explosion of multi-polarity, okay? And to try to compete then for paradigmatic attention and dominance and resource where they then have to deploy critiques of others and it is a very much a, hey, which side are you on? What group are you gonna be? So it’s gonna create the amount of both equivocation, defense, they’re not engaged in dia logos here to get to the answer. They’re generally engaged in staking out territory and trying to get attention and resources, which of course then adds an enormous amount of chaos and uncertainty in relationship to what it is that we are talking about. Right, so when you turn, let’s say you wanna try and address the problems that Descartes has bequeathed us, and then you say, well, what I’ll do is I’ll turn to science and gather data and good theory in order to try and come up with a way of solving these Cartesian problems. Instead, what you get is this fragmented mess, right? That actually is rewarding your ability to give an adequate, even an adequate problem formulation of what Descartes has left us. Right, I talked to somebody again, sort of more on the science side of this equation, but coming from complex that actually is Jim Ruck. I was talking to him the other day, he’s like, well, I looked into psychology and I can make heads or tails of it. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So that on the, and I’ve talked to a number of philosophers sort of in the same way, it’s like you enter into it, you enter into the swamp of all of this kind of possible angles, data sets, language games, et cetera. Yeah. Okay. And so by 1927, Lev Vygotsky, who tragically dies early, but he’s a brilliant psychologist. There’s two baddies. Yeah, he’s second only to Piaget in terms of developmental psychology in my opinion. Oh, absolutely, yeah. Vygotsky is an unrecognized type. Right, right. One of my next door, right next to me, and we hired her, is Elena Savina. She is a Russian psychologist, educational psychologist. Got both her doctorate in Russian psychology and doctorate in American school psychology. We have thankfully an expert in Vygotsky and theory right next door. So it’s nice to, but so yeah, and actually we could do a whole nother issue about what happens in Russia and what gives rise to what’s called Russian activity theory, okay? Which actually is similar to Fourier cognition and a contextual adaptive behavior dynamic system that’s really fascinating with a layered cultural tool, language tool structure that develops in context. It’s brilliant, okay? But American psychology, that’s not what happens in American psychology. It’s actually Anglo-American psychology by this point too, isn’t it? Yep. Yep. Yes, absolutely. And so that’s a, I wanna be clear that I’m trailing, but the problem is super interesting even when we circle the particular cultural context for it. Okay? So- We have to remember, England and America are going to be the next two superpowers. That’s right. They dominate the world in a very important way. That’s right. And they have this very strong empiricist bent, okay? That actually has all sorts of power, but at the same time, empiricism in and of itself, if you don’t have the concepts and categories, can’t get you out. You have to have logic or metaphysical clarity, descriptive metaphysical clarity to actually gain cumulative knowledge, okay? So I interrupted you. You’re gonna say what Luria said, sorry, what Vygotsky said in- Right, so Vygotsky, the point I wanna make is that Vygotsky has identified exactly what I’m telling you. I was gonna say that actually he says, as you know, if you pay attention, actually it’s not even the theorists that are really articulating what the issue is. It’s practitioners, it’s psychiatrists. By the mid-1920s, everyone’s like, I don’t know what psychology is. There’s no general frame. Is it Freud? Is it Watson? There was the emergence of personalism, the personalist approach by Wilhelm Stern at the time. That actually builds off of, sort of combines a few. And he’s in Gestalt psychology, but they actually all align to the domains that I’ve identified up to this point, okay? Not logical in the functional. Right, exactly. And so now, boom, you get this real crisis, all right? And Russian activity theory offers, I think, are actually not the exact same solution that I do, but an interesting one. But inside American empiricism, the system simply grows, okay? So in terms of its confusion. Right. So you get, here’s a couple of other pieces that then emerge in England, and in particular, United States. So out of Watson, you get Skinner. Yes. Okay? Skinner is not a classic behaviorist, okay? He’s a radical behaviorist. Yes, exactly. And has this whole philosophy of what behaviorism is, and absolutely, for him, what everything we call mind is behavior. Right, right. For Skinner. So he’s like, you’re always in the presence of one behaving person. If you have a toothache, that is your manifestation of private behavior, okay? So the complete transition of the language of what normally would be called mind is called behavior. The goal of science is the prediction and control of behavior, and Skinner gives rise to a branch of that, okay? Which I think is absolutely crucial to understand. It’s wrong in some ways. It’s unbelievably, it’s defined against the information processing view of the cognitive revolution, okay? Which we’ll come back to in a sec. But it is absolutely crucial that we better have a framework for mind as behavior, okay? In my opinion. And Gilbert Ryle as a philosophical- I was just gonna bring up, I was just gonna bring up him as a thinker. Makes the very important point that our categories about what we think about as mind, much of it is behavior. And what the unified theory ultimately lends me to is that actually we need to instantiate the concept of mental behavior. Mental behavior turns to be a very, very important bridging concept between our fractured systems that can then be organized, okay? So we get Skinner, and that’s important for our own confusion because a number, about five to 10% of psychologists to this day think about psychology as the science of behavior, not of behavior and mental process, okay? And it gives rise to this powerful but also very isolating radical behavioral view that’s diametrically opposed to a number of other paradigms. So it is a radical paradigmatic view. And hardcore behaviors, people outside of their culture will be like, God, you can’t talk to those people. Yeah. But so let’s, I mean, so Ryle is important because he, so within Cox’s side, I was taught to distinguish between Skinner’s methodological behaviorism and Ryle’s logical behaviorism. But they’re allies. And like Ryle famously argued that all mental terms are logically analyzable into basically multi-track dispositional terms. Classic example is belief. We think because it’s a verb that we should be looking for some mental events. And Ryle says, no, all you’re doing is expressing a conditional behavior. To say I believe a training is to say, if I see that the window’s open, I will close it. Or if I go aside, I’ll take an umbrella, et cetera. And then what Skinner’s doing with the methodological behaviorism, what’s keeping behaviorism going in my opinion is, what did David back and say at one point, 100,000 hours of experimentation. The behaviorists really, really develop experimental methodology to a very significant degree. They definitely do. Right, and I think that Skinner’s concept of behavioral selection is really very powerful. When you understand the evolution from the classic stimulus response pairing into a feedback loop of behavioral, what I would call behavioral investments that have differential consequences that then select pathways of investment. Yeah, and I just wanna highlight that because, and other people have noted this, that this is something that people within Forty Cox I have noted, that that’s Skinner slipping Darwin in. Oh, yeah, and actually, right, he wasn’t, and Skinner, if you read him, I mean, he didn’t slip it in. He’s like, I wanna be the Darwin of operant theory. That’s what he said. You’re right for correcting me, but I didn’t, I gave, my connotation was incorrect. What I meant is Skinner, in fact, often explicitly refers to Darwin. But if you read textbooks on Skinner, you’re absolutely right. Yeah, yeah, no, you won’t hear that. Right, right, right, absolutely. So, and Skinner, so Skinner wants to understand us in this conversation, okay, as a functional response across three different tiers of selection, okay? Natural selection, operant selection, and verbal selection. Right, right, right. That’s his model, which, by the way, is gonna translate immediately, well, natural selection gives rise to the complex dynamic interplay of life, okay? Behavioral selection gives rise to the complex dynamic interplay of animal behavior, which I call mine, and then verbal selection, justification of rules, grammars, constituencies, give rise to, so he then has this very, he’s a contextualist, not a mechanist, okay? At his fundamental, if you’re familiar with Stephen Peffer’s worldviews, okay? In 1942 argued these different fundamental, so Watson is a mechanist through and through. Skinner’s a contextualist, okay? He’s always putting things in context. It’s really, really fascinating. But anyway, so yeah, so now what you get, but the horror of this, okay, is that because he then insists with this behavioral tradition, we’re not integrating sophisticated operant theory, or at least we’re vulnerable to breaking off sophisticated operant theory from the cognitive models, okay? And it’s the 4E people that have, we gotta come back decades later, right? To reintegrate and embody, to enact, think of the terms, embody, the enacted, the extended, all right? This is a nervous system in dynamic relation with the environmental contingencies, okay? But it gets split off, and it forces a particular kind of language that’s, one thing Skinner is, he’s unbelievably hostile to mentalism. He’s very, so that’s a- That’s gonna be, to some degree, is Achilles heel, precisely because he reaches up to the level of verbal selection, he’s gonna slam into Chomsky, right? And this is gonna be the devastating defeat of his career in so many ways. He’s gonna lose himself. And rightfully so, so here’s according, in the sense that, so you have then, then the humanists happened, by the way, and I’m not gonna get into them, but we have obviously Maslow, and which become unbelievably crucial for the identity of psychology, rightfully so, but also when we get into the profession, okay? And what we are, what we’re trying to help people with, and whether these other models are really deterministic and nasty. So this third force is crucial for human potential, it’s crucial for how to like actually have people be helpful in context. So that’s a very important thing, but the science of- Before you turn from it, Greg, I just wanna put a little flag in there that Maslow is also bringing back Aristotle in a very powerful- Yes. Like the hierarchy of needs is very- Absolutely, and it’s a very scale of nature kinds of stuff in many ways. So, and so maybe when we come back to, and certainly I consider the meta-psychology I built a scientific humanistic philosophy. Right, right, right. So, and I’m as a, and as a absolutely crucial to understand the application and professional development of psychology. And there are a lot of really powerful ideas that Rogers has about the science of human being. Definitely. I was just a little conscious of time and I wanna sort of make sure we wrap this up in relationship to the, get to the- The revolution, yeah, yeah. So, and you and I know this very well, so we’ll just sort of summarize. So then you go back to Babbage, Babbage builds a difference engine, okay? And we get the emergence of the idea of a thinking machine, we alluded to some of that, all right? And then it’s in the 1920s into 1930s and then explodes in the 40s and 50s, okay? That the world of information science and theory and mechanisms pop, okay? They explode, okay? Right, the Turing Revolution, basically. Exactly, you get the Turing Revolution where you get Shannon’s emphasis on information as reduction uncertainty and give rise to information theoretic approaches, okay? Which has become unbelievably influential. Basically, for those that are not aware, his notions about certainty, chaos, order, disorder, basically overlap completely, it turns out, with thermodynamics. So it’s a really fascinating reality there. And we’ll come back, by the way, in the unified system to be a very important thing because entropy and energy and the free energy accumulation inside and out turns out to be a very, very key element, okay? So what we get is, I mean, so what Greg is doing, and he’s introducing something that’s gonna be sort of the progenitor of cognitive science, right? You’re getting the beginning and Turing proposes it, right? The imitation game, et cetera. The possibility of a new way of studying mind. Let’s study mind by making minds. And I mean that very clearly. Let’s build artificial intelligence and we will go around all of this chaos in psychology and what we’ll do is we’ll build it and because we built it, we know how it works. And then we can also, we can now start talking. We have a way of talking about the mental that doesn’t seem sort of spooky and weird the way Watson and Skinner don’t like because we get what’s gonna, this is a bit anachronistic going backwards, but we’ll be able to talk about the hardware versus the software of these information processing machines. And the hardware is where the mechanical language goes and the software is where the mental languages go. And then, wow, this will be this. And then of course that’s going on, as Greg said, and then Chomsky is over here talking, showing that Skinner can’t explain language at all. And then what seems to be coming into the floor with the computational revolution is the idea of computer languages, programs and computer languages. And that that is the way in which we’ll be able to explain language and cognition. And it looks like the promise of a great reunification is outside of all of this chaos that Greg has indicated. So it’s a hundred percent. And so that’s it. And to the extent that psychology does get organized, that’s exactly what happens in some ways. So we get this, but there’s all this equivocation and inside the system. But yes, so crucially folks, information, information theoretic, information semantic and information processing, make a distinction between those three layers of this. But they’re equivocating at this juncture. But now what we do have is we have an idea that’s consistent in many ways with the natural science, very consistent in many ways. Although I would argue the cause effect of information processing, information theoretic, especially that’s then directed through a semantic system towards something, this is where you get, descriptively these are different kinds of cause effect behavior. Yeah, they are. And I would supplement that by saying that what’s called good old fashioned AI, the computational approach is, and this is, it leaves out what you were just flagging, what was good in Skinner, that whole dynamical system selection model, that the computational system, the computational approach really misses all of that selectivity, that dynamical coupling. Right, they jumped on the algorithmic processing so fast and then the building of it so fast that they acted as though they could just extract it completely, it was so powerful at one level and there was so much excitement. They left the body, they left evolution, they left actual phenomenological perception, participatory knowing, the actual embodiment of procedures, they left all that crap behind and acted as though they could just, well, deep blue beats people at chess, so that must be the whole damn thing. Yeah, yeah, exactly, exactly. Right, okay. So, well, I was just gonna say, so, I mean, there’s a sense in which, I’m just gonna speak as a coxsai and then I’ll give the mic back to you. Like, coxsai promises to try and deal with these problems, but it hasn’t yet produced a solution to the mess of the science of the mind. Is that fair to say? 100%, and in fact, we still, it helps. Okay, so the cognitive piece is absolutely central. We need to understand that the nervous system is there for a reason, it’s taking up energy and fundamentally, just like your gut, digest food to distribute energy, the nervous system digests information. Right, right, yeah. It digests information and we didn’t know that before. So the cognitive, really, so now like Searle, I’m making a reference here to Searle, is a biological, emphasizes sort of, yeah, it digests information, it processes information, it metabolizes information. Now, how it does that and what we actually mean by those terms, okay, is enormously complicated and how we embody that back into all these other domains of psychology, right? Exactly, exactly, exactly. Okay, so the functionality of mental life, the actual structure of phenomenology and mindless behavior, okay, either in an experimental condition or in an adaptive natural. Beautifully said, that’s beautifully said. Okay, so what is actually we’re looking at right now, so essentially what modern psychology is, is it’s a collection of all that crap, okay? It has a completely equivocating cognitive mental process as some sort of functional information processing thing, with 5% of psychologists still holding on strong to Skinner, all right, with all of these different paradigms around it and then they say, hey, it’s the science of behavior and mental process, but the key thing is we do science. That’s how textbooks are. And they never tell you, we actually, well, this is what we mean by mind. This is what we mean by behavior and this is the scientific language game that we are playing. And we don’t know how to define those terms, hence an enormous and completely unsatisfactory language system and thus the pre-multi-paradigmatic mess. And then cognitive science comes along and says, okay, well, we’ll take care of it. And I’m like, well, good luck. No, for sure. And the thing is cognitive science was supposed to be the solution to fragmentation, but there’s also fragmentation within cognitive science between the computational and the core. Well, now we’re getting consciousness studies, right? There’s a whole like the Arizona career, there’s consciousness studies, the entire system. And that’s the issue is that we’ve exploded, there’s equivocation, there’s enormous, and then it’s huge, it’s this mass, okay? And how do you create, how do you manage all of that inertia and how do we understand what it is? And so instead to untie the world knot, we have to understand that history. And the task before us as far as I’m concerned is what will happen when it’s done is a unified field frame, okay, that says, oh, I understand what they were referring to and their epistemology. I understand how each one of those domains were making sense and now conciliant wise, we can make sense of them all together. There can be a jumping together of facts with coherence and clarity. Right, okay, that’s excellent. And then the idea is that part of what we’re doing is that project is bound up and in dialogue with the project that we got sort of from Descartes and Hobbes, which is how do we- Well, you have to, right, because the hard problem of phenomenological consciousness and its relationship to conscious justification in humans and embodiment and action in animals down the line is unsolved. But if we, there’s some sort of, we can realize the relevance of a hierarchy that results in something, we could piece this thing together and have a good language system. And that’s what I sense you to be right on the trail of. That’s what, yeah, that’s well said. That’s what we’re trying to do right here, like your work and mine work together on that. I wanted to point out one other thing and you, there was an allusion to it. There’s one other way in which this is problematic, which is, as you said, you said that these texts, I have a third thing, I’m gonna make this worse, but I know it’s already implicit in your work, so I wanna explicate it, right? These textbooks not only fail to tell you what mind is and what behavior is, they actually don’t tell you well. There’s pretension in telling you what science is. The philosophy of science that is presupposed in sort of textbook psychology is very, very poor philosophy of science. The model of science there. Like for example, Watson’s, let’s just give one quick example. Watson’s idea that science works only in terms of observables and never in terms of unobservable entities is just ridiculously false. I mean, the point is, it’s anachronistic because of the time in which he was looking around and seeing science. But even by that time, scientists were pulling away from that model. And now of course, most of the entities that science talks about are not directly observable, they’re theoretically inferred. Completely. Right, and that’s not an exhaustive criticism, I just mean. No, listen. That’s an example. Right, it’s an unbelievable nightmare. And to me, it’s like, okay, we’re gonna take this thing called the scientific method, and hey, as long as you just follow that, then you get what the answer is. And man, there’s nothing that we know more clearly. You don’t just cookie cutter, okay? This method, and parrot it, and then yield as if it’s a well-defined problem that you just follow the little recipes on and you get to the cake at the end. That’s not what this is. And we in fact know that it’s not, yet that’s what they’re taught. I mean, this is the third most popular major. Psych 101 is like one of the most popular courses. And it provides no frame that what they’re being handed, I mean, it took me a while really, is actually an enormous amount of gobbledygook at a conceptually sophisticated level. So to me, the problem of psychology both is a very important understand, and it gets into getting the proper metaphysics ultimately of love, of friendship, of what it is that we’re trying to do in this world. And so that’s the why to me, I’m so passionate about helping people realize we can just open your eyes, see the history and see it. Right there, there’s really something very important for us to try to, Russ. That’s fantastic. Okay, I think we’ve now, between these four sessions, I think we’ve really set up at least an initially good problem. I think we got the problem formulation going. Exactly. I mean, we’re gonna come back to it because we’re gonna talk again about things we’ve alluded to, like the inadequacies of GoFY, first, second, third generation, trying to reintegrate phenomenology and functionality back into the science of mind. Those are hallmark, by the way, what’s called for ECOGSI. Instead of constantly sneaking Aristotle back in, let’s make it explicit, at least the Ural Dynamical Systems Theory, deep continuity hypothesis of Evert-Tropson. These are all things we still have to explore, but at least I think we’ve got the beginnings of a good problem formulation and a shared language for doing that. So thank you, Greg. That was really great today. That was really good. Fantastic. Yes, there’s clearly a world not here, right? Of consciousness, mind, behavior, whatever, there’s a world not, and I’m excited because I think that there’s enormous convergent validity here that allows that world not to be potentially untangled.