https://youtubetranscript.com/?v=x2ndsG9-tEg
Welcome to Untangling the World Nod of Consciousness, wrestling with the hard problems of mind and meaning in the modern scientific age. My name is John Vervecky. I’m a cognitive psychologist and cognitive scientist at the University of Toronto in Canada. Throughout the entire series, I will be joined in dialogue by my good friend and colleague, Greg Enriquez, from James Madison University in the United States. Throughout, we are going to wrestle with the hard problems of how we can give an account of a phenomenon like consciousness within the scientific worldview, how we can wrestle with that problem in conjunction with the problem that Greg calls the problem of psychology that is pervasive throughout psychology, which is that psychology has no unified descriptive metaphysics by which it talks about mind and or behavior. Throughout this, we will be talking about some of the most important philosophical, cognitive scientific, and neuroscientific accounts of consciousness. So I hope you’ll join us throughout. And we’re going to move into another stage of the argument and start to consider some actual current theories about the nature of consciousness. So welcome, Greg, as always. It’s a pleasure to have you here. Thank you so much. Yeah, you know, we got to a really important point about adjectival and adverbial consciousness. I think we set up some really interesting things. I look forward to bridging into those, and I’m excited about what we got coming today. Great. So Greg mentioned some of the things. Let’s just do a quick review. We took a look at how Descartes didn’t solve, but try at least gave good strong indication as to how one could begin to follow up on the intuition that the function question, what does consciousness do, and the nature question, how does consciousness fit into the furniture of the universe? Because it’s such a strange thing. How those questions could be answered in an integrated fashion. And we took a look at his idea of pursuing a relationship between consciousness and intelligence. And we noted that that’s a very powerful intuition, and it’s a very powerful intuition that speaks on behalf of trying to answer the nature and the function questions in integrated fashion. And what Descartes proposed was that animals that are intelligent without consciousness have co-variation. They have brain states that co-variate with the world, gives them a general capacity to move around the world, navigate the world. We then noted that many current theories of representation, in fact, are co-variation theories, that a mental representation is something in the head that co-varies with the world, or sometimes in the head and body, et cetera. But many people note within that tradition that co-variation doesn’t have the specificity of reference that mental representations have. And Descartes seems to have been aware of this, not using those terms, but something analogous. And it looks like what consciousness does is out of all of the aspects of co-variation, object, weapon, black thing, phone, birthday gift, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. Curtain. Yeah. What consciousness does is it aspectualizes. It picks out one of those aspects and readies it for reason, readies it for intelligent behavior. We then noted by making a point of an argument from John Searle that how deeply that aspectualization and consciousness are bound together. Representation presupposes aspectualization. And then Searle says that aspectualization presupposes consciousness. I propose to you that we could flip it around, that aspectualization presupposes relevance realization and relevance realization could be used to explain in an integrated fashion both intelligence and consciousness, both in the sense that it’s a very complex concept. Consciousness via the function of aspectualization. Yep. And then we took a look at what that might look like. We took a look at the- How about let me pause you right there for just a second. Cause okay, cause this readiness for reason, I think is this really, really important point. And especially because we have René Descartes doing this in relationship to his own human thinking, what I would say, reading it for mind three, that rational justifying, right? But we’re in the animal kingdom, okay? So essentially it’s priming it in some ways to be, we don’t mean reason in relationship to justifying proposition, right? But we do mean holding it and perhaps simulating various counterfactual scenarios. And my language then calculating various paths of behavioral investment for affordances and stressors. So now you get a cortex that actually can really start to integrate and simulate if we wanna connect it to some of the mental manipulation based stuff. So we can imagine how that aspectualizing pulls in and then allows mental manipulation in a particular kind of way. Right, good, excellent. And so we took a look at how that functionality might be related to our phenomenological experience. And we took a look at Michael Palania’s work that is very much a case of, I would argue how such aspectualization occurs. And that’s something that bridges between two kinds of awareness. Substitutory awareness, which is awareness through and focal awareness, which is awareness of. And that’s that foregrounds things, the background. We talked about the way the features and the gestalt are related. So that’s the whole aspectualization process. And then we took a look at the rudiments of that tracking and the basic salience tagging and the work of Zen and Polition around this. And then we got the distinction between adjectival qualia, which tend to dominate the discussion in consciousness, the blueness of something, the greenness, versus the adverbial qualia, which is the here and now-ness, togetherness, which are the only qualia that survive when you load up multiple object tracking. That’s experimentally replicated. And the idea that consciousness, the fundamental, the formulating act, the primordial act of aspectualization is something analogous to demonstrative reference. This, this, this, and the grouping of them together that makes, and you need that for categorization. You can see that the getting it ready for what Descartes called reason, what you call counterfactual thought. Yes, very much. Go ahead, David. I just happened to see a cool video on Zipf’s Law. I don’t know if you know about that, but Pareto Distribution, all that other stuff, but it was on language, okay? And the most common words on the, of, and all of that, okay? So all of those actually words are Finsta words. They basically are words that then are gonna reference where things are rather than what they are, adjectival, you know, the nouns, verbs, expensive. So I was just, it brought my, to my attention how frequently our language is framing Finsta kinds of notion. Yeah, exactly. That’s good, I didn’t know about that. So the idea is you can see aspectualization making ready for, you know, higher thought, not full-blown reason, I grant you that, but something more in this act of, right, we salience tag things, we have the thisness and a thisness and then a togetherness, a here, nowness, togetherness, and then that is what is needed in order to form a category and therefore to form a concept. So one way we might talk about this is aspectualization is transforming variations into things that are ready for conceptualization. I was thinking about saying full-blown reasoning might not be right, but something like, with at least the beginnings of conceptualization. So we took a look at all of that and that, and then we talked about the fact that in the pure consciousness event, people lose all the adjectival folio, and all that’s left is, right, a very heightened version of the hereness and the nowness and the togetherness. So the sort of the here, now, eternity, and the togetherness is pure oneness, pure unity, and so you get kind of like this Gansfeld just purely adverbial folio, which is a good argument that adverbial folio are sufficient for consciousness and that adjectival folio are not necessary for consciousness. I wanna play with this a little bit more in that you could conceive of the opposite. You could conceive of a creature, kind of a humian monster, that had only adjectival folio, disconnected, not capable of being in any way conceptualized, patches, would they be patches, blobs of hereness, sorry, of blueness and greenness that share no hereness, no nowness, no togetherness. Is that consciousness? So I’ve regularly and reliably done this with many people and generally most people’s into which quite strongly is, no, that doesn’t seem like consciousness anymore. Now that’s not as strong an argument as the multiple object tracking argument, but at least is a plausible argument that adjectival folio are not sufficient for consciousness. Certainly not the way we fully think of phenomenology. So we have the full phenomena. When you say, oh, I wake up, okay, I’m asleep, I’m unconscious, I wake up, there’s that, there is, they’re both what you’re seeing and the witnessing function that’s pulling them together and organizing. And if you pull that off and said, okay, all you had is some felt sense of adjectival, bing, you know, whatever, right? It’s hard to even imagine without the framing, but you can, and actually I do believe my intuition and I think there’s some, you know, it’s a hard problem, but like pleasure and pain, as sort of root qualia that send out that bing to move, lean toward, lean away, right? As sort of the elements of this, the very early sentient, you know, the hinting early sentience that then is going to be witnessed by higher order processes that really bring phenomenology together, feels to me like the way in which it might have evolved. Yeah, that’s a good speculation, I’d like to come back to that. I’ll share one that I have, so I have less confidence in what I’m about to say, it’s much more speculative in the pejorative sense of the word. I have a speculation that adjectival qualia might be the instantiation of that function whereby the, whereby the, what’s been made, like it’s the making ready for conceptualization function. You have the aspectualized function of like, of the here-ness, now-ness, togetherness, the demonstrative reference analog, and then you have something that is actually making it ready to be something like propositional content or conceptual content, categorical content, and I suspect that adjectival qualia might be serving that function. I have no good argument or empirical evidence for this claim, so please note, that’s what I’ll say about it right now. Okay. Okay, so we went through all of this, and if we go through the multiple object tracking, the pure consciousness event, the humian monster, we seem to get an argument that adverbial qualia are sufficient, adjectival qualia are not sufficient, neither are they necessary, and therefore that would sort of lead to the conclusion that adverbial qualia are also necessary and sufficient, which means they would, in a logically proper sense, constitute essential features of consciousness. I’ll just say, this is what, when I first heard you make this, it made me very excited about it, because I was trapped, I think, in the adjectival qualia. I mean, they’re so salient, right? But you’re looking through the witness function, you’re looking through adjectival, right? And it is definitely the joint of those, and sort of the separation of them really helped, and then when I was like, well, what is the foundational essence of my, when I talk about perspectival knowing, or what I use to call phenomenological knowing, I mean, that was my general term for it, it’s that witnessing function. So that really sat for me, and it shifted my attention, it saw the way I saw how I was seeing through the lens of my understanding, that shifted, and then I got right into the witnessing function, and to me, that linked many different things together, and definitely afforded some insight. So. Thank you. I mean, so the idea, then the proposal, which will be further argumentation and evidence, is that the aspectualization function, and the here and nowness togetherness, can be explained in terms of relevance realization, and recursive relevance realization, and that that, and since, but independent arguments published elsewhere, that this relevance realization is the core of general intelligence, that would help explain, justify the intuition that there’s deep connections between general intelligence and consciousness. So there’s a lot that’s promising about this. I want to also be clear one more time, I’m not saying, and I know you’re not saying, Greg, that adjectival qualia don’t exist. I’m saying that, I’ve even offered a speculation that I don’t have that much confidence in, but I don’t have any alternative to it either, what I think the adjectival qualia might be or might be doing. We are gonna take a look at other people’s proposals of the adjectival qualia. We will not find many proposals about the adverbial qualia, and that’s gonna be surprising, especially when we look at people trying to address the function of consciousness. Okay, so there’s a lot to keep a look at. So this brings us to two, sort of a decision point, as you start down the enormous tree, a banyan tree of trying to explain consciousness. One of the key decision points is, okay, are you gonna try and build consciousness out of representational content, the content of representation, or you could try to build consciousness, as I’ve been suggesting, out of the aspectualizing framing function that gives rise to representations. Those are two options available. Now, the one I mentioned first is, far and away, the predominant way people, that’s the predominant choice that people make within cognitive science and philosophy. First of all, I wanna make clear why I think that is an intellectually respectable thing to do, while at the same time putting it into a frame that might call it into question. I wanna argue that trying to understand consciousness in terms of representational content makes excellent Cartesian sense. If you’re in a Cartesian framework, remember we talked about how the mind is basically reduced to its representational function, and consciousness is going to somehow therefore be a function of representation. The mind is a purely epistemic engine. It’s all just about truth, truth attaches to the content of our representations, and then you’d say, okay, and then they, consciousness, we talked about this, consciousness is where the mind touches itself, it’s all that’s left of conformity, but how do representations touch each other? Sorry for sounding graphic. Well, the idea is one representation takes another representation as its content. So I can have meta representations, I can have recursive representation, I can have a representation about a representation, and in fact, most of our representations are representations of representations, right? So the idea that many people have is you’ll build consciousness out of this meta representational or this recursive, depending on whether you wanna talk about it structurally or dynamically, right? This recursive meta representational function. Now you’re gonna fit, and this seems so intuitive because consciousness feels like it’s always consciousness of some states that are representational nature. So it’s a lot of intuitive plausibility, it makes terrific sense within the Cartesian framework of the mind. We’ve noted though that, and that Cartesian framework is massively legitimized by how it is insinuated seamlessly with the scientific worldview, and we’ve already given that argument at length. So what Greg and I also explored though is that framework, the Cartesian framework is tremendously problematic. It gives you the mind-brain, mind-body problem, it ramifies through the problem of psychology, right? So attempts to even get a science of the mind going are undermined by it, so it’s very problematic. So I’m trying to be very fair to people here, right? I respect, right? Makes good sense that within the Cartesian framework, you would try to build consciousness out of meta representations. But we should also be suspicious of that. It’s plausible, it’s intellectually respectable, but the suspicion of it should also be in our mind because that whole framework is in some way causing us a lot of deep and profound problems about the nature of mind and the nature of ourselves within the scientific worldview. So how does that okay? That sounds right on target with me. So yes, let’s get into that, that sounds good. So I want to, so we do not have the time, or I think even between us, the relevant expertise to cover every single version of this theory that’s been promoted. So what I have chosen to do is to pick one version of this theory that is seminal in that it has influenced many, it is intellectually respectable in its own right, and it’s seminal, also in the sense that it inseminates many other theories about consciousness. And this is Rosenthal’s theory, which is known as the higher order thought, or theory, or hot theory, so it’s got a sexy mind. Right. I want hot theory. So there’s sort of four conditions to this theory. The first three are unproblematic because it’s the fourth that is dealing with the problem I’ve mentioned. Okay. Sorry, the problem I’m gonna bring up right away. So before I get into Rosenthal’s theory, what’s the basic problem for any meta-representational theory of consciousness? Now, this is a problem not faced by Descartes, but it’s faced by all of us, because we have the idea that a lot of processing, and we discussed this last week with Searle, sorry, last time I was here, a lot of processing is unconscious cognitive processing, and that’s presupposed through most of cognitive psychology and cognitive science. Okay. So the problem is when you’re going to explain consciousness in terms of representation, you have to acknowledge the fact that we have many unconscious representations, we have many processes using unconscious representations, and many of those unconscious processes are meta-representational in nature. Right. So until I speak it, I have an unconscious belief that cats are mammals. So I have a representation cat, and part of its content is the representation mammal. Cat and mammal are not the same thing, so these are distinct representations. Something can be a mammal and not be a cat, for example, so what I have is I have, here’s an unconscious representation, here’s a higher order, right, here’s a representation that takes this as its content, so that if, right, so that there’s all kinds of processing going on in my memory, reconstructive memory might be doing something about my memory of cats and its relationship to other mammals via the connection, we know all kinds of stuff’s going on. So I have a representation of a mammal, and I look at all kinds of stuff’s going on, okay, so you have lots of, let’s take it that we have good empirical evidence, and I think pretty readily available, very much able evidence, that we have unconscious meta-representations and meta-representational processes. Great, let me pause you right there for just a sec, okay, so that people, so to me, one of the things that you made a point about, well, Descartes sort of has this, but he doesn’t, okay, is why does it become reified? Well, it becomes reified through the cybernetic and cognitive revolution, okay, where now we have the concept of, you know, information processing and representation, which we can now ontologically map in artificial intelligence and we all do, and then it’s like, oh, a system can translate something, it can get it recursive loops, it can make predictions based on uncertainty reduction, and we can build systems this way. So now we have as part of our sense-making architecture, right, the concept of cognition broadly defined, okay, and that’s a new idea, which is going to connect, in my estimation, it’s going to connect both to, well, how do, like, robots behave and how do you actually coordinate behavior, and it’s going to connect to consciousness, but consciousness is also going to get entangled, well, what do we mean by phenomenological consciousness, right? What you’re articulating here is, well, okay, representation on top of representation, but actually the cognitive both helps with that or that concept, but it also obscures it because that can happen without consciousness. Very much, very much, very much, and in fact, that example, Greg’s point brings up a powerful example in how this ramifies into the function question, which is, we, you know, we’ll come back to this when we do the Chinese Roman version of that, things like that, but the idea that we may get very sophisticated machines that are doing highly intelligent behavior without consciousness, and then we remember that we, now that we can explain that behavior, we are capable of understanding ourselves as doing so much that’s intelligent without it being conscious, and so this now, again, brings up what is consciousness for, what does it do, so you see how the nature and the function questions keep bouncing off of each other, because Rosenthal is not giving us a functional account, he’s trying to give us an answer to the nature of consciousness. Okay, so let, so the issue is, how do you turn unconscious representations into, into conscious representations, and somebody might be saying, that sounds like Descartes’ problem of co-variations into representation, I think there’s similarity there, we’ll come back to that, so that’s a good thought, but let’s come back to Rosenthal’s line, so how do I turn unconscious representations into conscious representations? The intuition is, I use meta-representation, the problem is, we have overwhelming evidence that you could have meta-representation and meta-representational processing without there being consciousness, so what does Rosenthal say? Okay, so let’s do it, so the idea is, the first condition is, I’m in some, I’m in some, I have some unconscious representational state, let’s call that A, here it is here, represented by my right fist, so okay, and then I have another unconscious representational state, right, let’s call this T, because it would be the thought of A, right, and we’ll come back to what that thought means, but T is of A, okay, and then the third condition is, being in A causes being in T of A, so if I have this state, it is causal of me having this state, is that okay, does that work so far? That works, okay, and we can note that the nervous system is hierarchically arranged, definitely, right, so this idea that this would be hierarchical levels, that’s fine, yep, that’s fine, so the problem is, as we said, we’ve already got good argument that that is not sufficient for turning, we have counter examples, we have lots of this without there being consciousness, so the fourth condition, which I call the intimacy condition, and I can’t remember, Greg, if I came up with that way of calling it, or if I got it from somebody else who called it that, because it’s what, it’s all I have is this meta memory of, yes, call it the intimacy condition, did I come up with that, or did I pick that up from somebody, so a public thing, if somebody else came up with that designation, and it’s right, and it’s extant in the literature, apologies, and if they have it, then let’s use it because it’s at, so the intimacy condition is this idea that A causes T of A without there being any inferential relationship between A and T of A, or there being any sensory information passing between A and T of A, so what that means is that there is no epistemic relationship between A and T of A, it doesn’t come through any kind of sensory information or inferential information. Why? Well, because Rosenthal wants to block, blocking the inferential blocks the examples I just gave of cat and mammal, right, there’s, right, it blocks that relationship, so he says, no, that’s not going to count because the relationship between A and T of A is non-inferential. He also wants to block weird connections that loop through sensory, so let’s use your example pain, let’s say pain is that A is, there’s tissue damage, and then there is the recognition of the need to react or respond to tissue damage, and that, right, okay, so let’s say my tissue is damaged but I’m not feeling any pain, and then I look and see blood, right, and that sensory information makes me behave in a certain way such that I pull away, no, notice my avoidance, okay, because I don’t like the sight of blood, does that mean I’m now in pain, so the idea is, no, it’s quite possible that I have the A, I have a T of A, I don’t like the sight of blood, that’s, right, and so I pull away, but that doesn’t, that’s not the same thing as feeling the pain of the cut, right, and so the idea here is you want to block those kinds of counter examples as well, you want it to be that, and here’s the point, that there’s some intimate connection between A and T of A, it’s not mediated by inferential states, it’s not mediated by sensorial states of any kind, is that okay so far? That’s okay so far, I’m following that. Okay, so the, of course, the 64,000 question, the winning the game, $64,000 isn’t very much anymore, won’t even, might buy, it’s not even a terribly expensive car anymore, anyways, so the question then comes, well, if it’s not inferential and it’s not via sensory information, what’s the nature, that’s the nature of the causal relation, so let’s grant the intimacy condition is correct, because if we don’t grant it, then Rosenthal’s series is just going to be counter example to that, so the key is that relationship, now that’s a little bit trickier about what it is, so we have to get at that more indirectly, and what I want to do is, I want to take a look at two criticisms made by Drepsky of Rosenthal’s theories, two attempts to refute it, and then defenses of Rosenthal given by Seeger, because they will help clarify what that intimacy condition is, okay, so Rose, Drepsky uses the example of pain, but pain is somewhat problematic for people, in terms, I don’t mean that it exists or that it’s qualia, I mean, of people’s ability to sort of parse it phenomenologically, so I use this example, which is generally better for people, so I’m going to slightly modify, this is just a pedagogical move, there’s nothing substantial to it, I’m just going to slightly modify Drepsky’s example and bring it up, so Drepsky says, well, this has happened to me, I’m angry, right, and it’s clearly a state that I’m in, but I’m not aware that I’m angry, so if you’ll allow me my language, I’m angry adverbially, so, right, I’m not aware of my anger, I’m aware through my anger of the world, the anger is the lens through which I’m seeing things, it’s coloring things in a certain way, you seem particularly threatening to me, right, etc., you’re hyper salient, I’m getting aroused for fighting you and all that sort of stuff, but if you were to ask me at that moment, or perhaps until you ask me, are you angry, I’m sure you encounter this in therapy all the time, right, that must happen all the time to you, right, okay, so the example is not controversial, and then Drepsky says, well, look what we have here, right, we have A, but we don’t have T of A, the person’s angry, but they’re not aware that they’re angry, and yet they’re still conscious, that anger is still a conscious state, okay, now first of all, notice what’s happening here, notice how this is, and how I could helpfully explain Drepsky by shifting over to the adverbial, and looking awareness through, not just awareness of, so the language we’ve introduced is already helpful for explicating Drepsky’s point, but Siva comes back and says, no, no, no, that’s a mistake, that’s a deep mistake, and it’s really interesting, Greg, how often, and when I’m teaching this argument, people make this mistake, even after I’ve taught them the mistake, okay, so A is unconscious in Drepsky, in Rosenthal’s model, and so it’s T of A, right, right, Drepsky is identifying T of A with the introspective awareness of the with the introspective awareness of A, right, so, and that’s, right, that’s not, we gotta go really slowly here, that’s not what Rosenthal’s saying, for Rosenthal, both A and T of A are unconscious, it’s only in the intimacy condition that the joint, the composite of the two achieves consciousness, right, now, so T of A is not your introspective awareness of your mental states, right, so a way of putting that that might make it easier for people to grasp, and this is the distinction that is important, there’s a big difference between being conscious and being self-conscious, right, there’s, oh, one more clarification, there’s two meanings of self-conscious, one is consciousness of yourself, and one is reflective, reflexive consciousness, I mean the latter, not the former, we’ll talk about the former later on, okay, so there’s a difference between me being angry and me and me being aware that I’m angry, between being conscious and being self-conscious, in introspection, introspection is the function which by which I become self-conscious of my conscious states, is that okay? Right, and so, yeah, I’ll just, this is, in my language system, we’re talking about, you want to layer this up mind one, which is the neurocognitive functionalism, okay, and then into mind two, which is going to be, I think, A onto T, but that’s different from mind three, okay, which is the self-conscious recursive introspecting awareness that can report on all of that process. Exactly, exactly right, you inverted it by the way, it’s T of A not A on T, but that’s fine, but I’ve inverted for you, so I get why, I can see why that happens, so we, so the higher order thought T of A is not, it is not itself a conscious state, you have an unconscious state and an unconscious state, and when they are in the intimacy relation, that the composite is a conscious state, so we shouldn’t confuse, right, the higher order thought with conscious introspection, that is a mistake. Good, so let me see if I’m following this, okay, so I think we talked about the duck-rabbit illusion last time, right, so I’ve one layer, you’re bringing up the A, and then you have contact with either a duck or a rabbit, right, okay, so then you’d have the phenomenological experience, and that’s, so when you see the duck, there is the contact there, and then when you see a rabbit, there’s the contact there, and then that’s different also than with the, hey, what is that like for you when you think about that? Yeah, exactly, exactly, because presumably animal, many animals will probably have the first and lack the second. I think there’s a game changer with language on that. Yes, yes, and for example, just to be clear, there seems to be very good developmental empirical evidence experimentally based and also case study based that children are incapable of introspection until they’re about four years of age, even though they are clearly conscious. Now, I, being the weird, weird cognitive scientist I am, I actually recorded the first instances that were clear instances of my younger son being introspective, because when he was, you know, two to four kids have language, actually, that’s quite sophisticated. That’s right. You can ask them what’s going on in their head, and they’ll say things like blood, or, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right. They don’t have introspection. I remember when my younger son, he, we were driving along in the car, he was in the back seat, he was just coming in before, around there, and he said, oh, it’s snowing, but not outside, only in my head, right, and then there was another one when he came up to me, and he said, I have a reverse camera in my head. I’m thinking, what? What does that mean? And he said, and I asked him, he was getting the, and this, we know that this also takes language, he was getting auto-noetic memory, he was capable of time travel, he was capable of reversing and going back into the past. Interestingly, just as an anecdote, a side note, I should say, I asked him, does anybody else have the reverse camera? Oh, no, no. No way, man, this is new. Okay, so let’s remember, and this is a general lesson, this is why I introduce it, we’ve got to keep it throughout, that we shouldn’t confuse a couple of things. We shouldn’t confuse focal awareness with subsidiary awareness, we shouldn’t confuse consciousness with introspective self-consciousness. We have to keep all these things, and people slam these all together. Absolutely, that’s why MIND3, self-conscious introspection, is so different than MIND2, and if we don’t have the right language systems, then you would say, no, animals aren’t conscious. Well, if you mean, they’re not great at self-conscious retrospective and self-report, yeah, but do they feel pain and have A to T experiences? Yeah, that’s right, that’s right. Okay, so I think that’s very, very useful. Just again, so clarifying, clarifying, clarifying, and notice what we’re doing is all of these, all these explications of distinctions, all these distinctions, are each time we do this, we are gaining the increase in clarity because we are reliably and systematically reducing the potential for equivocation. This is not niggling. We have to do this correctly, or we will get it, we will get it wrong, right, we will get it wrong. Okay, now the second argument by Dresdky against Rosenthal is a little bit more interesting in terms of, it tells us more about what that intimacy condition might be. So Dresdky says, okay, well, if you’re doing this T of A, what that means is that all consciousness is consciousness as. It’s all, when you, we’ve already did this, you did Wittgenstein’s duck rabbit, all seeing is seeing as, seeing it as a duck or seeing it as a rabbit. All consciousness is consciousness as, which of course is, guess what, aspectualization. So aspectualization, bang, back on the table again without being properly explicated, without being foreground, without the discussion of adverbial qualia or all of this, but it’s here, it’s going to take a central role. And then Dresdky says, okay, so if Rosenthal is right, then, right, every conscious state is going to be aspectualized. And then he argues and says, but there doesn’t seem to be any aspect that’s necessary to any state of consciousness. And so let’s see, I could, I could be conscious of it as a duck, as a rabbit, as a black and white blob, as a smear, as the thing that Greg often refers to, right? No one, so, and then Dresdky says, but look, none of these aspects are necessary. And then he concludes, so aspectualization is not necessary. And since Rosenthal is committed to aspectualization, I have thereby refuted his theory. And Senior points out that’s a modal fallacy. The fact that no one particular aspect is necessary, that you cannot conclude from that, that no aspect is necessary. Let me give you an example. Okay, I’m talking about bodies, not matter, bodies. Okay, is everybody clear about that? So every body I encounter has a shape. But is any particular shape necessary to being a body? Like, do you have to be a rectangle to be a body? Nope. Do you have to be a sphere? You have to be, there is no shape that’s necessary. But does that lead me to the conclusion that shape is not a necessary feature of being a body? That’s a modal mistake. The fact that each one might be individually not necessary does not lead to the conclusion that the entire set can be absent. Okay, the category, right, exactly. Now notice what that shows you. It shows you, first of all, that aspectualization really can’t be separated from consciousness. And secondly, it’s the process of actual aspectualization, not the specific aspect that is actually central to consciousness. It derives us, this is a completely independent argument, right? But it leads to the same conclusion that the process, not a particular set of attributes revealed by a particular aspect, but it’s the process of aspectualization itself that’s necessary to consciousness. Now, what I want to suggest to you is that we should consider the aspectualization process as exactly the intimacy relation that is needed. That it turns unconscious co-variations into things ready to be mapped into potentially unconscious concepts, the way we’ve been talking about, and that is the process, that is the intimacy condition of consciousness. Why would I make that argument? Well, first of all, we’ve already, it’s independently motivated, it’s independently motivated by how aspectualization has come to the fore, but it’s also going to be motivated by a second argument, which, well, let’s take a look at, while always keeping the intimacy condition clearly in hand, let’s take a look at higher order thought theory. What is a thought? I mean, it’s a really vague term, it’s an equivocal term. So one thing that you might try is that higher order thoughts are beliefs, higher order thoughts are beliefs. So what T is of A is T is a belief about A. So I’m in some particular state, and then I get a belief about that state, and the belief about that state. And one of the advantages of that is belief is different from just conceptual relationship. So that might give you a little bit of wiggle room. The problem with that, of course, is we have unconscious beliefs about our beliefs, we already have that, and they remain unconscious. So, and this points to a lot of the differences between belief and consciousness. Our beliefs don’t seem to be processes that occur, they seem to be dispositions to behave. This is a classic argument made by Gilbert Ryle. So until I spoke it, I still believe it, but until I spoke it, right, it was in no way conscious to me, I believe that Africa is a continent. Now, I’ve had that belief all day. But that doesn’t mean I’ve been thinking it all day in the sense of Africa is a continent, Africa is a continent, Africa is a continent, or doing, sorting things into continents and putting Africa into the, like, I’ve been doing nothing with Africa and continents all day, right? And that nevertheless, I have the belief. So what is it to have the belief? Well, I mean, it’s a very problematic notion, but it seems like it’s like, if I have to categorize continents, I will put Africa into the category. If you ask me this question, I’ll answer yeah, right? And so beliefs aren’t in current, they’re not happenings, they’re conditional relations. But whatever the hell consciousness is, it is occurring. It is an occurring thing, right? Yes, absolutely. So one of the ways you might get around it is by saying, well, the belief isn’t the current, but this is occurring. But then how what the relationship between a non occurring state, an occurring state is such that the overall result is a current is also, you know, unclear. But you seem to be able to direct your consciousness in a way that you can’t direct your beliefs. There’s a voluntary aspect of consciousness. And I don’t need to belabor this with argument, because there’s a long standing tradition of a deep association between consciousness and free will. I’m not arguing for free will, I’m not claiming it exists, all I’m pointing to is there’s something about consciousness that leads people to believe consciousness is a self moving free thing. Your beliefs don’t function that way. Belief is not something you do. Pick a belief you’d like to have. I would like to have the belief, which and to believe something is to believe that it’s true. I would like to have the belief that everybody loves me. Okay, let’s do it. Let’s do it. I’m going to start believing it. I can say it to myself, everybody loves me, but I don’t believe it. I can imagine it. I can imagine all the people in the world. We love you, John. I can imagine I could desire it. I could fear it. I can hope it. But none of those things are the same thing as believing it. Belief doesn’t work them. In fact, I’m always unclear what is supposed to happen until evangelists ask me to believe. Believe. I sort of clench, it’s sort of like mental constipation. I sort of clench, what am I doing? I don’t know what I’m supposed to be doing. What they’re basically saying is stop criticizing, stop reflecting, and if you do all those things that will then cause you to come to a state of belief. So all of that being said, and there’s more, what I’m trying to point out is belief is just not the right kind of thing for consciousness. So we need something that’s much more of a process and that is in some important sense, self-organizing, dynamic, recursive. Right. And so I suggest to you that something that is a current definitely is something that is self-organizing and we already have independent arguments that it converts unconscious things into things that are ready for reason or ready for conceptualization, a bringing of an A and a T of A together is the process of aspectualization, the process of seeing through co-variations so that I now am aware of a particular aspect of the world in a way that makes it ready, poised for me to entertain concepts, conceptual problem-solving about it. And so I would propose to you that what we’re actually talking about in the intimacy condition is the process of aspectualization. Yeah. So let me see how this sits with you as a metaphor. Sure. Okay. So for me, one of the things that I sometimes use as a metaphor for how the brain, the basic structure of the brain is pulling its focus, is like a stadium. And each of the audience members, each of the fans is tracking a particular aspect of say the game that’s taking place. And there’s a particular frame that is constraining and orienting the key aspects of change. And then somehow the collective of that is harmonizing. So there are these, where they’re trying to track the particular elements. So if we put this into a little bit of a brain model, or at least, and obviously I’m being metaphorical here, but I want to be drawing the brain connection. If there’s a frequency of the fans that are tracking, that are tracking different aspects of change that are relevant, then that’s a way to bring the collective to map the A to T, it seems to me. Yes. And I’ll go one step further if we then bring this up into social psych with this analogy. What aspects of the game and how are they actually being attended to? And indeed, this will get into some mind free justifying, you probably know this. One of the earliest examples of social psych and perception was they looked at a football game that was particularly rough and brutal. They had two fans, I think it’s Dartmouth and Princeton, if memory serves, and they asked which team was by far the more cheating aggressors in the game. So who were the dirty players and who wasn’t the dirty players? Well, guess what? All the Princeton fans said those Dartmouth bastards, they were unbelievable. And they had all these penalties and our guys were just reacting. And of course you flip it around. So the frame of aspectualization if we start to think about what frames of mind are people looking through and how are they setting up to see the covariation across multiple levels, we can now start to see that pull. So I’m pulling the stadium idea of the brain into also. That’s good. Let’s pick up on that a little bit. That’s helpful. So first of all, again, Greg’s done this before and I want to bring it foregrounded. This aspectualization is a framing and it is a relevance realization. And notice a couple of things. So it’s going to be down the road. I’m going to say that when the aspectualization is, you know, we’re doing this readying for reason, readying for, but when the aspectualization actually affords for spectable knowing, I think that’s what’s going to be full-blown consciousness. And but notice what’s happening also, the perspectival knowing, so, you know, it was bound up with the participatory knowing of the observers. One group of people have, they identify right as Dartmouth, the other was it Plymouth? I think Princeton. Sorry Plymouth. I may be mistaken on this, but it doesn’t matter. No, no, it doesn’t matter. So their participatory knowing, their participatory knowing, the kind of identities they assume and the kind of identities they assign and the way, literally here, the agent arena relationship. I’m glad you picked that up. Yeah, I was like, oh, yeah. So the participatory knowing, right, it shapes the framing so that only certain kinds of perspectival knowing are sort of possible. And then that perspectival knowing, as Greg said, right, it is constraining the aspectualization. So only certain aspects are coming out. And that, of course, then affords what skills, right, people can be bring to bear and what skills they can acquire within that context. And that’s the procedural knowing. And all of this is happening in ways that seem to involve consciousness before we get to that, the propositional narrative, right? But then we would then nest them in layers. So now I say to my guy, you know, I’m there with my buddy from Dartmouth and did you see that? And he says, of course, I see that. Now we have a shared collective intelligence that those Princeton guys are this way. And then we frame our justifications, which frames our perspectival knowing, which frames our projected participation as fans into the system. So it’s that constant, you know, we can see that inter-relation across those various levels as to, you know, as to how two sides can watch the exact same game and come across. And of course, as a therapist, I see this in marriage all the time. Oh, my God, is this, you know, you hear one side like, oh, my God, how do they live with that person? You hear the other side and like, oh, my God, how do you live with that person? Right. So it’s so just the nested layers of this aspectualizing across these domains is a very, I think it’s a very, very powerful thing to understand the dynamic participatory relations that we are engaged in. I think that’s fantastic. And one of the ways, of course, you show the value of a scientific theory is not only its empirical adequacy, how can it explain the consensus, evidence and data? You also write something that argues for a theory. I’m not claiming this is a full blown scientific theory, but we’re working towards it, is the degree to which it is fruitful, the degree to which it makes things clear that were not clear before brings in new phenomena that could now be considered relevant evidence for the discussion of consciousness that might, you know, it’s less likely without this language that we would consider things happening in therapy as particularly relevant to understanding the nature and function of consciousness. But this language allows us to bridge, allows us to see things happening within the therapeutic context as well. So what is where we’ve gotten to? Because we’re in a kind of a very interesting place here. We were playing in, sorry, I keep running with it, we were playing in the Cartesian ballpark. Sorry, there’s a part of my mind. So, right, we were, and we’re playing, you know, solid, we’re going to do it with, you know, representational content of representational content. We hit this, you know, really thick problem. And so we put in the intimacy condition. We try to get clear about what the intimacy condition is. And lo and behold, we find that, right, in terms of responding to criticisms by Dretsky, and in terms of avoiding the things that are prohibited in the intimacy condition, we find ourselves zeroing in on the process of aspectualization as actually the best candidate. And, I mean, I hope people aren’t feeling this like a sneaky ninja jiu-jitsu move or something. But as we, in good faith, I was of good faith, tried to pursue this argument and the debate around it, we seem to have shifted to maybe it’s better to try and get consciousness out of the process of aspectualization rather than out of the content of our representations. Yes, absolutely. And I think that what, and I’ll just say also, I’m a, I, my, you know, there are different models of truth, of course, there’s foundationalism, there’s correspondence, there’s coherence. Whatever my genetic system got lined up, coherence is certainly something I find myself enormously interested in. And so for me, when I get really excited, when I take something, it coheres with a lot and it applies into these different domains. And it feels, does so in a way that’s supposed to be parsimonious and starts to create, you know, symphonic harmony between different domains. That is, and so that’s one of the reasons I like this so much is because that’s what happened to me as I listened to this through, I could then apply it, network stuff together across a wide variety of generalisms. So for me, that truth criterion is a particularly important one. So. Thank you for saying that, Craig. That’s helpful. I also want to return the favor and point out that Greg did something very, very smart because the analogy is also a seed analogy. That analogy is going, we’re going to ask you to remember it, remember the stadium analogy, because it’s a version of the analogy that’s at the core of Bernard Barr’s theory called the global workspace theory, which is one of the prominent cognitive scientific theory, and there’s a neuroscientific version of it with the Hain, a cognitive scientific and neuroscientific theory of consciousness, the global workspace theory. And it is a theory that is just to foreshadow, it’s a theory that is trying to answer the function, the function question, and it explicitly argues that the function of consciousness is relevance realization. So again, that’s a convergent argument that we’re going to be reaching towards, the relevance realization. It also is crucial in linking to working memory, which is crucial in intelligence and problem solving. And consciousness. Yes, we’ll come back to that argument, that relevance realization seems to be very crucial for working memory, especially the work of my colleague at UFT, Lynn Hasher, and that working memory has a lot to do with general intelligence, as Greg just said, but of course, there seems to be deep connections between consciousness and working memory, especially if consciousness gives us some capacity for counterfactuality, and all kinds of things like that. What’s interesting about all of this is the connections that we can make between consciousness, working memory, and general intelligence, and between different theories about the nature of consciousness, working memory, and intelligence. So that’s really, really powerful. And if one’s intelligence like mine or ends towards coherence, all of a sudden you start seeing music. So that’s sort of got us to an interesting place. And now that’s going to bring up a discussion, another distinction in the literature. And we’ll come back to it. It’s a somewhat controversial distinction, but it’s a powerful one that many people think is useful, distinctions are justified by their use, right, because they have to do with deciding the relative relevance of things. So Ned Block famously made a distinction between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness. And access consciousness is basically that things are conscious, and again, I don’t even know if he’s aware of some of this historical language, but access consciousness is when things are poised, when there are mental contents that are poised, they have been readied for reason, or what we’re saying, they’ve been readied for this more counterfactual, intelligent behavior. Simulation. Yeah, simulation. Right? Simulation, yeah. Yeah, sorry, I said simulation, didn’t I? Oh, I heard stimulation, whatever. Oh, well, I might have said it, but what was in my mind was simulation. Okay. And Greg and I will talk about how that’s probably an active simulation, rather than any kind of propositional or pictorial or something like that. And we’ll come back to that later. So some of you might be getting, ah, right, just wait, a fully embodied 4E version of simulation is what we’re going to argue for. And that’s not that uncommon, by the way. But that’s down the road. So let’s get back to what’s going on with Block. Right? And notice what we’ve got here. We’ve got this readiness for reason. And again, well, what does that look like? Well, he calls this access consciousness because it’s like you’re bringing, things are being poised to be brought into working memory and used. And what’s a good candidate for that? Well, a good candidate for that is this very process we’ve been talking about this aspectualization, this getting things ready, right for their categorical identity, all that stuff that we’ve been talking about. In a related manner, and they argue a lot. I’m going to go a bit on access consciousness before I go back to phenomenal consciousness. In a related manner, Michael Tai has argued for sort of a way of talking about consciousness. And he and Block seem to argue around this point of poisonous and access. And it’s not clear if it’s a deep difference that the rest of us should care about, or if it’s the narcissism of small differences. So- Well, welcome to the Academy. So I’m not going to, this is not primarily a scholastic endeavor, Greg and I are engaged in. So I’m going to put that intricacy aside. I want to just briefly go over what Tai says. So Tai says that when we’re talking about the functional nature of conscious, from time of consciousness, he has what he calls panic. It’s an acronym. So what turns an unconscious state into a conscious state? It’s poised in the way we’ve just been talking about. It’s readied, right? It’s being, I would argue, or I think you would argue with me, it’s being aspectualized, demonstrative reference, all that stuff’s going on. It’s being readied, right? For categorization, conceptualization, potentially counterfactual simulation, et cetera, all of that. So it’s abstract. Now that’s going to be something I’m going to come back to. You’ll see why in a sec. It’s non-conceptual. So it’s non-conceptual. It’s intentional content. So the difference between unconscious content and conscious content is panic. Now, of course, they both share content, so that falls out. The fact that it’s intentional, that it’s about something, that is just to say that the content is in some sense plausibly representational or at least intentional. And again, the fact that it’s plausible that many people would see unconscious representations as having that. So I don’t think the I and the C of panic do a lot of the distinguishing work. They’re needed there because if you don’t have I and C, the rest doesn’t work. So if you’ll allow me a bit of a Greek pun, pan is doing all of the work. So poised- Get that man a mic. Okay, poised- abstract, non-conceptual. So the problem with abstract is the fact that it’s also non-conceptual. Now, we can talk about non-conceptual because we’ve got a non-conceptual thing going on with all of the aspectualization and the fencing and the adverbial, right? All that stuff. So that’s okay. But normally when we talk about abstract, we talk about something that is higher on a taxonomic order. So vehicle is more abstract than car, which is more abstract than Mustang, which is more abstract than my old Mustang. Right, right, right. And so I move up. So now, but that taxonomies are precisely conceptual structures. So what does non-conceptual abstractness look like? So here is a proposal. We can’t get it out of propositional content because it’s non-conceptual. So the abstractness has to be procedural in nature. Well, what would procedural abstractness means? And here’s where I’m giving a proposal. I think procedural abstractness is generalizability. The degree to which I can apply a procedure across a wider diversity of context is the degree to which it is procedurally abstract. And so what we need is a kind of poisedness that is that kind of generalized procedure. And what seems to be one of the most domain general procedures of consciousness? Well, aspectualization. Aspectualization. No matter where we go, if I’m going to do any particular representational content, I first have to do the aspectualization that will get me into the place in which the conceptualization can then occur. So I think that access to consciousness, like just again making a convergent argument, Locke and from Ty, can be understood again in this very general process, which I think is an instantiation of what I think is one of the most procedurally general things we have, which is our capacity for relevance realization. So what I’m giving is a convergent argument that access consciousness is basically doing this aspectualization function, this higher order relevance realization. What I’m going to argue in fact is aspectualization is basically, and we already did it with the salience tagging, relevance is becoming salience, where salience is relevance to either, if you want to talk structurally, relevance to working memory, or if you want to talk functionally, it’s relevance to its relevance within perspectival node. Right. So we’re going to come back to all of that. And I’ll say also, so from a behavioral investment, so I’m always, so I’m embedding this in the whole organism, that’s why I love forward cognition, and why I love relevance realization is because what does the organism need to do to invest? It needs to know what is and what it might be able to create, to make, to be. So it is in the process all the way through, of like, okay, where am I, and what might be possible as I invest, and so that dual-sided element of realization that you have, is like, okay, I got to tech what is, and then what can I realize with it, and that goes so deep into the structure. Right, and both of those stages hit the problem of combinatorial explosion. They frame and constrain, and allow all the way down through the scale in a fractal sort of way, as far as I’m concerned. Yeah, exactly, exactly, exactly. So I mean, I have a lot more on this, but what I’ve tried to do is make plausible the idea that perhaps we should try and build consciousness, at least accept consciousness, out of aspectualization. Now, what about phenomenal consciousness? Well, phenomenal consciousness is the home of the adjectival qualia, right, and if there’s controversy about what it is, and what it might be, Ned Block has what he calls sort of a mental paint analogy. It’s sort of a mental paint that attaches to things, and it’s irreducible to conceptual content, it’s irreducible to functionality. Like I said, it’s if that mapping is correct, that sounds like adjectival qualia to me, and that means that it’s not clear that it’s necessary or sufficient for consciousness. I also worry on the other end of making it completely non-functional, makes it epiphenomenal, which is going to be very problematic. Right, so that’s why I like to, I do like this kind of idea a little bit, and then I love saw the access blocks distinction here. So if we go back to what you know, my intuition at least, is that pleasure and pain are flashes of paint across the nervous system. That then try to orient the whole brain approach of void, and so that’s the early, and then it spreads off of there, and then you’re getting this access conscious witnessing system. That’s good, Greg. We’ve got a couple minutes, let’s play with that. I mean, we should try and do a little bit of dialogus in the midst of all of this, right? So let me play with that a little bit. So I mean, of course, pain and pleasure are salient tigers, but your point is they’re not just salient tigers, because things can be salient without being painful or pleasurable. So I agree with you there, but it’s interesting because pain and pleasure are less distinct, which is your point. They’re procedurally abstract in the way we’ve been talking about. They generalize across many domains in a way that red and even red and greenness generalize. And so maybe are they part of an initial procedural categorization, like approach, avoid, which, right, right. And so, wow, it’s neat because then it’s getting really right at the level between sort of salience and the, if you’ll allow me, sort of proto-adjectival qualia, right? Yes. It’s right in that great area. Is that what you’re suggesting? 100%. So right, these are nature signals to approach and avoid. They’re nature signals to approach and avoid. So, and then that then basically is sort of like, so for me, what I call the pleasure pain parallel fitness principle, okay, so there’s a positive and negative correlation of energy investment associated with survival and reproductive success. And then you get embedded in that as the capacity for behavioral investment repertoires get more and more sophisticated, more and more flexible. It goes from fixed action patterns and reflexive withdrawal systems to coordinated guidance towards particular outcomes that are much more flexible and then feedback on your consequences, okay. And then you get feedback on consequences. You then have, bing, pleasure pain splashing across the nervous system, okay. And then a capacity to specialize around that and then all of a sudden be guided by that increasingly sophisticated smart ways. Right, that’s cool. So, right, right. So, let me try and do this phenomenologically. You have like, you have some basic here nowness, togetherness, the adverbial thing and you’ve got salient. And then what I’m sort of picturing in my mind, I don’t even know if this is right, is you get sort of a specification of salience, right? It’s still not, it’s not sort of located, it’s not a property of an object yet, right? Something being painful is not a property of any particular thing, right? It’s a specialization of salience that there’s a qualitative change there. That’s interesting. That’s interesting. It’s right on the border. Yeah, right. Well, so here’s another way of framing it, okay. So, in terms of the dynamic feedback loop of what I would call the whole of phenomenological knowing, okay, which is going to be procedural, perspectival, and participatory, right? What I did is I constructed what’s called the PME loop, okay. The PME is the perception. That’s going to then create the aspectualization and the integration will be higher up in the animal kingdom of the integration of the adjectival into at by adverbial. So, we’re now seeing through and we have the, and then that’s referenced against your motivational state of approach avoid, right? Right. Okay, so now I have a, I’m hungry, I want to eat this thing, and I want to avoid being eaten over here, right? So, I have an approach template to eat this, okay, and an avoid template to eat that, to be eaten by that. So, and just to even as I’m like, I’m camping, I get hungry, I know my sandwich is over there, right? So, then all of a sudden I’m like, oh, I’m hungry. I’m going to then organize my investment, all right, to reduce the discrepancy between where I am and to make salient that path of investment. As I do that and I get in there, I found, oh, here’s the sandwich that I want, I get more and more pleasure affect as I reduce the discrepancy to my goal. So, I start getting the jolt there that says reinforce and do more of that, okay. Then all of a sudden I get a bear pops up, all right. We’ll say a bear pops up. Now all of a sudden I have an image of getting eaten. I’ll have an idea of that bear moving towards me, okay, which then activates all sorts of avoidance, fear-based motivation. I back up and tell, hightail it out of the car, right. So, I’m in a dynamic relation between constantly creating perceptions, referencing them against goal states, and having jolts of emotion to energize myself accordingly. Okay, so let’s pick up on that. That’s good. Let’s go the other end though. Let’s see the paramecium. The paramecium approaches and avoids, but I’m not quite sure we could attribute pain and pleasure to it. It came out in your example because you did that, you know, you did the improvement of optimal grip, the reduction of discrepancy, because pain and pleasure are a specification of salience across time that affords learning, right. And so that, again, we’re bringing in intelligence. So, pain and pleasure then, like I said, I hadn’t thought about this, but your point is really cool. They’re fascinating. They sort of hover between adictival and adverbial qualia, right, and what they’re doing is they’re opening up salience to being specified across time so that learning and flexible response is possible. Is that a fair representation? Absolutely. I also think that they sit right in that weird space of realization, that they’re detecting what is and orienting what ought to be so that they have that energy to create, really, I mean, we as lived organisms, we sit in a nest of is-ought, right. We have to do that. And so I see it as that it yokes that stuff together across the, you know. That’s fantastic. Well, that was all the content, no pun intended, that I wanted to get across for today. I think you made some excellent progress. What did we do? Well, we saw that the higher order theories seem to converge back towards aspectualization, and then we’ve talked about, you know, how that also now involves shifting from relevance to salience. And then we did some discussion about access versus phenomenal. And again, we seem to get, we seem to really thicken up access, so it did a lot of the work that is usually attributed to phenomenal consciousness. And then we did something really interesting. We speculated about sort of the emergence of adjectival qualia out of adverbial processing via, you know, pain and pleasure and how they seem to be, well, at least right now, this sort of specification of salience across time that affords learning and the improvement behavior. And so that has all been, I think, tremendously fruitful and wonderful. So thank you very much again, Greg. Thank you very much. And that last move, that last move with pain and pleasure, thank you for bringing that in. I hadn’t brought that in. In my thinking before, that was very, very, very, very insightful, very helpful. So thank you very much. Happy to do some, man. The split between adjectival, as you know, and adverbial. So if we we can harmonize and create coherence, well, that’s what dialog goes. Okay, I’m gonna wrap us up for today. And we’ll see all of you next time on the next meeting on Tangling the World Nod of Consciousness. Take care, everyone.